Afterword: Web Philosophy | Bernard Stiegler in "Philosophical Engineering", eds. Harry Halpin and Alexandre Monnin

@Stiegler

Knowing how to act, knowing how to live, and knowing how to think rationally are not mere forms of cognition, because they are grounded on an exteriorization process that cannot be supervened on lower-level cognition, such as animal cognition, for instance—although, obviously, it is the great apes that put into motion the exteriorization process before hominization even began. (189)

Critique of Derrida's quasi-transcendental perspective:

Drawing from Husserl and Derrida, but also putting into question a certain number of Derrida’s presuppositions (such as his assertion that the trace needs to be approached from a quasi-transcendental standpoint, a presupposition that must be avoided like the plague, since it limits the question to that of “the” trace when there are only traces and it is this empirical multiplicity that needs to be thought out), one can differentiate tertiary retentions from primary and secondary retentions, and therefore posit that there is no arche-trace without the interplay of plural traces (Derrida 1976).

I do not quite get this but would like to get into this later:

If I specify such a point here, it is because the questions raised by the World Wide Web Consortium about the categorization of digital data and metadata are a matter of schema in the Kantian sense—that is, of a projection between a concept of understanding and the data of intuition (“intuition” being used as well in the Kantian sense of being constituted by—and in—space and time).

@grammatisation and philosophical engineering:

The question raised by this grammatization process today is that of a philosophical engineering, something that conditions the constitution of knowledge in a general manner, not only philosophical dialectics, but all forms of knowledge, including knowing how to live and knowing how to act. (191)

The two characteristics of this time of the web:

  1. "memory has become an economic and industrial activity, a source of profit." (191)
  2. "Second, this economic activity is undertaken through this whole new form of writing that is digital technology." (191)

Digital technology is the most current form of writing— nothing more, nothing less. Yet it is a form of writing that belongs to the order of what Marx, in the Grundrisse, describes as automation, a new process where science comes to be in the service of economics, of the amortization of capital’s investment, in a direction that leads to the destruction of all knowledge, which Marx at the time called proletarization (Marx 1973). (191-192)

Zooming in on the Web

Today, then, the question concerning Web engineering is to determine how to deal with the relation between autonomy and automatization in a context that is highly pharmacological. (192)

A return to the question of ontology, although I'm not 100% sure yet what Stiegler is after here:

More specifically, the question is to know how to deal with this relation by revisiting the question of ontology as it is framed in philosophy: the problem of universals from Aristotle to Heidegger, through Husserl, and in so many other dimensions of course, including Kant—and by incorporating the fact that the individuation of the retention system is what conditions the constitution of ideals. (192)

Stiegler seems to advocate an interesting and highly unusual notion of @information here:

Here we must discuss the question of the neurological condition of thinking about numbers and mathematics more generally. By referring to the works of Changeux and Berthoz, Dehaene claims to lay out the features of a mathematical bio-neuro-ontology or a physical bio-neuroontology (Dehaene 2009). We could then say that if Meno, by considering the tracings that Socrates forms in the sand, can ultimately arrive at the discovery of the conditions for calculating a square surface, it is very simply because his brain already contains this “in-formation,” this coming into form of his neurons through his biological heritage, that is to say, through environmental adaptation (Plato 1976). (193)

Stiegler's main critique on ontology seems to be that ontology assumes a metastasized stable core, which implies the effacement of the transindividuation processes from which it originates:

Deeper even than ontologies, which are only the surface effects of transindividuation processes that have metastasized and that in so doing have erased the movement that produced them, there are individuation processes. (194)

@automation and the generalization of the algorithmic

This question of automatization is that of the generalization of the algorithmic, of which informatics is an incarnation. A Vaucanson automaton is already algorithmic, it is a physical materialization that eventually allows for the repetition of a process.19 Because automatism appears at the origin of industrial society and of industrial mechanization, and today develops not only machines but also devices that can become microscopic (even nanometric), the issue becomes framed in entirely unprecedented dimensions. For instance, technological automatism can become the reason behind psychological automatism and neurological automatism, and even coalesce with them—these are the true stakes of what is called the NBIC convergence. (195)

NBIC: Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology, Cognitive Science.

@Enlightenment @autonomy @automatization

In such an age, the absolutely unprecedented question that is raised is that of the relation between automatization and autonomy. Behind this, Enlightenment philosophy itself is at stake. What did the Enlightenment philosophers want? They wanted to extend autonomy, and this extension of autonomy was grounded on the development of the “Republic of Letters.” (195)

But this "letter" of the Republic of Letters was not itself thought (as technology):

This republic itself is what allowed for the constitution of what Kant called “the reading public,” the res publica (Kant 1784). Yet the Enlightenment never gave thought to the letter itself, even from the standpoint of social mathematics, although Condorcet and some others did circle around such issues (Condorcet 1795). (195)

Be that as it may, the real question that is to be raised is that of a philosophy of enlightenment, of shadows and of numbers in the digital age. This must include speed, in particular as regards light-speed, since all these Web technologies are based on optoelectronic technology, a precise light-time that rests on a mobility without mass, on photons that do not fit in Newtonian mechanics but fit in Broglie’s wave mechanics. (196)

The question is: "how to produce autonomy from heteronomy" (196)

The stakes for Enlightenment philosophy in the digital age. To think autonomy ...

Not against heteronomy, as was believed by philosophers up to Kant and even beyond, but with heteronomy, a heteronomy that negatively is a pharmacological poison, precisely because it short-circuits autonomy, but that when one pushes for a therapeutic can become a positive pharmacology—that is, a future for an investment in the social, the amorous, the affective, the scholarly, and also the economic, that is, for a new industrial society.

These are the stakes of Enlightenment philosophy in the era of the Web. (196)

Highlight: short-circuits autonomy.