Phantoms of the Other: Four Generations of Derrida's Geschlecht | David Farrell Krell 2015, SUNY press.
Chapter 1. Geschlecht I: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference, 19-46
TODO
Chapter 2. Geschlecht II: Heidegger's Singular Hand, 48-68
TODO
Chapter 4: Geschlecht IV: Heidegger's Philopolemological Ear, 107-130
Moves from the hand to the ear.
Part 1 on the voice of the friend
Focuses on section 34 from Sein und Zeit which focuses on hearing and listening. Unlike listening hearing is not an "aural matter" but is both for the early and late Heidegger "the very essence of speech and language." (107)
In that section Heidegger refers to hearing as hearing the voice of the friend that every Dasein carries within itself. Curiously, the friend only appears in that section and even then seems to come completely unannounced.
Krell investigates a line of thought where this voice of the friend "within itself" (and so "eigen") is linked to the possibility of death as showing the ownmost possibilities of Dasein/being in the world. The friend from Derrida's perspective is also connected to the possibility of death (cf. Politics of Friendship).
The voice of the friend does not come from a friend that is present, as opposed to similar references in world literature (cf. 111).
Later I found a remark that further likens the role of the voice of the friend and the possibility of death in SuZ, based in turn on a remark from Derrida. The context is a discussion whether the voice of the friend "within oneself" in SuZ can refer to the friend as someone other. Derrida states that at least this is not explicitly denied. Krell: "And if the voice of the friend speaks words we cannot understand, even though we can hear them, would we not be opened up in a very special way to the fragility of our being and its ownmost possibility?" (113)
Relation to Geschlecht I when Derrida remarks on the undetermined sex or sexlessness of Heidegger's friend.
The main point of the Geschlecht series is to think together the sexual and ontological difference. W.r.t. the "carrying out" or "carrying to term" of the ontological difference (Austrag):
Yet the more earnest side of the Austrag is its dominion (Walten, a word taht will occupy Derrida throughout his final seminar, in 2002-2003) throughout the epoch of metaphysics. The ambivalence of such "dominion," itself crucial for the Geschlecht series, which tries to think together the sexual with the ontological difference, is that it holds sway over both the epoch of metaphysics, in which the difference comes to nothing, and the "other thinking" that Heidegger himself attempts to institute - in a word, the thinking of Ereignis and the granting of time and being. (112)
Very important passage (to me at least): **the thinking of Ereignis will always be a thinking of Versammlung **.
One of the most troubling aspects of this ambivalence in the Austrag is Heidegger's tendency to express the negative side always in terms of Latinization, of a Rome and a Christendom that obfuscate the Greco-German desire for being. And desire is the right word: philosophy loves being, loves and mourns it, as what has sunk into oblivion. Heidegger's attempt to leave philosophy on its own and to turn to a thinking of being as Ereignis will always and everywhere be a thinking of the gathering, Versammlung, and of the human capacity to think being as such. Yet it will be a gathering of something that has been lost, obfuscated, forgotten, abandoned. What human being can rise to such a challenge? (112)
N.B. When Heidegger speaks of "human" that word is used in "our" language and refers to the community of a "people" (112)
Krell mentions the sketchy and danger of this aspect of Heidegger's thinking... small step from engaging "in struggle on behalf of the community or nation" (113) to hearing "the roar of motorcycles instead of the voice of the friend" (113)
Part 2 on Struggle and War
Krell says that:
The lover of wisdom, the philosopher, says Heidegger, comes always too late with his or her "love for wisdom," inasmuch as the Heraclitean sense of filein [Griekse letters in origineel] as Gunst, "favoring," has disappeared by the time Plato and Aristotle arrive on the scene. Philosophy is thus always nostalgic, perhaps even mournful; it yearns for the time when one could "say the same" as the logos [idem], as Heraclitus commanded. Another name for such nostalgia is Eros [idem], a word that is quite rare in Heidegger's works, mentioned only briefly in the 1955 "Was ist das-die Philosophie?" (65:210) (113)
This interests me because it suggests that from Heidegger's perspective nostalgia is inherent to philosophy itself (or metaphysics specifically?). I'm wondering then whether Heidegger would affirm himself to be nostalgic as well, or whether he would strictly deny this as he places himself into another beginning of thought (beyond philosophy?).
Derrida asks (cf. 114) whether the voice of the friend is pre-erotic or not, in light of his own work on the politics of friendship that discussion the relation and distinction between love and friendship, the (homosexual?) fraternity etc.
Fascinating: rethinking the history of being as an erotic disorder:
Although Derrida does not go so far, we might wonder whether philosophy's loss of Heraclitean philein, of the pre-erotic philein, and the resulting mourning and nostalgia of philosophy, which is precisely the long-enduring epoch of a troubled and troubling Eroos, is the result of a second coup or frappe by which the Western world has been struck. To say the least, this would cause us to rethink the history of being (or of beyng): the abandonment by being of beings and the consequent oblivion of being throughout the epoch of metaphysics would be essentially an erotic disorder. Such a disorder would have to do preeminently with mourning and melancholy. Could such a thought be attributed to Heidegger? (114)
Anyways, Krell points out that in "What Is That-Philosophy" Heidegger nevertheless emphasizes "the gathering power of love" (114)
Derrida asks whether such a gathering is a problem for "democracy to come". Derrida asks whether "democracy to come" can "reconcile such insistent unification and incessant gathering with the heterogeneities, dissymmetries, disproportions, and incommensurabilities with which our democracies will increasingly be confronted (PA 372/183)" (114)
@ear Great quote:
It seems undeniable that, for Heidegger, all is a matter of gathering, Versammlung, to which the "inner ear" is always alert. This is the same ear that Heidegger evokes in the 1957 Der Satz vom Grund (SG 87-88), and it is the ear that was already celebrated in the 1934-35 lectures on Hölderlin's "Der Rhein" as "the ear of the poet" (39:196-203). (114-115)
Gathering: a view of harmony or of struggle?
And yet Derrida closes this chapter by noting the uncanny proximity of Eroos and Eris, love and hate, Eros and Discord, in Heidegger's thinking of "gathering." For if after World War II Heidegger find the logos to be a gathering in philein, which is to say in peace and harmony, in the 1930s he sees the gathering storm of logos in terms of polemos, "struggle," "war," and "combat." In "our" language, Kampf. (115)
Part 3: Opposition and strife within friendship, correspondence with Schmitt.
@logos is identified with struggle in the 30s, e.g. in Introduction to Metaphysics in 1935.
It is almost as though Heidegger is making two press releases, the first in 1935, the second in 1953, each in accord with the spirit of the times: after the war, "gathering" is all peace and love; before the war, and in collusion with the warriors, it is all struggle and combat. (115)
117-118 Beautiful passage on how all prejudices are already there when you read a text and how it implies a certain violence that is required to strip oneself of prejudices, from @tradition , which need to be "radically dismantled and deconstructed (SZ 21)" to getting rid of the everyday talk (Gerede).
Heidegger calls for eine Entgengenwärtigung des Heute, a "depresentifying of the today," a blotting out of the quotidian white noise that is meant to distract and disempower us (SZ 391, 397). (117)
Our preachers still preach of "eternal truths," and yet they have not passed through eternity in order to garner such truths, have not really been anywhere (SZ 229) (117-118)
Conclusion, slightly paradoxical: "In short, the phenomenologist and the thinker of being who wants to let being be will very often be driven to the most polemical sorts of attacks" (118)
Remarks on the Contributions to Philosophy (118-119) which was published in the year that Geschlecht IV was presented but which is also a work that Derrida apparently never or rarely cites.
And yet this volume, perhaps more than any other in the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe, demonstrates the gathering forces of both letting-be and polemic, both love and war, the entire philopolemology. (119)
119-120: Derrida focuses on Heidegger's concept of Kampf in relation to Schmitt. Does the community (cf. Ein Geschlecht) need a foe in order to be gathered together?
That is to say, does not the stress on Kampf and Auseinandersetzung ("confrontation") suggest that Heidegger is precisely a philosopher, one who loves wisdom nostalgically, mournfully, saturated as he is by a sense of loss? Loss of what? Of a sense for the meaning of being, of a sense for the meaning of the question of being, but also the loss of a sense of community, about which everyone today is still writing. (120)
@nazism
Identifying himself with the "few," the "only some of us" who can join the Kampfgemeinschaft, Heidegger succumbs to a voluntarism of the "essential will" of Volk and Führer. (120)
120-1: How can Heidegger's Kampfgemeinschaft be rhymed with his Hölderin's Hyperion who sees his "embattled community" turn into barbarians and who "ridicules his own project" (120-1).
Part 4: On sacrifice in friendship and strife; but actually focuses on polemos "as an ontological concept" (122)
The effort of Derrida's discussion is to show how both the prewar emphasis on Heraclitus' polemos and the postwar emphasis on Heraclitus' philein both end up in an account of gathering and unification, "(Ver-)Sammlung" (123).
Perhaps the forcing that most disquiets Derrida simply results from the fact that Heidegger insists on gathering everything into his assembly: love or hate, amity or discord, peace or war-it does not really matter, it all gets gathered. One is all. For a thinker of différance, this is a nightmare. (125)
Critical note from Krell here:
Although Derrida fails to mention it here, love and hate, gentleness and dissesion are not always matters of indifference to Heidegger. At least where Geschlecht is concerned, as we have already seen and as we shall see again, there are two strokes, and it matters very much which one strikes. For one stroke results in a onefold twofold that is at least initially gentle, whereas the other is the curse of discord. Although Derrida does not mention this aspect of his Geschlecht project here, I do not believe for one minute that he has forgotten it. (125)
First clear mention of sacrifice, which is supposed to be the theme of this chapter. This section concerns the disconcerting element of Heidegger's thought where the new beginning of thinking and poetizing coincides for the call for a founding of the state. Here the ear theme becomes prominent again:
Needed are new ears, a new way for new ears to hearken, and new songs for German ears to heed. Yet the "sacrifice" to which Derrida now draws our attention has nothing redemptive about it. If a people is to find the truth of its historical existence, says Heidegger, it needs to listen to the voices of its poets. However, these voices will not be heard. Indeed, the great poets are our "firstborn," and the firstborn must be sacrificed, [es] müssen die Erstlinge geopfert werden (39:146). Here Heidegger does not seem to be bothered by the Judeo-Christian allusion to Jacob and Isaac, or to the older story of Cain and Abel.
Concluding remarks
The fourth Geschlecht has introduced a new direction of thought and reflects on a new set of texts, influenced by the "Philosophical Nationality and Nationalism" seminar and Of Spirit (1987).
As always, Versammlung or "gathering" is at the core of Derrida's disquiet. Yet in the texts studied in Geschlecht IV, especially those from the 1930s, it is the gathering of Kampf and Auseinandersetzung, struggle and confrontation, that Derrida wants and needs to understand. (127)
The militant aspect of Heidegger's thought in the 30s:
Heidegger's insistence that there is such a thing as "a people's historical Dasein," and that Dasein stands in urgent need of decision, and furthermore that both the Volk and its historical Dasein are one, so that the decision will be grandiose, all-encompassing and all-compelling, is nothing short of militant. (127)
Perhaps Derrida's deepest worry ...:
Perhaps Derrida's deepest worry is that Heidegger's compulsion to gather and to resist at all cost dissemination and dispersion, even when such gathering paints itself in Heraclitan colors, is precisely what obscures Heidegger's perspective and inhibits his imagination and his empathy with regard to the others? (128)
The context of this remark is Heidegger's limited "inner ear" for the suffering during WWII. He's still acting as if there is "one" people. Where is "the slightest reference to German Jews or to the shtetl Jews of eastern Europe, to the Roma clans, to members of different classes (...)" (128) etc.
Very interesting comment: Heidegger's insistence on gathering is itself a theme that makes his collapse back into metaphysics more likely:
When Heidegger makes his plea for a hearing that "holds firm," das standhaltende Hören, and when he praises the hearing that occurs in the "inner ear" for heeding only what has "genuine subsistence," eigentlichen Bestand (39:202), one has to remember that Bestand is also the metaphysical remnant of "permanence of presence," Beständigkeit des Anwesens, in the form of the technological stockpile. (128)
Immediately following that remark:
The more decisively Heidegger tries to "gather," the more likely he is to collapse back into the metaphysics he dreams of overcoming or of leaving to its own devices. (...) It is as though Heidegger's one ear, the inner ear that is instructed to hear only one thing, and Heidegger's one hand, along with the one friend who seems to have no face and no gender, deprive him of the richness of experience that two ears, two hands, and the friends for whom one yearns and suffers can provide. (128-129)
129: Krell argues that Heidegger's Destruktion after which Derrida's deconstruction is modelled is not applied to what Heidegger calls das Erbe i.e. the inheritance of a cultural and national legacy.
If Heidegger would have done that it "would at least have slowed the pace of Heidegger's rush to choose a hero and assemble his generation and his people into a Kampfgemeinschaft" (129)
Very interesting closing remark. A scene: Krell drives Derrida to the airport after the conference where Derrida delivered Geschlecht IV:
As he settled into the passenger seat, Derrida said, murmuring the words more to himself than to me, "Heidegger-we will never get rid of his corpse." The voice of the friend? In any case, the voice of an endless haunting.