Defeasible reasoning

From SEP:

Reasoning is defeasible when the corresponding argument is rationally compelling but not deductively valid. The truth of the premises of a good defeasible argument provide support for the conclusion, even though it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. In other words, the relationship of support between premises and conclusion is a tentative one, potentially defeated by additional information. Philosophers have studied the nature of defeasible reasoning since Aristotle’s analysis of dialectical reasoning in the Topics and the Posterior Analytics, but the subject has been studied with unique intensity over the last forty years, largely due to the interest it attracted from the artificial intelligence movement in computer science. There have been two approaches to the study of reasoning: treating it either as a branch of epistemology (the study of knowledge) or as a branch of logic. In recent work, the term defeasible reasoning has typically been limited to inferences involving rough-and-ready, exception-permitting generalizations, that is, inferring what has or will happen on the basis of what normally happens. This narrower sense of defeasible reasoning, which will be the subject of this article, excludes from the topic the study of other forms of non-deductive reasoning, including inference to the best explanation, abduction, analogical reasoning, and scientific induction. This exclusion is to some extent artificial, but it reflects the fact that the formal study of these other forms of non-deductive reasoning remains quite rudimentary.

The idea of defeasible reasoning is introduced by a seminal paper of Pollock ( 1987 ) called Defeasible Reasoning.

Pollock's idea of defeasible reasoning allows a more formalized account of Toulmin's argumentation model that opposed the idea that arguments should be deductively valid. From Prakken, H. (2018). Historical overview of formal argumentation. In P. Baroni, D. Gabbay, M. Giacomin, & L. van der Torre (Eds.), Handbook of Formal Argumentation (Vol. 1, pp. 73-141). College Publications:

The ‘classic’ logicians’ view attacked by Toulmin [1958] had been that all arguments should be deductively valid, that is, the truth of their premises should guarantee the truth of their conclusion, and that the only source of fallibility of good arguments is their premises. Influenced by Toulmin, the fields of informal logic and argumentation theory had already questioned this view and argued that arguments that fail to meet this standard of inferential perfection can still be good, as long as they withstand critical scrutiny. Pollock [1987] gave us the tools to formalise this new account, with his notion of a defeasible reason. (Prakken 2018, 82)

Pollock proposed an alternative account to deductive reasons in order to better capture ordinary reasoning (outside of the field of mathematics), called defeasible reasons:

In Pollock’s approach, the inference rules (in his terminology “reasons”) used to construct arguments come in two kinds: deductive and defeasible reasons (in his early work called “conclusive’ and “prima facie” reasons). An argument can be defeated on its applications of defeasible reasons, which can happen in two ways. Rebutting defeaters attack the conclusion of a defeasible inference by supporting a conflicting conclusion. For example, ‘Tweety can fly since it is a bird and birds typically fly’ can be attacked by ‘Tweety cannot fly since Tweety is a penguin and penguins cannot fly’. Undercutting defeaters instead attack the defeasible inference itself, without supporting a conflicting conclusion. For example: if the object looks red, this is a reason for concluding, defeasibly, that the object is red; but the presence of red illumination interrupts the reason relation without suggesting any conflicting conclusion. Pollock formalized several defeasible reasons that he found important in human cognition, such as reasons for perception, memory, induction, the statistical syllogism and temporal persistence, as well as undercutting defeaters for these reasons. (Prakken 2018, 82).

It's good to realize that this account then also requires an indication of the strength of a rebuttal or undercutting. Pollock's focus was on epistemic reasoning, so he formulated this idea of strength numerically as degrees of belief.

Defeasible reasons != nonmonotonic consequence notions:

Defeasible reasons should not be confused with nonmonotonic consequence notions. It is possible to design argumentation logics with nonmonotonic consequence notions in which nevertheless all arguments have to be deductively valid. For example, in classical argumentation arguments are classical implication relations from consistent subsets of a possibly inconsistent body of information and the only source of fallibility of arguments is their premises. (Prakken 2018, 84)

Defeasible reasons != deductive inference rules with assumption-type premises:

Defeasible reasons should also not be confused with deductive inference rules with assumption-type premises. Thinking otherwise would have the odd consequence that even the classically valid rules of inference become defeasible when applied to assumptions. (Prakken 2018, 84)

Prakken's summary on this topic:

Dogma has it that all arguments should be deductively valid, that is, the truth of their premises should guarantee the truth of their conclusion. The fields of informal logic, argumentation theory and epistemology have questioned this dogma and argued that arguments that fail to meet this standard of perfection can still be good, as long as they withstand critical scrutiny. The field of formal argumentation has shown that this idea can be formalised. (Prakken 2018, 127)