Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical Dimensions | Russell P. Boisjoly, Ellen Foster Curtis, Eugene Mellican. Journal of Business Ethics 8: 217-230, 1989.
@ethics @NASA
- Case study on the ethical implications of Roger Boisjoly's warnings against launching the Challenger in cold weather
- Focuses on the importance of organizational issues for ethics nowadays
Objectives:
- "Demonstrate the extent to which the ethical ambiguity that permeates the relationship between individual and organizational responsibility contributed to the Challenger disaster" (217)
- "reclaim the meaning and importance of individual responsibility within the diluting context of large organizations" (217)
Urgent underlying question: "whether existing ethical theories adequately address the problems posed by new technologies, new forms of organiza tion, and evolving social systems. At the heart of this issue is the concept of responsibility." (218)
Disaster did not happen due to a lack of virtue on the part on an individual (Boisjoly) but due to unproductive management structures and bad lines of communication.
It is dumb to rely on moral heroism of individuals and then have organizational structures that do not support morality. Instead, they should be conducive for moral behavior.
The article contains a detailed account of how Boisjoly tried to address the O-ring problem and how managment dealt with it (or more: did not deal with it). The burden of proof was on the engineers to proof it was not safe, rather than the other way around.
Ethical analysis
- Problematic relation between individual and organizational responsibility
- management became the locus of responsibility, completely drowning out individual responsibility (of engineers)
- The authorative review process afterwards became a way to evade personal responsibility by management, in the line of "I followed all formal procedures"; "I did my job"
- The review process itself was also perverted by shifting the burden of proofs on concerned individuals to prove the issue. Acceptance of this shift is disturbing.
- Suffered from "groupthink" (225)
These issues combined create a climate that occurs more often in big modern companies where individuals end up perceiving themselves as small parts and powerless and, indeed, as not being the person responsible.
So decisions end up being made by individuals where they are not properly attributes to them.
Although this principle operates in a gray area where the difference between indirect responsibility and pardonable ignorance can be marginal, a tragic, complex event like the Challenger disaster demands its application. Like the law, ethical thought must not be willing to accept ignorance as a sufficient excuse when it can be reasonably established that those in the causal sequence or in positions of authority should have known, or found out before acting or rendering decisions. This is especially true for managers who become instruments of their own ignorance whenever they prevent the free and complete flow of information to themselves, either directly by their acts, or indirectly through the subtle messages they convey to their subordinates, in their management style, or by the organizational climate they help create (229).