The ontological interpretation of informational privacy | Floridi, Ethics and Information Technology (2005) 7:185-200

Main claims

  1. "informational privacy is a function of the ontological friction in the infosphere, that is, of the forces that oppose the information flow within the space of information" (185)
  2. "digital ICTs (information and communication technologies) affect the ontological friction by changing the nature of the infosphere (reontologization);" (185)
  3. "digital ICTs can therefore both decrease and protect informational privacy but, most importantly, they can also alter its nature and hence our understanding and appreciation of it" (185)
  4. "a change in our ontological perspective, brought about by digital ICTs, suggests considering each person as being constituted by his or her information and hence regarding a breach of one’s informational privacy as a form of aggression towards one’s personal identity." (185)

Introduction

Goal is not an overview of privacy literature.

Rather, it is to argue in favour of a new ontological interpretation of informational privacy and of its moral value, on the basis of the conceptual frame provided by Information Ethics (Floridi, 1999; forthcoming-a). (185)

Informational Privacy and Computer Ethics

Why is informational privacy a pressing issue?

@2P2Q hypothesis (186):

  1. Increase in data Processing capacities
  2. the Pace of data processing
  3. The Quantity of data
  4. The Quality of data

Floridi's criticism: only focuses on obvious and secondary effects of the digital revolution. Floridi emphasizes digital, I think because for him that is just one part of a larger informational revolution.

This overlooks:

  1. A potential increase in privacy
  2. That privacy may change in nature.

Floridi instead argues that ICTs redraw the boundaries of informational privacy.

Examples:

  1. ICTs also allow more anonymous or non-personal interaction; e.g. people lying about their location by text.
  2. revisibility of data, vs. hard documents stored away somewhere, e.g. in parishes, that allow reconstruction of whole family trees.
  3. encryption, firewalls etc.

The new challenges of ICTs "have their roots in a radical and unprecedented transformation in the very nature (ontology) of the informational environment, of the informational agents embedded in it and of their interactions." (186)

Informational Privacy as a Function of Ontological Friction

Imagine four agents living in a house, representing a part of the infosphere.

Example of "ontological friction":

Accessibility, in its turn, is an epistemic factor that depends on the ontological features of the infosphere, i.e. on the nature of the specific agents, of the specific environment in which they are embedded and of the specific interactions implementable in that environment by those agents. If the walls in the house are few and thin and all the students have excellent hearing, the degree of accessibility is increased, the informational gap is reduced and informational privacy is more difficult to obtain and protect. (186)

Explanation of "ontological friction":

The ontological features of the infosphere determine a specific degree of ‘‘ontological friction’’ regulating the information flow within the system. ‘‘Ontological friction’’ refers here to the forces that oppose the information flow within (a region of) the infosphere, and hence (as a coefficient) to the amount of work required for a certain kind of agent to obtain information (also, but not only) about other agents in a given environment, e.g. by establishing and maintaining channels of communication and by overcoming obstacles in the flow of information such as distance, noise, lack of resources (especially time and memory), amount and complexity of the data to be processed etc. (186-187)

Environmental affordances and constraints are of course relative to the "informational capacities" (187) of agents.

Example: "In our model, brick walls provide much higher ‘‘ontological friction’’ for the flow of acoustic information than a paper-thin partition, but this is irrelevant if the students are deaf." (187)

Consider closed vs. open office spaces.

Main claim:

Put simply, informational privacy is a function of the ontological friction in the infosphere. It follows that any factor affecting the latter will also affect the former. (187)

@data @superconductivity

This also shows why ICTs are relevant. ICTs can lower the ontological friction of the infosphere incredibly due to their "data superconductivity" (187)

There is however a difference between old and new ICTs.

Ontological friction and the difference between old and new ICTs

Already the alfabet, printing, etc. smoothened friction and allowed increase informational flows.

Warren and Brandeis' article on privacy was largely in response to photography and its distribution in newspapers.

However, it is not the case that there is a steady decrease in informational privacy.

As emphasized above, changes in the nature both of the environment and of the agents play a pivotal role as well, so the actual ontological friction, and hence the corresponding degree of informational privacy in a region of the infosphere, are the result of a fine balance among several factors. (187)

E.g. the newly emerging metropolis offered a new kind of anonymity that counteracted the effects of the latest ICTs. Big cities offer more privacy than small villages where everyone knows everyone.

Old ICTs characteristics:

Old ICTs have always tended to reduce the ontological friction in the infosphere because they enhance or augment the agents embedded in it. (187)

  • Tele-ICTs (telescope, telegraph, radio, telephone, television) are enhancing
  • Recording ICTs (alphabet, writing and printing technologies, video recorder etc.) are augmenting
  • Ultimately, these were bundled together.

The main point here is that these ICTs are:

  1. agent-oriented (enhancing or augmenting)
  2. predigital

This ‘‘agent-oriented’’ trend in old, predigital ICTs is well represented by dystopian views of informationally omnipotent agents, able to overcome any ontological friction, to control every aspect of the information flow, to acquire any personal data and hence to implement the ultimate surveillance system, thus destroying all informational privacy, ‘‘the dearest of our possessions’’. (188)

The continuist interpretation of the difference between old and new ICTs entails that new ICTs are simply more powerful, but essentially more of the same:

All past ICTs have tended to reduce the ontological friction in the infosphere by enhancing or augmenting the agents inhabiting it, but digital ICTs are no exception, so the 2P2Q explanation is correct. Orwell’s ‘‘Big Brother’’ is readily associated with the ultimate database. (188, N.B. this is the position Floridi argues against)

The fundamental difference between old and new ICTs is that new ICTs can re-ontologize the infosphere:

The difference between old and new ICTs is that the former tended to reduce informational privacy, whereas the latter can also increase it. This is because the former tended to enhance or augment the agents involved more and more, whereas the latter can also change the very nature of the infosphere (that is, of the environment itself, of the agents embedded in it and of their interactions). The 2P2Q explanation misses a fundamental difference between old and new ICTs: the former are enhancing or augmenting whereas the latter are best understood as re-ontologizing technologies, an important distinction that needs to be analyzed in some detail. (188)

Digital ICTs as re-ontologizing technologies

Introduction of the neologism "re-ontologization" (cf. re-engineering).

Five trends of re-ontologization:

  1. The digitization of the informational environment
    • In 2002 5 exabytes of digital data were stored, which is equivalent to 37000 new Library of Congress's
  2. Homogenization of the processor and the processed (between digital resources and digital tools)
    • "The ontology of the information technologies available (e.g. software, databases, communication protocols etc.) is now the same as (and hence fully compatible with) the ontology of their objects." (188)
    • Artefacts are increasingly computerized
    • Even whole social environments will be computerized; ubiquitous computing / ambient intelligence
  3. Evolution of new informational agents
    • "These new artificial agents share the same ontology with their environment and can operate in it with much more freedom and control. This is where digital ICTs can be mistaken for mere augmenting technologies. Arguably, the infosphere will be progressively populated by artificial or hybrid agents, to which other (not necessarily human) agents will be able to delegate tasks and decisions. It is to be expected that the moral status of such agents will become an ever more challenging issue." (189)
    • N.B. augmenting was one of the characteristics of Old ICTs according to Floridi.
  4. The informationalization of interactions
    • "In the re-ontologized infosphere populated by ontologically equal entities and agents, where there is no ontological difference between processors and processed, interactions become equally digital. They are all interpretable as ‘‘read/write’’ (i.e., access/alter) activities, with ‘‘execute’’ the remaining type of process." (189)
  5. ! Mutation of old (human) agents into informational agents
    • "by re-ontologizing the infosphere, digital ICTs have also brought to light the intrinsically informational nature of human agents." (189)
    • does not concern digital alter egos, online identities, or their "data shadow" (Westin, 1968)
    • "Computers and digital ICTs are not augmenting or empowering in the sense just explained. They are ontologizing devices because they engineer environments that the user is then enabled to enter through (possibly friendly) gateways. So, whilst a dishwasher interface is a panel through which the machine enters into the user’s world, a computer interface is a gate through which a user can be telepresent in the infosphere (Floridi, forthcoming-b)." (189)
    • "This simple but fundamental difference underlies the many spatial metaphors of ‘‘cyberspace’’, ‘‘virtual reality’’, ‘‘being online’’, ‘‘surfing the web’’, ‘‘gateway’’ and so forth."

Summary:

The re-ontologization of the infosphere, just sketched, has been causing an epochal, unprecedented migration of humanity from its Umwelt to the infosphere itself. Inside it, humans are informational agents among other informational (possibly artificial) agents. They operate in an environment that is friendlier to ‘‘digital creatures’’. They have the ontological status of informational entities. And as digital immigrants are replaced by digital natives, the latter may come to appreciate that there is no ontological difference between infosphere and Umwelt, only a difference of levels of abstractions (Floridi and Sanders, 2004a; forthcoming).

Informational Privacy

Advantages of the new approach that sees privacy as a function of ontological friction (all on 190):

  1. Re-ontologization includes the 2P2Q as a subset
  2. "contrary to the 2P2Q hypothesis, the new approach explains why digital ICTs can also enhance informational privacy"
  3. although "there is still a sense in which the information society provides less protection for informational privacy than the industrial society did."
  4. "the ontological hypothesis provides the right frame within which to assess contemporary interpretations of informational privacy"
  5. "can indicate how we might wish to proceed in the future in order to protect informational privacy in the newly re-ontologized infosphere."

Rest of paper treats these points one by one (except the first one, which is already obvious).

Empowering the informational agent.

Extra protection at

  • Generation
  • Storage
  • Exploitation of data.

Return of the digital community

"We are back into the now digital community, where anonymity can no longer be taken for granted, and hence where the decrease in ontological friction caused by old and new ICTs can have all its full-blown effects on informational privacy." (191)

Increases surveillance, for good and bad.

Overall point is that there are differing (both on individual and communal level) thresholds for what is acceptable ontological friction (or lack thereof).

The information society has revised the threshold of ontological friction and therefore provides a different sense in which its citizens appreciate their informational privacy. Your supermarket knows exactly what you like, but so did the owner of the grocery where your grandparents used to shop. Your bank has detailed records of all your visits and of your financial situation, but how exactly is this different from the old service?

" Some steps forward into the information society are really steps back into a small community and, admittedly, the claustrophobic atmosphere that may characterize it." (192)

About being able to find out information about someone online, difference between then and now/future:

Shocking? Yes, in the anonymous industrial society, but not really in the pre-industrial village before it, or in the information society after it. In Guarcino, a small village south of Rome of roughly a thousand people, everybody knows everything about everybody else, ‘‘vita, morte e miracoli’’, ‘‘life, death and miracles’’, as they say in Italian. There is very little ontological friction provided by anonymity so there is very little informational privacy in that respect. A difference with the information society is that we have seen that the latter has the digital means to protect what the small village must necessarily forfeit. (192)

I remember these sections quite literally from Floridi's book on Infosphere. Think that chapter is only a modified version of this article.

Therefore I stop reading for now, because privacy is actually not my focus at the moment. Probably worth it to read it later.