Doing Philosophy in Style: A New Look at the Analytic/Continental Divide | N.N. Trakakis
Philosophy Compass 7/12 (2012): 919-942
Abstract:
Questions of style are often deemed of marginal importance in philosophy, as well as in metaphilosophical debates concerning the analytic ⁄ Continental divide. I take issue with this common tendency by showing how style – suitably conceived not merely as a way of writing, but as a form of expression intimately linked to a form of life – occupies a central role in philosophy. After providing an analysis of the concept of style, I take a fresh look at the analytic ⁄ Continental division by examining the various stylistic differences between philosophers on each side. Despite these differences, I argue, both sides of the divide suffer from a common stylistic deficiency, and if this deficiency were rectified the gulf separating the two traditions may not appear as insurmountable as it presently does. To show this, I draw principally from the philosophy of religion, a field that has recently experienced a renewal in both the analytic and Continental traditions. (919)
Is the analytical/continental divide helpful? Or is this distinction spurious? The sheer diversity of for example "continental philosophy" is already dazzling: what is "held in common by exponents of existentialism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, structuralism, Frankfurt School Critical Theory, and postmodernism?" (919)
Common proposals for the distinction (cf. 919):
- substantive philosophical differences in typical theses and presuppositions
- realist or Platonic metaphyics
- vs. historically and temporally oriented metaphysics
- difference in questions asked / research field
- differences in method
- "quasi-scientific method that emphasises specialisation" (919)
- vs. "look beyond natural and formal sciences, taking the arts and humanities as its model of philosophical inquiry." (920)
Premises of this paper:
- "Philosophy, no matter what else it may be, is a thoroughly and perhaps inescapably literary pursuit."
- The question of style for the analytical/continental divide deserves more attention
- "This rich variety in style, however, is not only diminishing in today’s homogenised and professionalised academic discourse. It is also often assumed that style is philosophically unimportant." (920)
- It is often assumed that stylistic differences are shallow i.e. does not essentially affect the content of philosophy and as a consequence is likely not a good explanation of the continental/analytical divide.
Main claim of this paper:
"By taking a fresh look at the analytic ⁄ Continental divide, it can be seen that, in spite of the clear stylistic differences between philosophers on each side, there is a common stylistic deficiency that both groups suffer from." (920)
Paper contains a section on some self-referential issues on discussing styles, that revolve around the fact that one uses a particular style in such an argument (920-22).
Method over style
Main idea of Berel Lang: philosphy's neglect of style is part of it's own image, the ideological view of itself.
Lang brings this out by considering the differences between method and style. The kind of methodology usually practiced in philosophy, according to Lang, is impersonal and ahistorical, even when it professes to be interested in origins and genealogies. The rationale often lying behind a philosophical method is that ‘‘anyone can do or use it; the requirement of duplicability – the ‘re-application’ of the method should yield the same results – presupposes this condition.’’ 12 Style, on the other hand, is deeply personal and historical, ‘‘it is inseparable from the agent whose style it is,’’ which is why we speak of ‘the style of Dickens’ or ‘the style of Van Gogh’ (thus establishing a close link between style and ‘signature’, where signature is that which helps identify the maker or provenance of a work). But then to privilege method over style is to promote a conception of philosophy that shuns individuality, history and context, that denies "the particularity of the particular," this being the occupational hazard of philosophers who attempt to "speak out-of-time even when, as often happens, they take time seriously as a subject for philosophical analysis." (923)
This is especially prominent in analytical philosphy and natural science, where "any significant regard for style tends to lead to a departure from the standards of objectivity and rationality" (923)
924-925 discusses the concept of style, in particular the distinction between style and content, and shows it's contested.
Style differences between analytical and continental philosophy
Analytical:
Emphasis on clarity: "involves adopting a style of writing that is as simple, accessible and transparent as possible." (926)
- Motivation: the strong preference for commonsense beliefs
- Accompanying that, a "a preference for the style of expression that is found in (or would appeal to) the lay, non-specialised community of 'ordinary folk': a style that is plain, clear and concise." (926)
- "short and crisp sentences are to be preferred to convoluted and verbose ones"
- "technical and rhetorical language is to be avoided wherever possible in favour of straightforward and unadorned speech drawn from ordinary language" (926)
Slightly contradictory to that, a hang to formalisation, e.g. using calculus or formal logic.
Formalisation is a first step in rigorous reasoning that also requires precision (926), evidenced in meticulously defining terms and makes subtle distinctions etc.
There's a quite clear confluence between method and style here:
For a method of inquiry that favours, say, logical and conceptual analysis and argumentation will naturally lend itself to a neutral medium of discourse composed in an impersonal and disinterested style, so that the distinctive voice of the author is displaced by an impartial, probing and ‘rational’ voice (an ‘ideal observer’) that is devoid of bodily affect and cultural context. (927)
Q: What are concrete signal words/sentence structures that would reflect such a "neutral" voice?
Continental
One will usually find a language that makes use of a wide range of literary tropes and strategies, including undefined neologisms, parables and pseudonymous discourses, elaborate word-plays and paradoxical turns of speech, hyperbole, irony and metaphor, and so on. (928)
I quite like a comparison of Heidegger with some Zen schools.
Quote from McGrath on criticism that Heidegger's question of being is not sensible:
It may be that Heidegger’s question is not intended for answer; it may be that the question is designed to break down our comprehension, creating confusion, an incapacity to proceed with business as usual… On this reading, the ambiguity generated by Heidegger is not, then, the chaos generated by unclear thinking, but a deliberate and skillfully executed obfuscation – like a Zen koan – designed to break our heads and free us of the hardened categories that obstruct genuine understanding. (McGrath quoted on p.929)
About which Trakakis remarks:
This inevitably creates difficulties in comprehension and interpretation, and so reading such works may be hard work. But who ever said that philosophy should be easy? To complain about the difficulty of, say, understanding Heidegger or Derrida would be to miss the point that a language less complex and less subtle may lack the faithfulness to the phenomena and realities they are attempting to describe and disclose. (929)
See the 202011181522-aesthetics_of_difficulty.md.md .
Style of writing and style of life
Main argument of the author:
But the quite stronger point I wish to make is that a way of writing (and, especially, a way of philosophical writing) should inform and inhere in a way of life. In other words, a style of writing is at its best when it is grounded in a certain, particularly admirable style of life. But, I wish to argue, it is this very connection between life and style that is lacking in both analytic and Continental philosophy. (931)
It's quite clear how it is lacking in the "neutral" and detached "objective" style of analytical philosophy, but a bit less obvious to me how this holds in continental philosophy (which does seem closer to existential questions).
Claim of the author is that continental philosophy is also lacking here in this regard:
But what has largely gone unnoticed is that Continental philosophers– unlike the medieval mystics they attempt to emulate – fail to contextualise their apophatic discourse within a broader way of life that would give their negativity not only rhetorical effect, but also genuine substance and style. (933)
Should philosophy then again become propaedeutic to theology, in a way?
The fear, however, is not entirely unjustified, for it points to the realisation that the ideal of a purely secular philosophy – one that is purged from all spiritual practices – is nothing but a chimera. Philosophy, conceived as an ascetic discipline, cannot completely sever its religious roots, even if it is not practiced within the parameters of a religious tradition or institution. (937)
Reflection:
I really enjoyed this paper, but near the end the focus of the continental/analytical divide became very weak.
The somewhat weak and easy conclusion is that by recognizing their own failures (in terms of style and embededness in life), "the hope that new avenues of communication will be opened that will bring the two closer together, making each more receptive to the insights of the other." (938).