J. Backman -- Logocentrism and Gathering Logos.
Research in Phenomology 42 (2012) 67-91
(Greek letters have to be repaired, prevent compiling with pandoc at the moment)
Abstract:
Derrida's deconstructive strategy of reading texts can be understood as a way of highlighting the irreducible plurality of discursive meaning that undermines the traditional Western "logocentric" desire for an absolute point of reference. While his notion of logocentrism was modeled on Heidegger's articulation of the traditional ontotheological framework of Aristotelian metaphysics, Derrida detects a logocentric remnant in Heidegger's own interpretation of gathering (Versammlung) as the basic movement of λόγος, discursiveness. However, I suggest that Derrida here touches upon a certain limit of deconstruction. As Derrida himself points out, the "decentering" effect of deconstruction does not simply abolish the unifying and focalizing function of discourse. Insofar as deconstruction involves reading and interpreting, it cannot completely evade narrative focalization. Rather, both Heidegger and Derrida can be understood as addressing the radical contextuality of all discursive centers and focal points as well as the consequent impossibility of an ultimate and definitive metanarrative.
Dit is een interessant argument. Ik zou ook in mijn artikel duidelijk moeten maken dat Derrida en Heidegger wellicht dicht bij elkaar liggen, en dat de eenheid van Heidegger's Geschick wellicht ook iets weg heeft van een narratief focaal punt. Ook interessant om op te merken dat Derrida niet pretendeert dat hij
TODO: vind een duidelijke zin die aangeeft dat een focaal punt niet wordt afgeschaft, maar dat Derrida veeleer dat motief tussen aanhalingstekens plaatst en duidt: nl. dat het geen teleologie of eschatologie impliceert.
Tot p. 72: Uiteenzetting logocentrism en ontotheologie
References for Heidegger's description of @ontotheology :
- “Die seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des Nihilismus” [1944–46], in Nietzsche, Vol 2, 6th ed. (Stuttgart: Neske, 1998), 311–15
- translated by Frank A. Capuzzi as “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being,” in Nietzsche, Vol. 4: Nihilism, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), 207–10;
- “Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik” [1956–57], in Identität und Differenz, 12th ed. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2002), 31–67;
- translated by Joan Stambaugh as “The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics,” in Identity and Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 42–74.
Heidegger's central thesis on the metaphysics of presence:
According to Heidegger’s central thesis, the ideal of being inherent in the tradition is constant presence (beständige or ständige Anwesenheit, for Heidegger, the implicit sense of Aristotle’s οὐσία, “substance” or “entity”)8 in the sense of a determinate and self-identical accessibility to intuitive awareness (νοῦς); hence Derrida’s idiom “metaphysics of presence.” (69)
Reference 8: - See, for example, Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit [1927], 18th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2001), 25–26 [hereafter, SZ]; translated by Joan Stambaugh as Being and Time, revised by Dennis J. Schmidt (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2010), 24; - Einführung in die Metaphysik [1935/53], 6th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1998), 147, 148, 154 [herafter, EM]; translated by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt as Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven, CO: Yale University Press, 2000), 206, 207, 216.
@logocentrism by Heidegger and Derrida:
The term “logocentrism” was originally coined by the philosopher of life Ludwig Klages to designate the Platonic tendency to subordinate the dynamic unity of life or “soul” to “spirit.” [9] For Derrida, it denotes the (no less Platonic) tendency to subordinate the full material reality of discourse and language to λόγος in the sense of an ideal “logical” meaning-structure—and, ultimately, to subordinate all discursive structures to a “transcendental signified,” to λόγος in the sense of an ultimate central “meaning” that would no longer refer to anything other than itself and would thus provide a self-sufficient and permanently accessible center for discursive chains of references. [10] (69, 70)
Ref 9: Ludwig Klages, Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele, vol. 1: Leben und Denkvermögen (Leipzig: Barth, 1929), XXI, 121, 129–30, 144, 217, 232, 374, 472, 511. Cf. Egon Pöhler, “Logozentrisch,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer, vol. 5 (Basel: Schwabe & Co., 1980), 502–3.
Ref 10: J. Derrida, De la grammatologie (Paris: Minuit, 1967), 71–72; translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak as Of Grammatology (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 49.
Backman's basic argument here is to draw a comparison between Derrida's logocentrism and Heidegger's ontotheology, as two names for basically the same thing:
Logocentrism is the desire of discursive thought to transcend discursive structures in order to arrive at a point at which the basic contextualizing movement of discourse—the endless “deferral” (différance) in which meanings always turn out to be constituted by references to other meanings, those meanings in turn referring to others—would cease and be consummated in an immediate disclosure of the non-referential and undeferred presence of an absolute meaning.12 In this sense, “logocentrism” is another name for “ontotheology.” (70)
My addition: But of course, Derrida's term logocentrism includes various logocentric signs present in Heidegger's work, whereas Heidegger would consider himself moving beyond ontotheology.
Similarly, vocalized speech can be regarded as a material representation of an even more original “speech,” the voiceless λόγος of thought described in Plato’s Sophist, in which the soul communicates ideal meanings to itself immediately, without recourse to a material medium. (70-1)
This “internal λόγος” is typically conceived of as being independent of linguistic context; conventionality and context-specificity are introduced into discourse together with the materiality of vocal and written signs.15 Such phonocentrism is, for Derrida, the basic matrix underlying the distinction between material sign and ideal meaning—the signifier and signified of Saussurean structural linguistics—which in turn makes a “transcendental” signified, i.e., a final, absolutely universal referent, a plausible ideal. (71)
- Overzicht stappen artikel
(1) I begin by arguing that in spite of their heterogeneous, suggestive, and aporetic character, Derrida's readings of Heidegger do have a certain focal point---namely, the question concerning the very possibility of focal points, in other words, the problem of the unity and plurality of discursive meaning.
(2) This problem is seen to be especially prominent in Derrida's detection of an inherently "logocentric" move in Heidegger's interpretation of the Presocratic concept of λόγος as "gathering" (Versammlung) and in the latter's constant reaffirmation of the primacy of gathering, concentration, and unity over dispersal and multiplicity.
(3) Even though Heidegger does not simply adopt or endorse the Greek concept of λόγος as such but, rather, transforms it in a decidedly non-Greek and postmetaphysical manner, he does indeed retain a certain notion of the unifying and focalizing function of discourse and language. This, I suggest, is the only kind of "logocentrism" that can properly be attributed to Heidegger. However, I maintain that what is at stake here is a transformation, not an uncritical continuation, of the "ontotheological" logocentrism of traditional metaphysics.
(4) Turning to Derrida's concession that a certain logocentrism is "philosophically necessary" and unavoidable, I will end by asking to what extent and at what cost the deconstructive abstention from looking for unifying centers of discursive meaning, or the active "dispersion" of such centers, is feasible. In other words, how far can the deconstruction of logocentrism be taken? Are not deconstructive readings, in the end, committed to a certain minimal "logocentrism," a narrativity that no longer claims the status of metanarrativity?
*
1 Narrative Unity: Heidegger's Unthought
73: Verschil in methodologie tussen Heidegger en Derrida. Heidegger plaatst teksten in de grotere samenhang van de geschiedenis van de metafysica (totdat alles is opgenomen in het meesternarratief van de gehele geschiedenis van het zijn?)
vs. Hegel
74. vs Hegel: Heidegger's historische denken impliceert een relatatieve teleologie en het einde van een particuliere geschiedenis (ipv. een absolutum)
"The Heideggerian metanarrative is thus more modest than Hegel's: it only incorporates the specific history of a specific situation (its own), from the point of view of what, in that situation, is emerging as something excluded by the tradition as it shows itself when considered retrospectively from that situation."
76: Quote from Derrida: "What if Heidegger's unthought . . . was not one, but plural? What if his unthought was believing in the uniqueness or the unity of the unthought? I won't make a critique out of my uneasiness, because I do not believe that this gesture of gathering is avoidable. It is always productive, and philosophically necessary. But I will continue to wonder whether the very "logic" of desistance, as we will continue to follow it, should not lead to some irreducible dispersion of this "unique central question." Derrida, Désistance
77: De 'analyse' van Derrida waarop het eenheidsmoment in Heidegger zichtbaar blijft:
"From this perspective, Heidegger's main traditionalism would be his methodological conviction that exposing certain inherent limitations of the metaphysical tradition could disclose a unified postmetaphysical perspective upon a single dimension disregarded by metaphysics. It is in this sense that the movement of transgressing metaphysics allegedly holds Heidegger within the confines of metaphysics."
Derrida's probleem met Geschichte en Geschick
Geschick, Envoi, Destiny, History
"Derrida becomes increasingly sensitive to certain traditional commitments of the Heideggerian notion of the epochal history of metaphysics, in which every phase in the progressive unfolding of being as a certain kind of presence and in the corresponding withholding (Greek: ἐπέχειν) of a certain kind of non-presence is referred to a central "destiny" or "dispatch" (Geschick, envoi) of being.30 Indeed, Derrida is suspicious of the very notion of "history" as such, insofar as it implies, in the literal sense of the Greek ἱστορία, a teleologically structured narrative in which all elements ultimately come together."
De vraag die op het spel staat: waarom kent post-metafysisch denken nog steeds een centraal perspectief? Bij Heidegger: dat van het zijn in een zijnsgeschiedenis.
Hoofdstuk 2
78: Passage over de spanning die Derrida ontwaart in Heidegger m.b.t. logocentrism en de metafoor van de stem van het Zijn. M.b.t. ontologische differentie.
[Bij behandeling van 'de stem van het Zijn' is het misschien goed aandacht te besteden aan Heidegger's moeilijke verhouding tot metaforen]
78: In de Geslecht essays behandeld Derrida Versammlung, gathering, maar zonder te doen alsof dat een eenduidige betekenis zou hebben in Heidegger's werk. Versammlung is, als begrip binnen Heidegger's oevre geen focaal punt [al staat de hele notie van een focaal punt wel op het spel in dit concept en Derrida's verhouding ertoe]
80: Geslecht 4. Aandacht voor Heidegger's interpretatie van logos bij Heraclitus. Zijn is logos.
- Herbepaling Derrida's notie van "logocentrisme" in Geslecht 4: Heidegger's Ear. Korte bespreking van Derrida's bespreking van Heraclitus.
81: VOORBIJ DERRIDA. Derrida vooronderstelt dat het verenigende verzamelen dat logos is (in Heidegger/Derrida) niet uniek en singulier kan zijn. Het singuliere kan volgens Derrida niet een eenheid zijn, omdat dat herhaling impliceert (waardoorheen die eenheid bestaat, zo is de suggestie althans). Maar Backman wil argumenteren dat de "gathered unity of logos" wel gedacht kan worden als een *singuliere eenheid. *
Hoofdstuk 3: The singular unity of the postmetaphysical Logos
81. Vertalingen van Logos als Lese en andere betekenissen --> Logos, reading, gathering.
82. Reading as gathering.
Heidegger (in SuZ) over zijn interpretatie van logos bij Aristoteles. De apophantische functie.
- De iets-als-iets structuur van logos betekent zowel dat het elementen verbindt en tegelijkertijd uit elkaar houdt. "A collecting that preserves apartness and articulation"
83. ! Twee verschillende maar verbonden betekenisniveaus van logos bij Heidegger. Enerzijds in algemene zin als "gathering", maar ook in de concretere zin van spreken, dat ook een linguistiek verzamelen is. De narratieve kwaliteit: het type eenheid dat een verhaal heeft.
The Heraclitean λόγος, Heidegger maintains, is not primarily a human faculty, but rather simply the formation of unified meaning from differentiated elements through a selective and collecting gathering. However, the other central meaning of λόγος and λέγειν, "saying, speaking out, telling," is neither secondary nor derivative. On the contrary, λόγος is in itself a discursive and linguistic gathering; even more, it is the very essence of discursiveness and language. In an important and revealing passage, Heidegger tells us that λόγος is also the basic narrative structure of discursiveness, i.e., the formation of consistent and "logical" narrative meaning in the form of a "story" or "tale" (Sage), which precisely presupposes a selective placing-together or "collocation" (Lege) of narrative elements.
84: Logos oorspronkelijk nog niet concreet taal. Taal eerder een expressie van logos.
Vanuit SuZ. Onderscheid tussen logos / discourse en concrete talen.
Spanning [ik denk dat dit dezelfde spanning is die Gert-Jan aankaart op het einde van zijn stuk over Language as Gathering] tussen logos in algemene zin, die tegelijkertijd inherent als linguistisch/narratief wordt gedacht (dat stelt Backman adhv Heidegger citaat). Als concrete talen niet simpelweg een derivatief zijn van een algemene logos, hoe kan dan de logos dan nog echt als universeel gedacht worden aangezien er meerdere talen zijn, die historisch gesitueerd zijn.
85 Universeel vs Heidegger's historiciteit
HOOFDSTUK 4:
Bespreking Derrida's reserveringen bij logos als "gathering" en Backmans tegenwerpingen
86 Gathering en de overgang naar het andere begin. Suggestie: aanwezigheid wordt een spoor.
87.
89. Appropriatie van Heidegger's denken in termen van Derrida, maar juist om te argumenteren dat gathering te verzoenen is met wat Derrida doet. Er is altijd een (narratieve) gathering, er is een centrum, maar dat is altijd het centrum van een specifieke context.
90: wederom: niet de afschaffing van de notie van een centrum, maar juist de notie van centrum als gefixeerd. Het centrum als functie.
91: thought and experience function by gathering their different elements around a focal point. This is also what we understand by the narrative function of discourse: "relating," in the sense of narrating, literally means establishing a link between diverse past events and the present of narration, gathering them around the present. Moreover, just as Derrida emphasizes the "philosophical necessity" of the gesture of gathering, he is now emphasizing the "indispensability" of the narrative function. This means, perhaps, that there always already are narratives. The discursive nature of meaningfulness entails that meaning is always "told" meaning, i.e., integrated into a framework with a "point" or center that binds together the multiple references to a context.
David Wood suggests: "[p]erhaps what we think of as the privilege of the same, of unity, of presence, is not the privilege of some autonomous value, but the privilege of a certain minimal framing."82