The Transformation of the Sense of Dasein in Heidegger's Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)
Authors:
I read this text a few years ago. This summary simply digitalizes highlighted areas of that reading with comments placed them.
"If it "is" indeed nothing, it is at the same time everything: it is the very operation whereby the things themselves come to be, the very operation whereby "there is" (something rather than nothing)." (221).
"Can we ever speak of being itself, if being is such as to escape the structure of selfhood altogether? Since it is neither an individuated thing nor an essence, neither a substance nor an idea, it cannot be treated as a noun or made the subject of a proposition." (p. 222)
What is the proposition of being?:
"Yet, despite all these difficulties, if the word "being" is not the emptiest and most general of words, if something is really at issue in it, it will need to be made the object of a certain discourse and take the appearance of a proposition, albeit at the cost of a radical transformation of the very nature of the proposition. yet this discourse will need to unfold from the very matter for which the word stands, the proposition will be of being, that is, belonging to being, in the strictest and most literal sense. What, then, is the proposition of being?" (p. 223)
"Sein is a verb. And an infinitive. And verbs, particularly in the infinitive, refer to events, first and foremost." (223)
Being as event must be distinguished from ousia and quidditas, but also from the sense of "accident" as it presupposes a independent substance. (223)
"The thinking of being as event will require a reversal of this order, so that substances themselves will come to be seen as happenings, as accidents, as it were, of a primordial and forever recurring event, which itself cannot be assimilated with another more primordial and superior form of substantiality." (223)
N.B. the wordplay in "accident" here.
In a phrasing such as es regnet, "the taking place is itself the subject".
Towards answering the question what is the proposition of being?
"Here, the subject is the verb, and the verb is pure event. Such, then, is the way in which being itself must be heard and experienced: as an event, as something that is happening or taking place, yet not on the basis of something other than itself - a pure event, a subject-event"
What makes the event "being" special is that "it designates not so much a particular event, an event alongside other events, but the event of all events, or better said perhaps, the eventness or eventuality of all events."
How to find a term for this event character?
"Events escape the grasp of metaphysics, for they are without essence: their very essence is to not obey the law of essence understood as quiddity. Now if Heidegger does indeed deploy the classical determination of essence (Wesen) anew, rescuing it from its metaphysical appropriation, it is only at the cost of a formidable and daring transformation that equates the operation of essence with movement as such, verbalizing it, de-reifying it, allowing it to coincide with the very movement of unfolding, with being as such; it is only, and ironically, to overturn the notion of essence so that, from being the first and highest substance, it becomes a pure event, being as becoming or happening" (224)
Essence of being as the negation of contingency: "Essences, on the other hand, at least in their classical formulation as quiddity, are equated with the being of a thing precisely as the negation of the becoming or the eventuality that is implicated in the thing, which is then relegated to the status of contingency, accidentality." (225)
So Sein needs to be qualified as "a wesen or a Wesung (and not a Wesen), a Geben (and not some thing given)." (225)
Da-sein: "Moving away from addressing beings in their whatness, Heidegger addresses them in tersm of their being-there, that is, in terms of the "there is" that exceeds the mere physical contours of the individuated thing and that this this is" (226).
"It will have pointed in the direction of the "there is" that sustains and traverses every phenomenon, in the direction of the phenomenality of all phenomena, but with this remarkable characteristic that this phenomenality is itself non-phenomenal, beyond phenomenality. Heidegger's phenomenology **is a phenomenology of the inapparent **" (226).
"Heidegger will have never been in a position to separate completely the question of the how of being, which does not immediately call for an individual qualification of this how, with the question of man as the "proper" name of being. (227)"
"As if, as Heidegger explicitly suggests, being "needed" man" (227)
"As if being destined itself to man. That being needs and opens up the domain of the proper is something that Heidegger will have assumed throughout. Could it have been otherwise?" (227)
Then De Beistegui asks whether this thinking of being necessarily needs to a new form, or "other" humanism. And would this still be a form of anthropocentrism?
Can one avoid to "presuppose the human as one pole of its unfolding?" (227) (of being).