Se: Hegel’s Absolute and Heidegger’s Ereignis
@absolute @Ereignis
Authors:
118
‘Only insofar as it is what divides can the daimōn also be what assigns a fate and what destines [daiomai first means “to divide,” then “to assign”’
Cf. het opdelen dat Agamben ook bij Schmitt vooropstelt, en dat ook in Geschick centraal staat: verdelen en ordenen. Unfolding of difference. Cf. ook Derrida’s destiny through differance.
124
M.b.t. Hegel’s Absolute:
‘Eternity is not something before time but is, in essence, fulfilled time (erfüllte Zeit), finished history. Hegel states this clearly at the end of the Phenomenology: “Spirit necessarily appears in Time, and it appears in Time just so long as it has not grasped its pure Notion, i.e., until it has annulled time... Until Spirit has completed itself in itself, until it has completed itself as world-Spirit, it cannot reach its consummation as self-conscious Spirit.”’
‘Hence the essential orientation of the Absolute towards the past, its appearance in the figure of totality and remembrance. Contrary to an ancient tradition of thought that considers the present as the privileged dimension of temporality, Hegel regards the past as the figure of fulfilled time, time that has returned to itself. It is, however, a question of a past that has abolished its essential relation to the present and the future, a “perfect” past (teleios, to use the term with which Stoic grammarians characterize one of the forms of the conjugation of the verb), in which no historical destination remains to be realized.’
--> Oftewel, dit is de situatie waarin de geschiedenis geen enkel potentieel meer heeft? Waarom niet? Omdat er niets langer impotentieel is.
Dat reflecteert dus de situatie waarin het verleden niets dan een museum is, een picture gallery, de dood van traditie:
‘In the “paralyzed unrest” of the absolute concept, what is ultimately achieved is simply what has happened. What is fulfilled is only the past, and what human spirit must recognize as proper at the point at which it extinguishes time is its having-been, its history, which now confronts it as if gathered into a space: a “picture gallery” (Galerie von Bildern). The end thus spirals back to the beginning.’
--> Tegenover deze voltooide geschiedenis, waarin dus feitelijk elke traditie als overlevering is geneutraliseerd, en simpelweg is begrepen wat is gebeurd, staat Bartleby en Agamben met hun preoccupatie met wat niet is gebeurd. Cf. quote uit stuk over Benjamin. Cf. Sec. literatuur van Heiden.
125:
‘And how are we to conceive of a timeless past and memory that no longer refer to a present and to a future? A total memory that is always present to itself and that therefore has nothing to remember?’
126
‘The suggestion has also been made—and this is equally possible—that with the supremacy of the Absolute’s orientation toward the past, the fulfilled figure of the human may instead have the form of a book that forever gathers and recapitulates in its pages all the historical figures of humanity’
M.b.t. absolute taal: ‘For what is a truly fulfilled discourse that has exhausted all its historical figures and has returned to itself, if not a dead language?’
Suggestie van Agamben:
‘Or is what is at issue here a language that, while remaining human and alive, dwells in itself—a language no longer destined to grammatical and historical transmission, a language that, as the universal and novel language of redeemed humanity, coincides without residue with human activity and praxis?’
128
‘Only if the two sides (the Without Figure and the Fulfilled Figure) are thought together in their reciprocal appropriation can there be *se itself, the frontal vision of God. As long as we remain in only one of these two aspects, there can be only the repetition of one of the figures of the negative foundation of the metaphysical tradition, but no fulfillment. In the first case, the phenomenon subsists as the absolute appearance of nihilism; in the second, the Without Figure remains hidden in the shadows of mystical darkness.’
129
M.b.t. Heidegger’s Ereignis
‘Here, too, the entry of thinking into the proper, into *se and into the simplicity of idios and ēthos, is paradoxically the most difficult matter to consider. Here too, this matter appears as “the coming of what has been” (die Ankunft des Gewesenen).’
‘In each case, the decisive element in the characterization of Ereignis with respect to the Hegelian Absolute is finitude.’
The finitude of Ereignis is finitude in itself, not in relation to infinity.
‘What is decisive in this passage as well is the idea of an end, an achievement, a final dwelling in the proper. The thought that considers finitude in itself, with no more reference to the in-finite, is the thought **of the finite as such, that is, of the end of the history of Being:’ **
**Lange quote over Ereignis without destiny. **
130-1
‘For what can be the sense of a destination that no longer withdraws from what it destines, a concealment that no longer conceals itself, but rather shows itself to thought as such? And what does it mean that withdrawal, which “characterized metaphysics in the figure of the oblivion of Being,” now shows itself as the “dimension of concealment itself”? What does it mean for Ereignis to be Enteignis? What does it mean to think concealment (lēthē) as such? What can it mean, if not that what appeared in metaphysics as the oblivion of Being (in the sense of an objective genitive: man forgets Being) now shows itself as what it is, that is, as the pure and absolute self-forgetting of Being?’
131
‘We cannot speak of there being something (Being) that subsequently forgets itself and conceals itself (we cannot speak of a name that withdraws, destining itself in events of speech). Rather, what takes place is simply a movement of concealment without anything being hidden or anything hiding, without anything being veiled or anything veiling—pure self-destining without destiny, simple abandonment of the self to itself.’
‘This can only mean that “the history of Being is finished,” that Ereignis is the place of the “farewell from Being and time”; Being no longer destines anything, having exhausted its figures (the figures of its oblivion) and revealing itself as pure destining without destiny and figure.’
ECHTER, waar schiet Heidegger tekort? ‘But, at the same time, this pure destining without destiny appears as the Proper of man, in which “man and Being reach each other in their nature”’
‘Wat thinking must confront here is no longer tradition or history—destiny—but, rather, destining itself (the hermeneutic interpretation of Heidegger thus reaches its limit). But this destining—the Proper—is pure abandonment of the self to what has neither propriety nor destiny; it is pure ac-customing [as-sue-fazione] and habit.’
Wat is dan het eigenlijke van de mens, diens ethos? DEEL VAN CONCLUSIE:
‘The most proper, ēthos, *se of humankind—of the living being without nature and identity—is therefore the daimōn itself, the pure, undestined movement of assigning oneself a fate and a destiny, absolute self-transmitting without transmission. But this abandonment of the self to itself is precisely what destines humankind to tradition and to history, remaining concealed, the ungrounded at the ground of every ground, the nameless that, as unsaid and untransmissible, transmits itself in every name and every historical transmission.’
132-133
Taal & Ereignis.
‘And yet precisely for this reason, insofar as all human language is necessarily historical and destined, only by un-speaking (Ent-sprechen) and by risking silence can human beings correspond to difference (im Nichtsagen nennen, erschweigen).’
133
‘The thought that wants to think the Proper (like the thought that wants to think *se) cannot lead to any lexical entity or existing thing. Insofar as it is itself what destines, the Proper, the ēthos of humankind, remains unnamed in philosophy. Unnamed, it is thus without destiny: an untransmissible transmission.’
‘With Hegel and Heidegger, the tradition of philosophy has therefore truly reached its end. (...) Tradition, which covered over what was destined in figures, now shows itself for what it is: an untransmissible transmission that transmits nothing but itself.’
134
*Se is abandoned (verlassen) to tradition as untransmissible, and only in this negative fashion is it grounded in itself’
‘Nevertheless, precisely insofar as the revelation of this abandonment of *se constitutes the extreme outcome of Hegel's and Heidegger's attempts to think the most proper, any thought that wants to be adequate to this outcome and confront it cannot infinitely repeat its essential gesture. And yet today, thinking, whether in the form of hermeneutics, a philosophy of difference, or negative thought, presents as a solution the pure and simple repetition of the fundamental metaphysical problem: that transmission transmits nothing (if not itself), that difference is anterior to identity, that the ground is an abyss.’
‘The end of tradition, which was the supreme outcome of the thought of the Absolute and Ereignis, thus becomes an in-finity; the absence of destiny and ground is thus transformed into an in-finite destiny and ground. Both Hegel and Heidegger, by contrast, clearly insisted that for thought to register the abandonment of *se in tradition was necessarily for it at the same time to consider the end of the history of Being and its epochal figures.’
VS. Derrida, Nancy
‘To regard the trace as origin, to regard transmitting without transmission and difference as difference, can only mean that traces are cancelled and that transmission is finished—that is, that historical destinies have ended, that humankind is definitively in its ēthos, and that its knowledge is absolute. The grounding of man as human—that is, philosophy, the thought of *se—is achieved. The ungroundedness of man is now proper, that is, absolved from all negativity and all having-been, all nature and all destiny.’
It is Agamben’s task to make sure that ‘what appears as the overcoming of metaphysics is not to be a falling back inside metaphysics and its in-finite repetition.’
134-135
‘If metaphysics thinks *se as what, remaining unsaid and untransmitted, destines man to history and transmission, how are we to consider a *se that does not even destine itself as untransmitted, a dwelling of man in his *se that has never been and that has therefore never been transmitted in a historical figure?’
135
‘This simple figure of fulfilled humanity—which is to say, human humanity—would therefore be what is left to say for speech that has nothing to say; it would be what is left to do for praxis that has nothing to do. In the words of Bacchylides, such speech and such praxis would truly have found the doors of the unsaid, having consumed the unsayable transmission’
159
‘At this point, in which generator and generated, memory and hope, elegy and hymn, onceness and repetition exchange parts, happiness is achieved. What happens here—new angel or new man—is what never happened. But this—what has never happened—is the historical and wholly actual homeland of humanity.’