Bayesian Abduction | Peter Lipton, Ch. 7 2nd edition "Inference to the Best Explanation"

Lipton starts with a pretty standard discussion of Bayesianism.

Bayes' Theorem matches some explanatory intuitions, e.g.:

Surprising evidence confirms more -> lower P(E), higher posterior. (Lipton 2004, 104) (Look up that example of the man with the birth control pill; we never expected him to get pregnant).

Disconfirmation: when p(E|H) is lower than p(E), we have diconfirmation. Then the hypothesis makes the evidence more surprising than what it is considered by itself.

Then Lipton compares possible strategies for countering Van Fraassen's boosting argument (Bayesianism is rational and coherent; IBE is incoherent because it deviates from Bayes' theorem).

One may argue that Bayesianism is not entirely right, and point to canonical problems such as the problem of old evidence or the problem of new theories [@Lipton2004a, 105; @Easwaran2011a]. One may also point out that Bayesianism fails to account for the ways people actually reason, including all their fallacies and deviations from the Bayesian rational results. So even though Bayesianism may be a correct normative account of inference, this opens the door for IBE as a descriptive account of how people actually reason [@Lipton2004a, 105]. Another way out may be to admit that indeed Bayesianism places constraints on combinations of degrees of beliefs, but that this does not imply a commitment to any particular belief. What Lipton means is that, when we let explanation guide our inferences with IBE and we end up with a "boosted" posterior, this does not necessarily mean that we violated Bayes' theorem. Instead, we may preserve the consistency that Bayes' theorem prescribes by giving that explanatory hypothesis a higher prior. So in this response, explanatory considerations guide our inferences, but this does not necessarily have to conflict with the probabilistic consistency of Bayes' theorem [@Lipton2004a, p.106]. This is already a form of compatibilism in the sense that IBE and Bayesianism may exist next to each other. We established, however, that a good account of compatibilism should show how both theories relate and ideally complement each other. Lipton's own proposal indeed considers IBE and Bayesianism to be complementary:

Bayesian conditionalization can indeed be an engine of inference, but it is run in part on explanationist tracks. That is, explanatory considerations may play an important role in the actual mechanism by which inquirers 'realize' Bayesian reasoning. [@Lipton2004a, p.107]

In other words, "explanatory considerations provide a central heuristic we use to follow the process of conditionalization, a heuristic we need because we are not very good at making the probabilistic calculations directly" [@Lipton2004a, 107].

Where do they come in?

"explanatory considerations may help inquirers to determine prior probabilities, to move from prior to posterior probabilities, and to determine which data are relevant for the hypothesis under investigation." (107)

"may also play a crucial role in scientists' expression of their preference for hypotheses that promise to be fertile, that is to explain phenomena in addition to those directly under scrutiny at the time of inference" (107)

Lipton is not after compatibilism with a "thin" notion of IBE, where "best" equals "most probable" and IBE only makes minor additions to Bayesianism. Instead, he wants to make it compatible with his "thick" notion of the most lovely explanation. Lipton's main thesis is that scientists infer the most lovely explanation, which is the explanation that adds the most understanding, and that in doing so they are ipso facto generally also choosing the most likely explanation [@Lipton2000, p.6; @Lipton2004a, 107].

This heuristic answer circumvents Van Fraassen's argument that IBE must be wrong because Bayesianism is right: IBE is now a way of doing Bayesianism! However, this comes with the great burden of showing that being guided by the explanatory considerations of IBE indeed approximates or tracks the normative probabilistic outcomes of Bayesianism.

If these suggestions are along the right lines, then arguing that Inference to the Best Explanation is wrong because Bayesianism is right is like arguing that thinking about technique cannot help my squash game because the motion of the ball is governed by the laws of mechanics. Even if Bayesianism gave the mechanics of belief revision, Inference to the Best Explanation might yet illuminate its psychology.

The squash reference is less innocent in hindsight: Lipton died during a game of squash after having a heart attack.

Then p.108-109: cases by Tversky and Kahneman that show that people suck at Bayesian inference.

What's the conclusion? Seems to be support for incompatibilism: Bayesianism is "descriptively wrong and explanationism descriptively right." (11) So rather they are doing something different.

An obvious challenge to Lipton's view are the many cases where people reach conclusions based on explanatory considerations that do not agree with Bayesian outcomes. A clear example is the case of Linda the Bank Teller [@Lipton2004a, cf. p.110]. Examples like these may be taken as an argument for incompatibility. If IBE is descriptively right in describing how people actually reason (including their mistakes), and Bayesianism descriptively wrong, what's the common ground between the two?

Lipton is more optimistic than for example Tversky and Kahneman, who more or less conclude that we are bad Bayesians by relying on heuristics. Lipton instead points out that 1) fallacies are atypical, and if our heuristics would never track likeliness it becomes hard to imagine how we deal with our complex environment on a daily basis; 2) that we can always point out the fallacies to those making them, after which the correctness of the Bayesian solution can be recognized [@Lipton2004a, p.111].

Lipton admits that his notion of loveliness does not neatly map onto any one element of Bayes' theorem. However, because we cannot follow the Bayesian recipe in our daily lives, he suggests three ways in which explanatory consideration may "lubricate the Bayesian mechanism" [@Lipton2004a, p.114-116].

Firstly, they may help in determining the likelihood, which is needed to move from prior to posterior. Perhaps loveliness is an indication of the likelihood $P(E|H)$, which would in turn influence the posterior probability of a hypothesis. In any case, loveliness does not exclusively map onto likelihood.

Secondly, they may help in determining the priors. If loveliness indeed plays a role in conditionalization, then it also has a role in determining priors "in large part because today's priors are usually yesterday's posteriors" [@Lipton2004a, p.115]. The same holds for the prior over the evidence, insofar as this may be the result of a previous conditionalization. The prior over the evidence can be interpreted as how surprising it would be to observe evidence E, given the current beliefs. Additionally, explanatory virtues such as simplicity may directly play a role in determining the prior probability of hypotheses.

Thirdly, they may play a role in determining what evidence is relevant to take into consideration. Bayesianism is silent in this regard. In IBE, we may instead "come to see that a datum is epistemically relevant to a hypothesis precisely by seeing that the hypothesis would explain it" [@Lipton2004a, p.116].

To summarize, Lipton claims that our heuristics do not replace Bayesian reasoning, but in the general case help us realize its constraints, which we do ultimately recognize as normative for our reasoning. As a heuristic for Bayesianism, lovely explanations should be a guide for likely explanations, but Lipton put this forward as a line of research more than that he has conclusively shown this. Noticing that fallacies are an exception is barely a satisfying argument and we can easily show that we do not need fallacies for loveliness and likeliness to diverge. If we have a sick patient, a doctor may provide the extremely likely explanation: "the patient is ill". In Lipton's view you would think such an explanation receives a low likelihood because it is very unattractive, since it adds no understanding whatsoever. It is however a highly likely explanation because precisely it is so unspecific. Lipton has however provided a great kickstarter for the compatibility debate and many proposals work out one of his suggestions in more detail.