Caputo Mystical Element of Heideggers Thought

CAPUTO

(56) "The greatness and the enduring thing in the thought of a thinker," he says, "consists simply in this, that he brings into words that which has all along been sounding (immer schon anklingt)" (SG, 48). Thus when Leibniz enunciated this principle, he was expressing something that was already being sounded forth. He "heard" an address which was already there but had never been articulated before. The important thing which Leibniz heard, according to Heidegger, is the "claim" (Anspruch) which the Principle of Ground makes upon us, the "demand" it puts upon us

(56-7) The power of this decree is nothing human, but the power of Being itself, for it is clear that for Heidegger Leibniz's principle is the address of Being to man. To the extent that we today are everywhere searching for reasons we live under the influence of Leibniz's principle and hear its calling. Yet we do not really hear what this principle says, because with all the receivers and transmitters which we have invented for listening to the most distant sounds, we do not hear the "claim" it is making upon us, the "decree" it lays upon us. We must all confess to having failed to hear this:’ --> Vgl. passage van Derrida in Envoi over Geschick, waarin Derrida zegt dat Heidegger hem waarschijnlijk verweten zou hebben dat hij de technologie van de post veralgemeniseert

PLAY

(58) ‘We are thus caught up in a fearful "play" (SG, 60-1). The more we search for grounds, the more groundless our existence becomes. It is as though the history of Being is playing with us, tantalizing us, indeed enticing us on to our own destruction. This is the first reference to the "play" of Being which Heidegger makes in SG, and I take it to be of the greatest significance. For one can see taking shape here the problem of the danger of Heidegger's path, which we discussed in Chapter One. The "Being" to which Heidegger invites us to be ''released'' appears to be a dangerous and destructive force which plays with the essence of man.’

Ground & Being

69: In saying that Being and ground belong together, Heidegger does not mean to say that Being "has" a ground but that Being "is" ground. Being does not have a ground but itself serves as the ground for every being. Being is itself ground-less (grund-los) (SG, 93), i.e., not grounded by anything else. Otherwise we would face an infinite regress, always looking for the ground of the ground of beings, etc. Inasmuch as Being is a ground without ground, Heidegger calls it the ''abyss" (Abgrund), that which lacks a basis and ground. Being then is both ground and abyss.

The leap from representation to non-representation

70: The familiar intonation had to do with the ''representation" of "beings," but the new intonation demands a more simple kind of "thinking'' of Being itself, of "Being as Being, i.e., as ground" (SG, 96). Now Heidegger raises the important question of how one makes one’s way from the old to the new key, how one leaves the metaphysical principle concerning the being for the non-representational thought of Being:'

70: ‘But we must not get the idea that the leap can be made easily, or straight off, without preparation.’ The five steps.

71: ’The steps are not five continuous steps, like the steps of a "logical discourse," because the first four steps have to do with the preparation for the leap, providing the "jumping-off" ground (Absprungsbereich) for the leap, while the fifth has to do with the leap itself. There is thus an essential discontinuity between them

71:

1) ‘(1) The first step, which Heidegger concedes was touched upon only in passing, concerns the incubation-period" of the Principle of Ground (SG, 96-8). For twenty-three hundred years, before Leibniz finally enunciated it, this principle "slept." Now since the Principle of Ground is indeed a saying about Being, as we have learned from the leap of thought, it is clear that this period of incubation is also a period in which Being itself, in its "truth," was likewise sleeping. The period of incubation is an epoch of Being, a period in which "Being withdrew itself as Being" (SG, 97). The time of incubation is a "dispensation of Being" (Seinsgeschick: SG, 98), a sending which withdraws.’

2) incubatie van PoSG stopt als een Grundsatz over zijnden, maar de incubatie is juist op diens hoogtepunt wat betreft het horen van PoR als een zeggen van zijn! (SG100)

3) 72: smv --> PoG als principium grande, het horen van de ‘claim’ van het principe: ‘And so, in this all important step, we were able to detect the “missionary” (geschicklich) movement of Being itself, and we were also able to understand that the demand to deliver reasons issued from Being itself.’

4) Mystieke poeet Angelus Silesius: things rest in their own grounds. 5: horen in het principe wat we in stap 4 hoorden

(72) Things do not need to have grounds delivered up for them. They do not have to be "certified" as beings by having grounds "supplied" for them. Rather, insofar as the being is, it emerges out of its own grounds, its own Being. It stands forth of itself; it shows itself from itself. This is what the Greeks originally meant by physis (EM, 11-2/11-2) and what the author of Being and Time meant by a phainomenon

THE PRINCIPLE OF GROUND AND THE HISTORY OF BEING

Vertaling & Epochen

73: ‘For the address or language of Being (die Sprache des Wesens: US, 200/94) is historical, not merely in the sense of having a history (Geschichte), but more fundamentally, in the sense of arising out of the mission of Being (Seinsgeschick) itself (SG, 161). The mission of Being is the way in which Being sends itself while at the same time withdrawing over the ages of Western history (SG, 109-10). The clue which Heidegger follows in pursuing the missionary (geschickliche) movements of Being which come to expression in the Principle of Sufficient Ground is, therefore, a linguistic one, viz., the seemingly innocent translations of logos by ratio, and of ratio by Vernunft and Grund. These translations (übersetzungen) are not harmless human conventions for Heidegger, but contain within themselves an entire tradition (ü), i.e., a process by which Being itself "hands itself over" from one age to the next (SG, 163-4, 171). These translations are not human decisions at all (SG, 161), but the way in which language itself is speaking to us. Thus each translation bespeaks its own age, its own distinctive epoch of Being. The task which Heidegger sets for himself now is to "hear" (erhört)’

74: ‘Only by following these lectures can we understand Heidegger’s critique of philosophical reason, for Heidegger’s critique is essentially historical. That is, he thinks that what philosophical reason means is what it has come to mean by way of an historical process. The limits of philosophy are limits which it has assumed by its translation into the words ratio and “reason.” For there was once and there can be again a more original kind of speaking and thinker before ratio, Grund, and Vernunft were spoken which, being simpler than philosophy, is more fundamental than it. Thus the thinking which listens to Leibniz’ principle which we have so far undertaken must be both a thinking back on (andenken: SG, 107) the primal source from which philosophical reason derives, and a thinking forward to (Vordenken) a new beginning, at the end of philosophy, in which the ringing together of Being and ground can be heard again.’

Conditions of possibility & Ground

Behind the formula "a priori conditions of possibility" is hidden the rendering of the sufficient reason (Grund), the ratio sufficiens which, as ratio, is pure reason (Vernunft). (SG, 126)

The unity of history of western thought (no progression):

(76-7) This multiplicity of words is nothing "bewildering," for behind it lies the "sameness and simplicity of the mission of Being and accordingly a solid constancy of the history of thought and of what is thought by it" (SG, 153). One might think that Heidegger is looking for the "rule" or "logic" in the history of Western thought, that like Hegel he wishes to find the idea which is relentlessly unfolding in history. But Heidegger immediately waylays this suggestion:

The epochs cannot be derived from one another and reduced to the course of a continuous process. (SG, 154)

While there is a unity to the history of the West, it is not the unity of a continuous development, but the unity of a common source in the mission of Being, a common root, from which the diverse epochs spring up "suddenly" (SG, 154, 160) and unpredictably, like buds on a branch. The epochs arise from the "selfsame," and the selfsame is ''concealedly revealed" in them. Heidegger thus is looking for the place of "rest'' (SG, 144) behind these epochal fluctuations, for that which is "enduring" (Währende: SG, 160) in the missions, the "constant" (das Stets: SG, 161) in them, that which has "solid constancy" (gediegene Stetigkeit: SG, 153). This enduring constancy is not free from the flux of the missions in the sense of being the end or cessation of them, the final and exhaustive mission, but rather in the sense of being their source. One can see in these expressions very clearly the problem which Löwith underlines, viz., that Heidegger's latest writings have taken a turn away from the historical and towards the atemporal.’

(78) Thus we must look back further to the Greek logos, of which ratio is itself the translation. To what extent, then, Heidegger now asks, does logos, in its Greek sense, belong together with the Greek conception of Being? Logos comes from the verb !egein, which means, as Heidegger has consistently maintained over the years, "to collect together," "to lay one thing beside another," "to arrange one thing after another" (SG, 178); hence its translation by the verb reor.6 Thus !egein means to let something lie forth (vorlieganlassen) and so come into appearance. In "arranging" a thing one sets it into the proper context within which it can emerge as the thing that it is. Now that which itself lies forth (das Vorliegende) is that which comes to presence of itself (das von-sich-her-Anwesende): ‘Legein and logos are the letting lie forward of the thing which comes to presence in its presence. (SG, 179). But that which comes to presence in its presence (das Anwesende in seinem Anwesen) is what the Greeks mean by the being in its Being. Thus “logos means Being” (SG, 179). Now insofar as that which lies forward (das Vorliegende) is that upon which “properties” may be [79!] based, and “about which” there can be talk, logos also means “ground.” Thus in logos, both Being and ground are named together.’

The strange status of the Greek origin: Quote Heidi: ‘The belonging together of Being and ground comes into the word which is called logos only for a moment which, in terms of the mission of Being, is uniquely lofty and perhaps the highest of all. (SG, 180)’ Caputo 79: ‘There was a flash of lightning, a flash of Being itself, which took place in the thinking of Heraclitus (VA, 227), but as is the case with lightning it passed away as soon as it happened. The subsequent history of Being, instead of unfolding what the early Greeks experienced (as in Hegel’s view), did precisely the opposite, viz., it covered over its beginnings all the more completely (SG, 180; cf. EM 136-49/149-64). The original belonging together of Being and ground was lost and the two were separated.’ 79: ‘The self-evident validity of this rational search for causes rests upon the now no longer heard ringing together of the unity of Being and ground in the Greek word logos.’

PLAY

79-80: ‘Thus Heidegger’s “historical critique” of philosophy is completed. Philosophy “as a thing of reason” (eine Sache der ratio: WdP, 22-3) is the result of an oblivion; it is a fall from a primal time in which it was recognized that the thing lies forth of itself, that it rises up and stands before us on its own grounds. Philosophy is an oblivion of [80] the fact that things do not depend on human justification but that they emerge before us on their own. Philosophy is a tyranny over things which insists that nothing is unless human reason has certified its existence. What is needed instead of philosophy is a thinking which learns from the mystical poet to be like the rose, without why, i.e., to let things be. But there is one final difficulty to which we must now turn. The fallenness of philosophy is not a human error, but a withdrawal on the part of Being itself. Man is caught up, Heidegger said above, in a fearful “play” (SG, 60-1) which is not of his own making, the play between the sending and the withdrawal of Being itself.’

Paragraaf 5: The play of Being

Betekenisaspecten van Spiel:

  • Zijn kan niet ‘uitgelegd’ worden in termen van zichzelf of iets anders. We kunnen alleen over zijn denken wanneer zijn zich geeft, en wij zijn laten zijn (legein etc.) Cf. 80
  • Play & Correspondentie met zijn als zijn als het Unermessliche en tegelijk het Mass-gebende. De missie van Being. Betekenisverwantheid met de missive van Being.
  • We spreken dus over spel precies voor zover het geven van het zijn niet regels volgt. Tegen metaforische benadering ‘spel’. We kennen de essentie van spel niet. Hoe leren we die kennen? In het denken van het spelende geven van zijn, waarin het zijn maatgevend is. Zijn kent zijn spel, en wij als mens zijn gesetzt in dit spel. Hoe participeren wij? Is hier een verband aan te geven met de theia moira van Nancy, die hij karakteristiek interpreteert in termen van methexis: participatie als deling. Cf. 84
  • Tot de essentie van spel behoort in ieder geval negatief bepaald dat het spel geen ‘waarom’ heeft: geen grond, geen reden.
  • Heidegger denkt de afgrond, het unmatige en onmetelijke in termen van de essentie van het spel.
  • Wat is de essentie van spel? Heidegger kijkt naar Heraclitus: ‘He turns then to Heraclitus to defend his injection of the idea of play into his final pages of SG. It is nothing “playful and frivolous” (spielerisch) which has led us to speak of the play of Being, he says, but a necessity arising from our attempt to think in terms of the mission of Being.’ (82) We hebben al gezegd: spel houdt een midden tussen contingentie en noodzakelijkheid. Wat we daarmee bedoelen kan hier iets duidelijker worden. [?Ja?] Waarom speken we van ‘spel’? We maakten de sprong. Daarmee kwam het Geschick in zicht als het afgrondelijke geven van zijn dat ons verwijst naar een notie van spel om de orde van het Geschick te begrijpen. De spelende orde van het zijn is dus, na de sprong, iets wat noodzakelijk gedacht moet worden om Geschick te begrijpen. Tegelijk betekent de noodzakelijkheid van deze orde geenszins dat wij buiten het Geschick en diens ongegronde spel staan.
  • Spel & Vertaling! Het spel is werkzaam in de vertalingen van logos – ratio – grund / vernunft etc.
  • Het spel is ook een spel van ‘verstoppertje’ : zuschicken und entziehen

Veranderen: bij introduceren ‘play’ duidelijk maken het geen regelgeving betreft. Heidegger in deze termen begrijpen is ‘play’ als metafoor gebruiken. ‘Play’ is geen metafoor. Zoals Heidi zegt: de essentie van ‘spel’ is ons onbekend. We moeten de betekenis spel niet metaforisch benaderen vanuit spe lzoals wij dat kennen. (in de SvG keert Heidegger zich karakteristiek ook tegen metaforen. Verwijzing G-J, verwijzng SvG)

80: ‘We cannot hope to think Being by “explaining” it in terms of something else or even itself. To think Being adequately we must let Being be, let it lie forth (vorliegenlassen, legein) and emerge of itself (physis).’

80: after the leap ‘we have only now for the first time come into correspondence with “Being as Being”’ [Brievenwisseling]

81: ‘as that which to rational thought is “unmeasurable” (das Unermessliche) and which itself gives the measure (das Mass-gebende) to thought. Heidegger thus has completely reversed the Sophist dictum. it is not man or human reason which is the measure of things, but Being itself which is the measure of thought.’

81: ‘Being rests in itself, in its own “play.” And not only that: but man too rests, i.e., is “posited” and “staked” (gesetzt) upon this play.’

81: ‘But what “play” is this of which Heidegger is now speaking? It is not the play with which we are familiar. For Heidegger tells us straight off that up to now Western thought has been quite unable to comprehend the essence of play, because it has always considered play only as a being and, as such, something which is to be explained in terms of “ground, ratio, rule,” etc. (SG, 186). In metaphysics, to illustrate what Heidegger seems to be saying, play is considered to be a form of “leisure” whgose purpose is to allow us to retrun to “work,” a break in the “seriousness” of life, a flirtation with “unreality” which provides an “inter-lude” from the harshness of reality. In every case, play is “founded” upon and justified in terms of work and seriousness as the telos which supplies it with its sufficient reason.’

81: ‘This play is, like the rose, without why’

81: ‘Are we to think the “play” in terms of the “abyss” or the abyss in terms of the essence of play? In the final pages of SG Heidegger adapts the later alternative: to think the truth of Being, which we have attained by a leap, in terms of play.’

81-2: ‘He turns then to Heraclitus to defend his injection of the idea of play into his final pages of SG. It is nothing “playful and frivolous” (spielerisch) which has led us to speak of the play of Being, he says, but a necessity arising from our attempt to think in terms of the mission of Being. In listening to the Principle of Sufficient Ground, we have ultimately been led to hear the Greek word logos ringing through it. But what Heraclitus called logos he also called by other names: physis, that which emerges from out of itself; kosmos, the ordered totality of all things; and finally, aion, which is usually translated as “world-time.” But, for those of us who have taken the leap of thought, aion is the name for what we call the mission of Being.’

[Mission / missive]

82: Over fragment van Heraclitus: ‘Thus the fragment says the mission of Being is a child who plays. The child-king is the mystery of play upon which Being itself rests and upon which the life of man also rests. The mission of Being sends itself to us in a mysterious, play-like way.’ 82: ‘If one player throws a ball to another, then he “plays” the ball “to” the other. Heidegger says, then, that the mission of Being “plays Being and ground to us” over the history of Western metaphysics. This it does by means of the play which is at work in language in the translation from logos to ratio, and from ratio to Grund and Vernunft. The history of metaphysics is a vast “language-game” played not by man but by Being, a language-game in which we do not play with words, but words play with us (WHD, 83/118-9). The history of philosophy is the playing of Being with man.’ [Dit lijkt wel een metaforische benadering. / Play & Vertaling]

The sequence of epochs, their relation? 83. ‘The epochs spring up unpredictably; they are a “free play.” There is no “why” for the sequence of epochs.’

  1. ‘One cannot ground the sequence of epochs in a higher explanation. One can only let them be, accept them as they are.’

83: ‘The play of Being means that we must surrender every “why?” and remain content with “because.”

83: ‘Heidegger’s identification of the play of Being as the missionary movements of Being confirms what he said above about the play in which modern man is caught up: the more he searche for grounds the more groundless his existence becomes; the more fully he masters the energies of the earth, the less he is able to truly build and dwell upon the earth. The play is thus a counter-play (Widerspiel):

There is an enigmatical counter-play between the demand for delivery of a ground and the withdrawal of the basis (Boden). (SG. 60)” ‘

Het eigenaardige van de zijnsgeschiedenis zoals Heidegger die ziet, is dat in het spelende geven van het Zijn, het Zijn zichzelf ‘tegenspeelt’ door in het geven zichzelf essentieel niet te geven.

The game is thus a game of hiding:

  1. ‘It is a game of “hiding” itself from us in the very act by which it reveals itself. In addressing itself to us as the ratio sufficiens is has concealed the original belonging together of Being and ground in the Greek word logos.’

Waarvoor verstopt de waarheid van zijn zich? Voor de beheersende grijp van metafysica.

Spel en participatie

84: ‘Man is thus in no way a mere “spectator” or onlooker in this “game.” On the contrary, he is “drawn” (gezogen) into it and his whole essence is “staked” and placed upon it.’ --> Cf. Citaat SG186-7)

84: ‘If Being is a play then the role of Dasein is to play along with it. Dasein cannot, as in Leibniz, lay down first principles which Being must obey, nor, as in Kant, submit Being to reason’s own a priori synthesis, nor, with Nietzsche, expect Being to submit to its will. Dasein must give up philosophy and metaphysics altogether in order to “play along with” (mitspielen) the play of Being. That is the only measure we can take of the immeasurable.’

86: ‘The “jug” thus is not an “object”; it has not been subjugated to the demands of representational thinking. The jub abides in the region which lies outside the sphere of influence of the Principle of Ground. In the jug, Being and ground belong together, for the jug lies forth on its own. It does not need to have a reason rendered for it.’ participatie & dood

84: ‘But the way in which Heidegger suggests we play along with Being is to return to our mortality, to dwell in the nearness of death, to be come what we alone are, mortals.’

participatie & playing back / return play

87: ‘Now Heidegger tells us that mortals must learn to play along with the play of Being. That means that we must learn to play along with the play of language. To play “back” what Being plays “to” us. Thus if Being “plays to us Being and ground” (SG, 188), we must learn to make a “return play.” And there is no better example of such a return play than SG itself. For the central move in SG is a change of key in Leibniz’ principle from “nothing is without ground” to “nothing is without ground” a linguistic, auditory shift of stress which allows us to “hear” something we did not hear before. Heidegger thereby “returns” the play which language itself is playing to us.’

88: ‘There is a dialectic of address and response between Being and Dasein in SG, but the question is whether it is a true and genuine dialectic.

89: ‘For the sequence of epochs is not rule-governed but a play, whose movements come about “suddenly” and unpredictably. The history of Being is not a human doing at all; it is beyond man’s control and calculation. Indeed Heidegger even says, as Versényi points out, that in the end we can only wait (G, 37/62) upon this play. The play between Dasein and Being is not the loving play between God and the soul described by Angelus Silesius. It is a “dangerous game” in which we are the stakes.’

89: ‘In moving beyond the categories of both reason and religion, Heidegger’s play has become enigmatic and troubling, leading his critics to claim that he counsels self-surrender to a blind and purposeless power. And the work which Heidegger dedicates to a critique of the Principle of Ground, to which all philosophy must subscribe in one way or another, concludes by hearing in it the playing of a groundless play.’

Contra deze kritiek van ‘self-surrender’: het is alleen maar na de activiteit van de leap dat de ontvankelijkheid van het ‘luisteren’ het uitgangspunt wordt. Het gaat niet simpelweg om passiviteit, maar om een soort actieve ontvankelijkheid.

91: ‘But Dasein’s understanding of Being is its capacity to “transcend” (üersteigen, transcendere) beings to their Being, to transcend innerworldy entities to the horizon of the World itself. Thus the proper framework for discussing the essence of ground is “transcendence” (“transcendental” truth).’

95: ‘For in SG Heidegger shows that, beginning with the Greek logos, and passing through the Latin ratio, which is used to translate logos by the Romans, the medievals, and by Leibniz himself, up to the German Grund and Vernunft, the “self-same” thing has been speaking. In each of these words belonging to the Western metaphysical tradition the belonging together of Being and ground has been concealedly addressing itself to us. In these translations (Übersetzungen) the Western tradition (Überlieferung), which stems from the history of Being itself, hands itself over to us (SG, 163-4). These translations are not innocent human conventions; they are nothing human at all. They are the speaking of language itself (SG, 164), the address of Being to man who, in giving utterance to these words, is responding to the primal word of Being.’

Overgang van geschiedenis naar zijnsgeschiedenis. Een soort epoche v.d. sprong? En een eidetische reductie?

95: ‘In WG, Heidegger remained in a sense in the “natural attitutde” about Leibniz’ principle. He took it to be the expression of an historical individual. But in SG the natural-historical (historisch) attitude is broken and it is replaced by the critical-historical (seinsgeschichtlich) thinking which thinks this principle in terms of the history of Being itself.’

NIET spreken over ‘condition of possibility’ (doe ik wel ergens)

95: ‘Lacking the perspective of the mission of Being, the essence of ground is determined in WG as a “condition of possibility,” an idea which for the later Heidegger belongs to the metaphysics of subjectivity. The essence of ground is the “conditions of possibility” of the manifestedness of the being, of all “intentional” behavior, and of every question “why?”. But this is, as Heidegger argues in SG, the Kantian understanding of “ground” (SG, 126) which, instead of letting the being emerge on its own grounds, instead of living without why, makes it dependent on human thought.’

96: ‘Founding in WG is still confined withint the limits of what is criticized in the Discourse on Thinking (Gelassenheit) as “transcendental-horizontal” thinking. In WG, grounding is a transcendental a priori which renders beings possible and which, even if it is more fundamental than “representational” thought, still does not attain to the pristine simplicity of letting-be.’

110: ‘as the Geschick commences, being hails as logos and that means, hails in the essence of ground/reason. Seen in terms of the commencement of the Geschick of being, being and ground/reason. Seen in terms of the commencement ofthe Geschick of being, being and ground/reason “are” the same, and they remain the same, but in a belonging-together that diverges into a difference that varies historically.’ (PoR 110)