Why the precariat is not a "bogus concept" | Guy Standing
22h
Abstract:
The precariat, a class-in-the-making, is the first mass class in history that has systematically been losing rights built up for citizens. So, why is it the new dangerous class and how is it differentiated from other class groups in the evolving global labour process?
Attacks from the left: the precariat is not a class.
The class characteristics of the precariat:
- distinctive relations of production / labour relations
- insecure labour
- flitting in and out of jobs
- incomplete contracts
- indirect labour relationships mediated by agencies or brokers
- not a loss of status, but a habituation to expecting a life of unstable labour and living, which is different from proletariazation
- way higher demands on skills than anything demanded from the proletarian
- precariat skilling: costly to acquire, easy to lose
- lack of occupational narrative due to lack of stability
- proletariat is exploited in paid time, precariat has to work off the job.
- distinctive relations of distribution
- heavy relience on money wages
- little enterprise non-wage benefits
- no rights-based state benefits
- distinctive relations to the state
- According to Standing the precariat is the first mass class in history that has systematically been losing rights built up for citizens
- fewer and weaker civil, cultural, social, political, economic rights
Standing makes the point that "benefit entitlements" hinge on labour performance, but ignore other "forms of work that are not labour". E.g. reproductive work, which does not gain any entitlement to rights. This is framed by the left as a criticism of wage workers, which it is not.
For instance, the old proletariat that still retains employment security, and enterprise and state benefits, can be expected to push their unions to look after their interests relative to those of the precariat. Breman and those who think like him fail to understand why the precariat does not relate to labour unions. Breman also misrepresents my position in claiming I say that many people “define themselves as working class, in part precisely because they are in precarious jobs” and that I “dismiss this as identity confusion”.
What the book actually says is that those in the precariat with a university degree are unlikely to feel comfortable defining themselves as working class but, as they do not own property or have a salary, they are equally unlikely to feel comfortable calling themselves middle class. The point about identity confusion related to inconsistent self-definitions by parents and their offspring as revealed in opinion polls.
Three groups within the precariat:
1) Atavists * "consists of those falling out of old proletarian communities, whose parents had traditional manual jobs and lives. This group is alienated, anomic, anxious and angry because it cannot reproduce a past, and is inclined to listen to populist politicians blaming migrants or “skivers” for their situation. " 2) Nostalgics * "classic denizens, being migrants or ethnic minorities, unable to relate to a lost home, without a present. They too are alienated, anomic, anxious and angry, but tend to keep their heads down politically, with occasional days of rage when they feel their space or freedoms are being excessively encroached. " 3) Progressives * "educated people who feel denied a future, a sense that they can build their lives and careers, after being promised their qualifications would lead to that. They experience a sense of relative deprivation or status frustration. This is becoming a source of immense stress. For instance, according to the Economic Policy Institute, in the USA in 2012, 46% of those in low-wage jobs had university education, up from 17% in 1968, while the average wage in such jobs had fallen in real terms. Over three-quarters of all those in low-wage jobs had at least high-school diplomas."
Class consciousness and voice
The way this is put in a new book[8] is that the precariat must become enough of a class-for-itself in order to abolish itself. In other words, only when enough people in the precariat see themselves as part of a group facing similar challenges will they gain the social strength to demand a common set of changes. Roughly speaking, this was what happened to the proletariat in the early decades of the twentieth century.
Conclusion:
Two new securities needed next to known labour-related security.
1) basic income security 2) strong representation security
In other words, it is essential to strengthen the bargaining capacities of everyone vis-à-vis capital and the state. I do not downplay this aspect, as Bremen claims. Strong unions are needed to represent employees but, in addition, new forms of collective association are required to give the precariat Voice in all relevant forums, inside and outside workplaces, and above all in confronting the state.
The precariat is a new dangerous class partly because it rejects all the old mainstream political ideologies and because it is intuitively transformative. One of the most subversive pieces of graffiti that captures that point was daubed on a Madrid wall: “The worst thing would be to return to the old normal.”
Another way of putting it is that whereas the modal proletarian, and his representatives, aspired to stable full-time wage labour stretching into his future, the modal member of the precariat aspires to achieve an enriching array of work activities in building occupational freedom. There is a difference.
Discussion question:
- What is one crucial downside of being part of the precariat? Describe one idea, which could mitigate that downside. (This can be an AI related approach, but doesn't have to.)
- Regulating timeframes by law in amazon storage facilities
- Maximizing income and working times across different gigs with an AI app that tailor makes a personalized job plan.