The Quine-Duhem thesis
We cannot decide a priori on what is a relevant representation structure:
Encountered in Haselager-Cognitive_Science_Folk_Psychology_The_Right_Frame_of_Mind.md (p. 124):
On the basis of the Quine-Duhem thesis, Fodor argues that one cannot once and for all localize the class of data relevant to the fixation of a belief or the confirmation of a scientific hypothesis (Fodor, 1983, p.108-109). Quine argued that the first dogma of empiricism, i.e. that there is a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, has to be rejected since there is no non-circular way to flesh out the notion of analyticity. Because of that the second, reductionist dogma fails as well; the confirmatory instances of a statement cannot be known a priori (Quiene, 1951/1980, p.40-41). The consequences of assuming that there is no analytic-synthetic distinction is confirmational holism. Our knowledge of 'what confirms what' is a posteriori and contingent (Fodor & Lepore, 1992, p.37-38). Therefore, the endeavour to make a priori or general decisions on structure, on what is relevant to what, is an impossible one. (124)
The context of this discussion is to find the right knowledge structure for a connectionist network that is supposed to model how humans do common-sense inference.
TODO:
Read up more on the thesis itself. I currently have no time.