Configuring the Networked Self | Julie E Cohen
Online version available: https://juliecohen.com/configuring-the-networked-self/
Chapter 5: Privacy, Autonomy, and Information
@privacy
The amount of information collected about both individuals and social groups has grown exponentially and covers an astonishing range of subject matter, from purchasing history to browsing be-havior to intellectual preferences to genetic predispositions. This information lasts longer and travels farther than ever before; it is stored in digital databases, exchanged in markets, and “mined” by both government and private actors for insights into individual and group behavior. The increase in data-processing activity coincides with the rapid spread of identity-linked authentication re-gimes for controlling access to spaces and resources, both real and digital. Authentication data are added to the other information stored in digital data-bases, creating comprehensive, persistent records of individual activity. The last two decades also have witnessed a dramatic upswing in real-time monitoring—by camera, satellite, and electronic pattern-recognition tools—of public spaces,privately owned spaces, and traffic across communications networks. (1)
Introduces interpretations of the phenomena that people say they care about privacy but do not show it
Surveys report that ordinary people experience a relatively high generalized concern about privacy but a relatively low level of concern about the data generated by specific transactions, movements, and communications. Some policy makers interpret the surveys as indicating either a low commitment to privacy or a general readiness to trade privacy for other goods. Others argue that the various “markets” for privacy have informational and structural defects that prevent them from generating privacy-friendly choic-es. They argue, as well, that inconsistencies between reported preferences and revealed behavior reflect a combination of resignation and befuddlement; most Internet users do not understand how the technologies work, what privacy policies mean, or how the information generated about them will actually be used.
Page 2 concerns difficulties for legislators and scholars to agree on privacy solutions.
Highlights:
- First, privacy scholars generally have as-sumed that the self that privacy protects is characterized by its autonomy. This formulation does not withstand close scrutiny—scholars cannot agree on whether “autonomy” denotes an absolute condition or a matter of degree, and neither understanding makes sense taken on its own terms—and the policy recommendations it generates are incoherent. (2)
- Second, although privacy theo-rists have articulated a variety of collective interests that privacy serves, they have avoided digging too close to the root of the asserted social interest in denying privacy—in gathering information, imposing identity-linked authentication procedures, and monitoring spaces and networks. Scholarly reluctance to confront the case against privacy weakens the case for privacy; collective-interest justifications that seem incomplete are more easily swept aside
- Finally, privacy theory offers a very poor account of the metaphors used to describe privacy interests and harms. Most privacy theorists disdain spatial metaphors for privacy as ill-suited to the networked information age, but have not ex-plored why spatial metaphors continually recur in privacy discourse or what that recurrence might mean for privacy law. At the same time, they have seemed not to notice the dominance of visual metaphors in privacy discourse,and have not considered the ways in which the implicit equation of privacy with invisibility structures the legal understanding of privacy interests and harms.
Interesting remarks on the relation between privacy and liberalism:
Privacy and liberal political theory are closely intertwined, but the problem of privacy is more complicated than that argument suggests. The understanding of privacy as tied to autonomy represents only one possible conception of privacy’s relation to selfhood. More fundamentally although privacy is often linked tothe liberal values of dignity and autonomy within our political discourse, it also conflicts with other liberal values. In the networked information society, protection for privacy compromises the liberal commitments to free flows of information, to the presumed equivalence between information and truth, and to the essential immateriality of personality. The conceptual gaps within privacy theory therefore reflect not only tensions between liberalism and critical theory, but also tensions internal to liberalism. As we will see, the gaps within privacy theory have very real consequences for the content of privacy law and policy. (3)
The subject of Privacy: The Autonomy Paradox
The first main defect in privacy literature is the connection between privacy and selfhood.
The questions Cohen asks:
- Privacy rights attach to individuals, but how and why? (3)
- What is this self that benefits from privacy? (3)
The claim of Cohen is that "autonomy-based formulations of privacy interests raise more questions than they answer" (3)
The various view on privacy offer inconsistent accounts, both between them and within themselves.
The main dispute:
- In Europe and Canada the idea of a "self-sufficient, autonomous individual has been under attack" from the perspective of social theory. (3)
- In the US this is considered to be an attack on the notion of the self, itself, to which privacy would apply.
- N.B. in Cohen's formulation it's not the notion of self but its autonomy that is disputed, but it seems that autonomy and selfhood can not or barely be separated from a US viewpoint.
In the US privacy laws are largely freedom of thought against social or governmental disapproval, to shield from "the chill of majoritarian displeasure" (4)
Cohen calls this the "romantic dissenter":
The romantic dissenter is not, on the whole, a fragile figure; among other things, when she chooses to participate in the rough-and-tumble of the marketplace of ideas she will not be able to demand protection against those who disagree with her or against ad feminam attacks on her character. But her claim to privacy protection for her beliefs, associations, and intimate decisions is widely acknowledged. And if she chooses to speak anonymously, she often can invoke constitutional protection for that decision as well. (4)
Dominant focus of privacy is on the sphere of the home:
The home is conceptualized as a retreat from public life, affording shelter from public scrutiny of one’s activities; in this respect, it complements the doctrines that protect intellectual privacy. In addition, privacy protection for the home shelters activities that simply have no place in the public sphere.
This notion, as I've also seen in other papers, has a mismatch with issues around informational privacy. Privacy is here more a form of control over your information; Cohen does not mention this in these words, she says it's a matter of "opting into or out of data collection" (4). Informational privacy is thus something you can negotiate and, importantly, something that is tradeable; it has market value, surplus.
The dominant image here is that of a "rational chooser":
This individual is concerned above all with maximizing his surplus in the marketplace. He may have preferences for privacy, but he regards those preferences and any formal entitlements to privacy as tradeable for other benefits that he might value more highly. I will call this privacy claimant the “rational chooser”; as with the economic user of copyrighted works, the rational chooser’s implicit theoretical allegiance is to economic models of behavior and decision making. (4)
Summary of the main conflict here: both of these accounts of privacy have their "home domains", but applications without those domains are almost certainly to be frustrated.
As in the case of copyright, the first thing to notice about these characters is that they seem to exist only within their home domains. One can easily imagine the rational chooser consenting to have his communications or reading decisions monitored and to have trouble comprehending the chill that supposedly would result from allowing information about intimate decisions to be disclosed. Yet that view of appropriate privacy rules for belief, association, and the like is decidedly a minority one. Expressive and associational privacy, and to a lesser extent residential privacy, are the domains of the romantic dissenter. The romantic dissenter, meanwhile, might complain that the collection, use, and sale of information about her grocery purchases or her rental history chill her opportunities for self-development. Should she do so, she would have trouble finding a sympathetic audience. Within the structure of U.S. privacy law, commercial transactions are the domain of the rational chooser. The banal, de minimis nature of most such transactions has repeatedly frustrated efforts to reframe information privacy problems as implicating profound self-development concerns. (4)
Both the romantic dissenter and the rational chooser exercise autonomy, but the autonomy exercised by each is different. The rational chooser is a definitionally autonomous being who experiences unbroken continuity between preference and action; his choices are relatively impervious to outside influence, and so he neither wants nor needs privacy protection for them. The romantic dissenter requires privacy protection for her autonomy to flourish; as a practical matter, then, she exercises autonomy only to the degree that her environment enables it. (5)
I like the clarity and polemic style of this formulation:
If the rational chooser and the romantic dissenter were actually two different people, this might not be especially troubling. Since they are supposed to be the same person, the divergent conceptions of autonomy are worrisome. (5)
So we have two different and incompatible conceptions of autonomy, which in turn fit two different schools on thought.
- Liberal political theory & rational chooser
- "negative liberty as the absence of overt constraint" (5)
- "At any point in time, the autonomous self is definitionally capable of both choice and consent"
- This assumption is in many cases invalid: "Children and young adults must grow into their autonomy, and this complication introduces the problem of dynamic self-formation that the negative-liberty framework seeks to avoid. To know when an individual has attained the capacity for autonomous choice, we need to decide how much nurture is enough." (5)
- Positive liberty & romantic dissenter
- freedom to choose, enabled by the environment
- "sometimes moment-to-moment choices need to be constrained so that people can become free to make better long-term choices than they otherwise might make."
- "Within a positive-liberty framework, though, the search for the dividing line between “autonomy” and external influence presents a problem of infinite regress. Some privacy scholars, myself included, have attempted to finesse this problem by characterizing information-collection practices and privacy rules as intimately involved in the ongoing constitution of selfhood." (5)
Some thoughts on the autonomy paradox w.r.t. GDPR:
- I would say that the European GDPR belongs more to the second part insofar as it puts heavy constraints on the value of consent. Many other considerations can overrule consent: people sometimes should be protected from themselves (soft paternalism). I'm also thinking: protections against misleading terms and conditions; strict conditions on explaining cookie policies sufficiently clear etc. All measures that enable the consumer to make an informed choice.
But even the "constitutive privacy" scholars (cf. 5) "continue to insist on the existence of an autonomous core - an essential self identifiable after the residue of influence has been subtracted." (5-6)
Main problems:
- There are everyday conflicts between these two positions; mainly because it is unclear which one applies and should be guiding in a given situation (see 6 for examples, e.g. using a computer in your home vs outside your home)
- Both do not address many subtleties of privacy
Examples:
To begin with the most banal, they don’t explain the desire for privacy for ordinary bodily functions. Activities such as excretion and sex are neither secret (everyone does them) nor romantic in their anatomical essentials, yet the view of them as private is strongly held. The romantic dissenter and the rational chooser also don’t help us understand why most people assume that sharing personal details with one’s airplane seatmate or one’s circle of friends does not automatically equal sharing them with one’s employer. Nor do they tell us why many people tend to feel that being subject to regularized surveillance in a public place is qualitatively different from simply being visible to others present there. In other words, they don’t explain why most people understand privacy as a quality subject to an enormous amount of contextual variation. (6)
Interesting point: the autonomy paradox mainly shows an underlying "deep conceptual poverty" of privacy research:
Ultimately, the autonomy paradox illustrates the ways in which the commitments of liberal political theory have constrained scholarly approaches to the self-society relation. Interrogating the conceptions of autonomy that exist in privacy theory exposes a deep conceptual poverty about what selves are made of. (6)
In fact, Cohen argues that the autonomy paradox is the result of a conceptual confusion. Just like for example Heidegger "absolved" epistemological questions about knowing the world by dissolving the rigid distinction between Dasein and world, Cohen follows social science in making the conceptual distinction between self and society poreus:
Within contemporary social theory, the separation between self and society that lies at the root of the autonomy paradox does not exist. From that perspective, a robust theory of privacy requires an understanding of the processes by which selfhood comes into being and is negotiated through contexts and over time. (6)
(But Nissenbaum etc. or even Floridi's ontological account of information flows are better in this sense right?)
The problem of privacy theory according to Cohen is that it stays to obsessed with selfhood, especially in the US. Mainly because messing with selfhood is seen as an attack on choice; which implies a strong liberal account:
Those scholars read the constitutive-privacy argument as completely inconsistent with liberty of choice and of belief. As Jeffrey Rosen puts it, “I’m free to think whatever I like even if the state or the phone company knows what I read.”12 That argument, which elides the distinction between social shaping and choice, is a product of the liberal conception of autonomy, pure and simple; social shaping negates choice only if choice is understood as requiring a perfect absence of influence. (7)
A theory of privacy for the information age should engage it and should explain what function privacy performs in a world where social shaping is everywhere and liberty is always a matter of degree. (7)
The latter would be a nice phrasing of a networked self: being shaped within a networked world is not an attack on selfhood; it rather requires a conceptualisation of our self-formation as a "networked self" through managing of information flows (including our own).
Thoughts w.r.t. phd proposal:
TODO in proposal also informational privacy noemen?
Technological mediation also lets go of the idea of an autonomous subject vs a lifeless object. However, it does assume at least a relative autonomy in the sense that the subject this has the capability to understand its own mediation. This is a weaker "hermeneutic" notion of autonomy, if you will. (misschien is autonomy niet meer het goede woord). (Het is misschien wel gepast het over de autonomy van "self-formation" hebben; niet vrij van externe invloeden, maar capable om die vorm te geven; maakt link naar GJ's paper ook weer duidelijker! Ik kan daar ook een thema van maken: technological mediation and self-formation, dat Verbeek geloof ik zelf een onderbelicht aspect noemde in dat Fatum interview). However, digital technologies can be said to challenge this possibility of understanding in various ways. (Without this possibility of understanding, the soft human agency in technological mediation falls to the background. This idea w.r.t. the digital results in somewhat of a resurgence of technological determinism: we are being overwhelmed, "short-circuited" (Stiegler) and also a remarkable cultural resurgence of pessimistic accounts of the "Ipod-liberalism" of the internet (Morozov; the Net Delusion).