The Principle of Indifference
The Principle of Indifference states that when we do not have relevant evidence when considering the possible outcomes of some event, we should distribute the epistemic probabilities (or "credences" or "degrees of beliefs" in Bayesian terms) equally over those outcomes.
In the Bayesian framework, this principle can be used as a guide towards assigning a prior that is non-informative. Note that distributing degrees of belief in frequentist statistics does not mean anything, as there you would not specify a prior but just observe frequencies of outcomes when repeating some event.
Bertrand's paradox and variants thereof points out that there is no unique way to apply the principle of indifference for some given problem. This is because we can make different choices in what our hypothesis space is (i.e. what we apply our "indifference" to and over which we distribute our credences).
Compare to the maximum entropy principle .