The intentional stance | Kind, A (2004), in Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind, E. Hochstein (ed.) May 2004.

Three strategies for predicting behavior:

  • Physical stance
  • Design stance
  • Intentional stance

Where 'behavior' is taken in the broadest sense possible, "such that the movement of an inanimate object-e.g., the turning of a windmill-counts as behavior."

Prediction is linked here to explanation: "We use them to predict and thereby to explain the behavior of the entity in question."

Once you move down above three stances, your predictions become "riskier" in a way, because the assumptions made are greater.

However, moving from the physical- to the design- and intentional stance, you gain predictive power.

Physical stance

"To predict the behavior of a given entity according to the physical stance, we use information about its physical constitution in conjunction with information about the laws of physics."

E.g. the answer to the question why water freezes at zero degrees Celcius is given from a physical stance.

Design stance

"When we make a prediction from the design stance, we assume that the entity in question has been designed in a certain way, and we predict that the entity will thus behave as designed." (Kind)

"Design-stance prediction, when applicable, is a low-cost, low-risk shortcut, enabling me to finesse the tedious application of my limited knowledge of physics." (Dennett 1996)

The design stance is thus already riskier, because it makes two assumptions:

  1. the entity is in fact design
  2. the entity will perform as designed, i.e. without malfunctioning.

Example: when you press the 'on'-button of your computer, you predict that the computer will boot up because that is how it was designed.

Despite making assumption, this type of reasoning has a lot of predictive power whilst being very efficient, because we do not need any knowledge of the inner workings of the computer.

Imagine having to explain why your computer turns on when you push the start button from a physical stance: complicated, inefficient, and you need to know a lot about computers. This is clearly also not how we approach this on a daily basis. However, we do resort to a physical explanation when the assumptions of the design stance are broken, e.g. when the 'on'-button no longer works, we do have to start thinking about the underlying physical components to explain this.

So it is also good to point out that these stances do not exclude each other.

The design stance also works fine for biological entities! We can predict that a hart will pump blood without understanding much of the hart! Why, it's "designed" to function like that (does not imply intelligent design, of course).

Intentional stance

"When making predictions from this stance, we interpret the behavior of the entity in question by treating it as a rational agent whose behavior is governed by intentional states. (Intentional states are mental states such as beliefs and desires which have the property of 'aboutness,' that is, they are about, or directed at, objects or states of affairs in the world. (...) )"

Can be decomposed into four steps:

  1. "Decide to treat a certain object X as a rational agent"
  2. "Determine what beliefs X ought to have, given its place and purpose in the world"
    • "Dennett (1981) suggests the following general rule as a starting point: 'attribute as beliefs all the truths rel... [ unreadable ] system 's interests (or desires) that the system's experience to date has made available'"
    • If I see someone standing in front of a red barn, I can attribute the belief to that person that she beliefs the barn is read.
    • Q: To what extent does this depend on a similarity between her and my experience? Can I do is because I can imagine how it would be if I were instead standing in front of the red barn?
  3. Determine what desires X ought to have.
    • "attribute desires for things a system believes to be good for it" (Dennett 1981)
    • "attribute desires for things a system believes to be best means to other ends it desires" (Dennett 1981)
  4. "on the assumption that X will act to satisfy some of its desires in light of its beliefs, predict what X will do"

Example: "adopting the intentional stance is for most purposes the most efficient and powerful way (if not the only way) to predict and explain what a well design chess-playing computer will do."

We can predict and explain the behavior of a chess computer without any knowledge of its program design (i.e. algorithms) or physical design.

Dennett's interpretism: between instrumentalism and realism

Dennett has often made an additional claim about the intentional stance: "that the intentionality of a creature wholly consists in its behavior being well-predicted by our adoption of the intentional stance towards it."

all there is to being a true believer is being a system whose behaviour is reliably predictable via the intentional strategy, and hence all there is to really and truly believing that p (for any proposition p) is being an intentional system for which p occurs as a belief in the best (most predictive) interpretation." (Dennett 1981)"

This "interpretism" is a difficult middle ground between instrumentalism and realism.

Realism: intentional states are inner states of the system causing behavior.

Instrumentalist: ascribing these intentional states are useful fictions.

Interpretism: A system really has a particular intentional state "when the best overall interpretation of that system's behavior says that the organism has that belief or desire."

"For the intentional stance, we detect certain patterns that, although partly constituted by our own reactions to them, are objective. But because these real patterns are not wholly determinate, the possibility of interpretive gaps will always remain."

What is the result of these interpretive gaps?

there could be two different systems of belief attribution to an individual that differed substantially in what they attributed-even in yielding substantially different predictions of the individual's future behavior-and yet where no deeper fact of the matter could establish that one was a description of the individual's real beliefs and the other not.

So you see that on the one hand this position is determined on the observer and has subjectivisic undertones, while at the same time maintaining that beliefs discovered through the intentional stance are objective phenomena.

The intentional stance requires a "delicate balancing act on the matter of the observer-relativity of attributions of belief and other intentional states." (Dennett 1987)