Cyborg intentionality: Rethinking the phenomenology of human–technology relations | Peter-Paul Verbeek, 2008

@cyborg @intentionality @Verbeek @Ihde

Abstract:

  • Introduces three types of "cyborg intentionality" that blend the human and technological

  • Technologically mediated intentionality: human intentionality takes place "through" technological artefacts.

  • Hybrid intentionality: the technological merges with the human
  • Composite intentionality: human and technological intentionality are added.

Introduction

There is a classical divide between humans as having intentions, technological being passive and mute (Verbeek cites Latour 1993, Heidegger 1977).

It is thus an ontological challenge to overcome this conceptual gap. And yet:

  1. Many authors argue we have become cyborgs to some degree
  2. Position of Stiegler: "we have always been cyborgs in a sense, since technology can be seen as constitutive for humanity. For Stiegler, humanity is an invention of technology, rather than the other way round; human beings exist by realizing themselves technologically (cf. Stiegler 1998)" (388)

Research questions:

How to understand “cyborg intentionality”? Is it simply a technologically influenced form of human intentionality? Or can blends of human and nonhuman beings have an intentionality of their own? Does something like “technological intentionality” exist, and if so, how is it related to human intentionality? Or can human intentionality simply not be understood without taking into account how it is intertwined with technology, as would follow from Stiegler’s perspective of “originary technicity”? (388)

Intentionality and technology

In phenom. tradition, "intentionality is the core concept to understand the relation between human beings and their world. Rather than separating humans and world, the concept of intentionality makes visible the inextricable connections between them." (388)

They cannot simply “think,” but they always think something; they cannot simply “see,” but they always see something; they cannot simply “feel” but always feel something. As experiencing beings, humans cannot but be directed at the entities which constitute their world. (388)

Ihde's mediated intentionality

Ik heb hier al een aantal notities over dus ik houd het kort.

@terminus

  1. Embodied; glasses extension of body.
  2. Alterity; tech. is terminus of experience, human interacts with device directly.
  3. Hermeneutic; "technologies provide representations of reality, which need interpretation in order to constitute a “perception”" (389)
  4. Background; "technologies are not experienced directly, but rather create a context for our perceptions, like the humming of the air conditioning" (389)

N.B. merk op hoe in alleen in de "alterity" relatie de mens-wereld relatie niet bemiddeld wordt; de wereld staat tussen haakjes.

"In all of these cases, except the alterity relation, human intentionality is mediated by a technological device." (390)

How to read image (compare the graph of Soraker): the arrow indicates human intentionality, the dash

Intentionality beyond mediation

Eeeeh... zijn de vormen van mediation waar ik in geïnteresseerd ben, dan.. geen vormen van mediation?

  • Hybrid intentionality
    • Not interrelated (a la Ihde) but intentionality of an entity in which human and tech are merged
  • Composite intentionality
    • Humans use technology that themselves have a form of intentionality

Where does Verbeek go past Ihde? Ihde focuses only on relations, not on

Because Ihde’s primary focus is on the relations between humans and technologies rather than the intentionalities involved, his analysis tends to blackbox the various forms of intentionality involved in these relations. Drawing attention to these intentionalities makes it possible to substantially augment his analysis. (390)

From later:

Ihde’s approach revolves around technologically mediated intentionality, in which both (mediated) human beings and (multistable) technological artifacts are constituted. (392)

In the schema we had arrows, indicated human intentionality, but also dashes, which indicate an unspecified relation. By focusing on that unspecified part Verbeek can radicalize the mediations of Ihde.

Cyborg relation: focus on hermeneutic and embodiment relation (focus on world):

If we limit ourselves to the embodiment relation and the hermeneutic relation – which are the most relevant relations in the context of intentionality since they ultimately involve relations with the world – these dashes indicate a relation between humans and technology or between technology and world. It is precisely by investigating the nature of these dashes that a closer characterization can be developed of what can be called “cyborg intentionality.” (390)

In the following sections, therefore, I will augment Ihde’s understanding of both the embodiment relation and the hermeneutic relation. (390)

Verbeek will flesh out the dashes.

Hybrid Intentionality

Ref:

  • Embodiment: (human - technology) -> world
  • Hermeneutic: human -> (technology - world)

In Ihde’s range of human–technology relations, technology moves ever further away from the human – from being “embodied” to being “read,” to being “interacted with” and even being merely “background.”

Everyday examples of "cyborgs":

When microchips are implanted to enhance the vision of visually impaired people, when antidepressants help to change people’s mood, or when artificial valves and pacemakers help to make people’s heart beat, there is no embodiment relation anymore – at least, not a relation which could compare to wearing eyeglasses or using a telephone.

The main difference is in the interpretation of the "dash" in the embodiment relation. It's really not just the technological extension of the human body anymore, like with glasses, but a bodily merging that physically changes the human being:

Instead of organizing an interplay between a human and a nonhuman entity, this association physically alters the human. (391)

So we go from embodiment to the cyborg relation with hybrid intentionality:

  • Embodiment: (human - technology) -> world
  • Cyborg: (human/technology) -> world

To distinguish embodiment from cyborg you should ask whether the human and technological share in an mediated experience can still be distinguished.

@drugs

"Just like the “being” which experiences reality under the influence of drugs, or which sees things with the help of an implanted microchip, is not entirely human, so is the intentionality involved here."

Interesting remark:

To be sure, the intentionality involved in the embodiment relation is not entirely human either: the specific ways in which humans are directed at each other through a mobile phone

  • Is the type of mediation that a mobile phone constitutes really embodied? I don't think so (or at least: it's only a very limited perspective).
  • In fact, I would want to explore being on your phone as a form of being disembodied and disconnected with your body.

Two trajectories for hybrid intentionality

  1. Posthumanism
    • Moves not beyond the human but beyond a limited understanding of what it means to be human
    • The "merging" is here an indication of the constitutive nature of technology for human beings.
    • Stiegler: "in order to understand what it means to be a human being, we need to take into account how the human and the technological co-constitute each other" (391)
  2. Transhumanism
    • Beyond the physical human as we know it now.
    • The "merging" of human and tech is physical

Composite intentionality

Third form of cyborg intentionality (so... mediated intentionality already counts as the first?). Ja:

  1. Mediated
  2. Hybrid
  3. Composite

In the case of the composite intentionality we can conceptualize of a technological intention that is not merged with human intentionality (cf. hybrid) but adds to it.

What is technological intentionality?

“Technological intentionality” here needs to be understood as the specific ways in which specific technologies can be directed at specific aspects of reality. In this context, for instance, Don Ihde elaborated the example of the sound recorder as having a different intentionality for sound than human beings have, recording background noises at a louder volume than perceived by human beings who only focus on the sounds that are meaningful to them in that specific situation (Ihde 1979: 77–78; Ihde 1983: 56; Ihde 1990: 102–103). (392)

Nice description of the relation of composite intentionality to the hermeneutic relation:

Composite intentionality plays a role in what Ihde calls the hermeneutic relation. After all, hermeneutic relations always involve a technologically generated representation of the world, which inevitably is the product of a specific technological directedness at the world: thermometers focus on temperature, spectrographs on light frequencies, sonograms on how material objects reflect ultrasound. Yet, this representing intentionality of “nonhuman” perceivers is only one form of composite intentionality. Not all technological intentionalities are directed at actually representing a phenomenon in the world – some of them, e.g., rather construct reality, like radio telescopes that produce a visible image of a star on the basis of “seeing” radiation which is not visible to the human eye. In this case, one could say the composition of human intentionality and technological intentionality is directed at making accessible ways in which technologies “experience” the world. (393)

So the hermeneutic relationship human -> (technology - world) implies that technology represents the world given that a human intentionality interprets the technology.

When we also add an arrow between technology and world to indicate "technical intentionality", this expresses another step namely that the technology also creates "its" own world. The technology only creates this world through the human intentionality that interprets this technological intentionality? (Cf. "humans are directed here at the ways in which a technology is directed at the world")

TODO: compare this to Floridi; difference between interface and the dishwasher that has a specialized environment "wrapped" around it.

Can the digital be expressed in this sense?:

  • We interact with digital entities that represent some phenomena through some information state; either other persons, a computation, a set of actions, ...
  • The digital technologies (/interfaces) we use also construct reality; not a physical one but a virtual one.
    • For Verbeek "world" never seems to mean "virtual" though.

Beetje een brainfuck, maar dit is echt de crux:

There is a double intentionality involved here; one of technology toward “its” world, and one of human beings toward the result of this technological intentionality. In other words: humans are directed here at the ways in which a technology is directed at the world. This implies that, to conceptualize the basis for composite intentionality, the dash in Ihde’s schematic depiction of the hermeneutic relation human → (technology–world) should be replaced with an arrow. (393)

  • Hermeneutic: human -> (technology - world)
  • But now technology itself as a form of "technological intentionality", so the dash is replaced by the arrow
  • Composite: human -> (technology -> world)

Case study: art

Art that explores technological intentionality (as distinguished from human intentionality)

But rather than putting these intentionalities in the service of human relations to the world – as is the case in Ihde’s hermeneutic relations – they explore technological intentionalities as relevant in themselves. They aim to reveal a reality that can only be experienced by technologies, by making accessible technological intentionalities to human intentionality. (393)

Case 1: Augmented Intentionality

Wouter Hooijman's night pictures with long shutter times.

Cf. Husserl's eidetic reduction:

In a sense, his pictures can be seen as the embodiment of Husserl’s method of “essential intuition.” By imaginatively transforming a phenomenon in various ways, Husserl wanted to determine which aspects are essential to it and which are not. Hooijmans’s images seem to accomplish this not in the realm of ideas but in the materiality of a printed photograph. (394)

This is why we could call this form of composite intentionality "augmented intentionality"

His photographs blend together an infinite number of visual impressions into one single representation of the world, which the human eye could never produce itself. We could call this form of composite intentionality “augmented intentionality,” since it consists in making accessible to the human eye an artificially (394) expanded form of human intentionality.

Case 2: Constructive intentionality

De Realisten make stereophotography of everyday objects which then can be viewed with 3D equipment (I assume 3D glasses? I could not quickly find an example).

The “intentionality” that De Realisten gave to their stereographic camera is not directed at making visible an existing reality but at constructing a new reality. For this reason, the intentionality involved here can be called “constructive intentionality.” (394)

So in short: both augmented intentionality and constructive intentionality are forms of composite intentionality.

Conclusion

A material interpretation of Nietzsche's remark that a human is a rope between an animal and the Übermensch. Technology has become relevant for thinking human-technology amalgrams; either in the direction of posthumanism or Transhumanism.