Hermeneutics and Information Science: The Ongoing Journey From Simple Objective Interpretation to Understanding Data as a Form of Disclosure | Matthew Kelly, Information Cultures in the Digital Age, M. Kelly and J. Bielsby (eds)

@digital hermeneutics @information science @Kelly

A close-reading of Capurro's Hermeneutik der Fachinformation.

How can hermeneutics be used to provide a general ontology of information?

Goal is to show how Capurro's work has an important point in the short history of information hermeneutics, and to relate Capurro's work to other main arguments.

How might "hermeneutic understanding and hermeneutically-informed methodology" (83) offer solutions to problems related to the social praxis of information science?

Hermeneutics and Information Science: Capurro and Before

Remark from Pöggeler: "if Heidegger's reshaping of the phenomenological project towards hermeneutics is to have anything but academic interest it needs 'to take real account of the fact that our world is determined above all else by technology' (1993, p.23)" (84)

See: Pöggeler, O. (1993). The hermeneutics of the technological world: The Heidegger‐Heisenberg dispute. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1(1), 21-48.

DONE: read Pöggeler 1993.

Capurro's understanding of hermeneutics as relevant to all science and also the praxis of information science, from Hermeneutik der Fachinformation:

Capurro explains what he means when he refers to hermeneutics: If hermeneutics is understood as a possible framework for a question which moves not only (i) outside methodological demarcation disputes between domains, but also includes (ii) the area of action, then this corresponds to a critical self-understanding of hermeneutics—the first emerges from the dialogue with analytical philosophy and the philosophy of science, and the second from the practical turn of philosophical hermeneutics itself that evaluates originally in a positive way the incarnation of human thinking in the context of praxis. In this sense, the occupation with the understanding is not only the theming of a certain kind of knowledge of man, but the interpretation of a basic structure of what being human actually means. (1986, 1.1 The business of hermeneutics, para. 3) (84)

In short: hermeneutics (mainly Heidegger's) applied to how we "conceptualize scientific information generally, and information retrieval in particular" (84)

Capurro 2000: we should try to see how "information is the shape of knowledge at the end of modernity." What does that mean?

Important names for the start of Capurro's information hermeneutics:

  • Börje Langefors
  • Alwin Diemer
  • Norbert Henrichs

Langefors: "the 'infological dichotomy' regarding data and information -data as representation of knowledge or carrier of information-leads to a necessary conclusion that the medium does not carry information but 'can only generate information when it is brought into correspondence with a suitable "receiving structure" or mental world model' (p. 7) " (87)

There needs to be some pre-agreement in order for data to convey information. This seems to translate into the issue that the frame or reference of intended users need to be taken into account in order for data to represent information/knowledge, i.e. the hermeneutic idea of pre-understanding is relevant here.

Citation from Capurro's "Hermeneutical questions concerning the construction of databases", Chapter 3.2, paragraph 3:

The meeting between a questioner and an (information) system is to be interpreted as a hermeneutic process, during which the open horizon of the questioner and the fixed horizon of the system itself provisionally “merge,” that is, the objectified preconception is published as a (possible) answer to a question, and thus understanding is recovered in the online dialogue. In this “fusion of horizons,” the identity and difference in their blending and contrasting simultaneously become apparent. (3.2.a, para. 3) Capurro also takes this interest in the hermeneutics of the constitution of online dialogue. (94)

Also interesting is Swanson:

we might look upon the process of information retrieval as a trial or a conjecture, guided by some idea of what one is seeking. The principal value of the process lies not so much in the direct use of the retrieved documents but rather in the indirect function which they serve of stimulating a reformulation of the request… The retrieval of irrelevant documents may therefore sometimes play as significant a role in stimulating research as does the retrieval of relevant documents. Errors or mistakes are not to be thought of in a pejorative sense, but rather as essential components of the research process (Swanson, 1977, pp. 138-139). (94)

See Swanson, D.R. (1977). Information retrieval as a trial-and-error process. The Library Quarterly: Information, Community, Policy,47(2), 128-148.

Hermeneutics and Information Science: After Capurro

Honestly, I didn't get much out of this section of the paper. It really specifically concerns information science. I only recovered some very short remarks that refer to tradition, as this is of special interest to me. But I basically did not get the main take-away of the paper.

John D. Caputo (2000) points out how in Being and Time Heidegger is concerned 'not in undermining the sciences, but in providing a hermeneutic accounting.' (96)

The crux of such arguments go to how science is no independent force acting in the world but "a hermeneutic projection of a sphere of objects...limited by the hermeneutic horizon of the scientists." (p. 166 from Caputo) (97)

These are difficult sentences to unpack. Yes, experience can be mine or ours or yours and theirs. Hermeneutic theory, or at least Gadamer, emphasizes how we should better appreciate tradition (if only for our own playful purposes which show we have fully engaged with it in all its truth and misguidedness). Interpretative acts do not prescribe, that is they do not ask other researchers to act similarly. Recognizing collective experience (tradition) as having an autonomous being-in-the-world, as being this-thing-in-itself, should clear away any residual reticence to prioritize that which makes for Dasein to act in a morally relative way. While it is difficult, and Hansson’s steps are not easy to follow, they are at least illustrative of the broad direction that his tradition wants to move interpretation in. If hermeneutic interpretation could have solved any one problem in the 20th century surely it would have been the trilemma of class politics, needless war and cynically-enforced poverty. When we speak to information as a side issue of science and allow our interpretation to fall on the side of a radical abstraction, I would argue that we commit a grave error in our role as intermediaries in a discourse of socially-based science. Adopting such a view should not be seen however as discounting a role for critiquing ideology in this intermediary role. I would argue that the critique forms an ancillary basis to interpretation and should not be confused with its core procedures. (105)