Relevante opmerkingen uit "Was ist Metafysik".

Authors:

Ik gebruik een niet uitgegeven Engelse vertaling, citaten bij gebruik terugzoeken in het Duits. Paginanummering verwijst naar de pdf-pagina van die Engelse vertaling.

Introduction to “What is metaphysics?” Getting to the bottom of metaphysics (1949)

[het grootste deel van deze tekst heb ik nog niet gelezen]

Heidegger’s lezing ‘Was ist Metafysik’ eindigt met de vraagt:

Waarom is er iets/zijnden veeleer dan niets?

In deze later toegevoegde tekst herneemt Heidegger zijn eigen vraagt vanuit zijn hernieuwde denkkader.

Andenken, 28:

‘Indeed, if thinking that now attempts to think the truth of be[ing] gets caught up in formulating because of a long habit of formulating be-ing, then as a first consideration as well as occasion for the transition from formulating to recollective [andenkende] thinking, probably nothing is more necessary than the question, “What is metaphysics?”’

28-29: For its own part, the unfolding of this question in the following lecture concludes with a question. It is called the basic question of metaphysics and goes: Why be-ing, after all, and not rather no-thing? Since then, much has been said back and forth about the dread and no-thing which are spoken about in the lecture. But it has not yet occurred to people to think over [überliegen] why a lecture that attempts to think from thinking of the truth of be[ing] to [thinking] of no-thing, and from there to the essence of metaphysics, claims that the question just given is the basic question of metaphysics. For the attentive listener, isn't there really something to be voiced that must be weightier than all the enthusiasm about dread and no-thing? The final question confronts us with the consideration that reflection which attempts to think of a way beyond no-thing to be[ing] in the end returns once again to a question about be-ing. Inasmuch as this question, in being introduced with Why?, asks causally in the conventional way of metaphysics, thinking of be[ing] is completely disavowed in favor of formulating knowledge about be-ing from [aus] be-ing. To top it all off, the final question is obviously the question that the metaphysician Leibniz put in his Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce (Fondé en Raison) [Principles of Nature and Grace (Based on Reason)]: "Pourquoi il y a plûtot quelque chose que rien?”

  • Deze passage is belangrijk om te begrijpen hoe Bartleby’s experiment verbonden kan worden met Heidegger’s vraag naar het niets, zoals hij het nu herneemt. Terugkijkend op het einde van zijn eerdere lezing, waarin Heidegger vraagt: waarom iets veeleer dan niets, nodigt hij ons uit tot reflectie over waarom hij deze vraag stelde. In dat licht moeten we ook herinneren dat hij de vraag ook niet beantwoordt, maar slechts opwerpt. Duidelijk wordt nu, dat het opvoeren van de vraag als de basale vraag van de metafysica begrepen kan worden vanuit Heidegger’s project om de metafysica te overwinnen. Dat de vraag basaal is, betekent dus niet zozeer dat Heidegger hem ook wil beantwoorden zoals die vraag doorgaans beantwoord is.
  • De vraag is dan in het bijzonder interessant omdat het wat zegt over het metafysische denken. Heidegger maakt twee opmerkingen in het bovenstaande citaat. Allereerst, eindigt een metafysische reflectie over de weg voorbij het niets naar het zijnde in overpeinzingen over het zijnde, en niet het niets. Ten tweede, de waarom-vorm van de vraag, is in dat opzicht niet betekenisloos, omdat het zich kennis ten doel stelt (hoe kun je kennis hebben van het niets? dit richt de oriëntatie van de vrager al naar iets). Het doet dat op een specifieke manier, namelijk volgens het principe van voldoende grond. De vraag is dus ook altijd Leibniz’ vraag: waarom is er iets veeleer dan niets? Omdat alles wat bestaat zijn grond heeft. Die grond verwijst uiteindelijk naar God.
  • Zo bezien is de vraag niet beantwoord, maar ook zeker niet betekenisloos. Vanuit het Andenken bezien raakt de vraag de kern van Heidegger’s verhouding tot de metafysica, aangezien zijn denken als Andenken én Vordenken het principe van voldoende grond opschort.

29-30:

‘That which is called the basic question of metaphysics would be consummated then in a fundamental-ontological way in a question from the very ground [aus dem Grunde] of metaphysics and as a question about this ground.’

30-1, ik heb wat voetnoten weggelaten:

It runs: Why be-ing, after all, and not rather no-thing? Assuming that we no longer think metaphysically in the customary way of metaphysics, but rather from [aus] the essence and truth of metaphysics to the truth of be[ing], it may now also be asked: How does it happen that be-ing always has the right of way and takes advantage on its own of every "is," while that which is not [an instance of] be-ing, that no-thing so understood as be[ing] itself, remains forgotten? How does it happen that it [Es] can really come of be[ing] and no-thing is not actually present [nicht west]? Is it because of this that all metaphysics makes it appear inconcussible that "be[ing]" goes without saying84 and therefore no-thing looks like being? That is indeed the way it is with be[ing] and no-thing. Were it otherwise, then Leibniz could not have said in the same place by way of clarification: “Car le rien est plus simple et plus facile que quelque chose.”’ [aangezien niets simpeler en gemakkelijker is dan iets]

31: We moeten dus de lezing herdenken ‘for once from its conclusion, from its end, not from an imaginary one.’

WHAT IS METAPHYSICS? (1929)

34: ‘The particular relationship of science to the world and the guiding attitude of man within it can be fully conceptualized, of course, only when we see and grasp what happens in a relationship to the world attained in this way. Man—one [kind of] be-ing among others—“pursues the sciences.” In this “pursuit” nothing less happens that the disruption by one be-ing, called man, of the entirety of be-ing, so that in and through this disruption be-ing thereby gives over what and how it is. In its own way, this eruptive disruption helps be-ing first come into its own.’

  • Dit sluit erg goed uit bij wat ik schreef over ‘man’ als de ‘interceptor’ die zijn terug-zendt naar zichzelf. Pas dan komt het zijn, dat is gezonden, tot zichzelf als zijn in diens zending. De zending moet onderbroken worden, niet altijd alleen maar arriveren, om het arriveren zelf te denken. Oftewel, pas in het opschorten van het arriveren (cf. Agamben in het inoperatief maken van zijn) kan zijn in diens zending gedacht worden.

34:

‘In its radical unity, this trinality—relationship to the world, attitude, invasion—brings an enlivening simplicity and keenness to existence [Da-sein] in the life of science [wissenschaftliche Existenz]. If we expressly take over for ourselves such an enlightened scientific existence [Da-sein], then we must say:’ (...)

35:

‘That which scholarly discussion effects with its disruption is be-ing itself—and above and beyond that, nothing [und darüber hinaus nichts].’  Het enige waar ik hier niet bekend mee ben, is in hoeverre de gedachte van ‘disruption’ hier gebonden is aan ‘wetenschap’?

39:

‘Is there negation and the not only because there is no-thing? This has not been decided; indeed not once has the question been expressly raised. We maintain that no-thing is more original than the not and negation.’

40:

‘Is no-thing is to be questioned in the way questioning works, then it must itself be given in advance. We must be able to encounter it.’

40:

‘But what is sought here is no-thing. In the end, is there [gibt es] seeking without some anticipation, a seeking to which a proper finding belongs?

40:

‘Generality of be-ing must be given beforehand in order to be made invalid [verfallen zu können] as such by negation, in which no-thing itself then must manifest [bekunden] itself.’

41:

If need be, we can think of the whole of be-ing as an "idea [Idee]," and then negate what has been thus thought up and "think" of it as negated. In this way we do reach the formal concept of a "thought up" [eingebildeten] no-thing, but never no-thing itself. But no-thing is nothing, and no difference can prevail between the thought up no-thing and "real [eigentlich]" no-thing, unless no-thing represents something other than the complete absence of difference [Unterschiedslösigkeit]. But "real" no-thing itself, isn't it once again that concealed and absurd concept of an actual no-thing [eines seienden Nichts]? For one last time now the objections of our intellect would call a halt to our search, the legitimacy of which can be demonstrated only through a fundamental experience [Grunderfahrung] of nothing.’

  • Heidegger’s aanpak van de vraag naar het niets gaat via deze fundamentele ervaring.

41:

‘As surely as we never get a sure grasp of the generality of be-ing in itself, just as surely do we all the same find ourselves somehow placed in the midst of the generality of bare [enthüllt] be-ing. In the end, there continues to be [besteht] an essential difference between getting a grasp of the whole of be-ing in itself and finding oneself in the midst of be-ing as a whole [des Seienden im Ganzen].’

41-42:

‘But no matter how fragmented the daily round may seem, it always maintains be-ing in the unity of a “whole [Ganzes],” although only in the shadows. Even then and precisely just then, when we are not especially busy with things, this “as a whole” overcomes us; for example, in genuine boredom. This is a long way off far off when this or that book or play, job or leisure activity, is boring [langeweilt]. It breaks out when “it’s boring [es einem langweileg ist.]” Profound boredom, like a silent fog insinuating itself in the depths of existence, pulls things, others and oneself into it altogether with remarkable indifference. Such boredom reveals be-ing as a whole.’

Passage over afstemming.

43:

‘Yet just when moods in such a way bring be-ing as a whole before us, they hide form us the no-thing we are looking for. We are then even less of the opinion that the negation of be-ing as a whole reveiled in mood puts no-thing before us. Accordingly, that sort of thing could happen to begin with [ursprünglich] only in a mood that reveals no-thing in the most proper sense of disclosing it.’

  • cf. thematiek van Agamben in Language and Death

43:

‘This event is possible and happens, though only rarely and only for an instant, in the fundamental mood of dread [Angst].’

44:

‘There is something like this about the “as a whole [im Ganzen]”: all things [Dinge] and we ourselves sink into indifference. Not in the sense of merely disappearing, but rather, in its very moving away [Wegrücken], it turns to us. This moving away of be-ing as a whole that closes in on [umdrängt] us in dread pressures [bedrängt] us. There’s nothing to get a hold on. All that remains and comes over us in the slipping away of be-ing is this “no [kein].”’

44-45:

‘We are “suspended [schweben]” in dread. More clearly, dread leaves us hanging because it brings on the slipping away of be-ing. So it is that we actual human beings [seienden Menschen] slip away [mitentgleiten] from ourselves in the midst of be-ing. For at bottom this is not uncanny to you or me, but rather “it” is like that. In the shuddering [Durchschütterung] of this suspense [Schweben], where one can hold on to nothing [nichts], only really being there [das reine Da-sein] remains.’

  • cf. Epoche bij Agamben.

45:

‘Dread strikes us dumb. Because be-ing as a whole slips away and straightforwardly no-thing rushes in, every saying “Is” [jedes “Ist”-Sagen] about it is silent in the face of it.’

46:

‘In the fundamental mood of dread we have reached the event of existence in which no-thing is made manifest and in which it must be questioned.’

46:

‘We have already initially given what, for our purposes, is the only essential answer to our question, if we take care that the question about no-thing has actually been posed. For this demands that we carry out the conversion of man into his being there [des Menschen in sein Da-sein], which every instance of dread occassions in us, in order to apprehend no-thing, which is obvious in it as it manifests itself.’

46-47:

‘No-thing discloses itself in dread, but not as [a kind of] be-ing. Just as little is it given as an object. Dread is not an apprehension of no-thing. Nevertheless, no-thing is made manifest by and in it, although, once again, not as if no-thing appeared [zeigte sich] separate “from [neben]” be-ing as a whole, which we found happening in uncanniness. Rather, we have said that it happens no-thing is at one with [in eins mit] be-ing as a whole. What does this “at one with” mean?’

47:

‘In dread, be-ing as a whole becomes untenable. In what sense does this happen? After all, be-ing is not annihilated [vernichtet] so that no-thing is left over. How could it be otherwise, when dread finds itself completely powerless in the face of be-ing as a whole! Moreover, no-thing manifests itself specifically with and in be-ing as something that is slipping away as a whole [im Ganzen].’

  • Dit vind ik een belangrijk citaat ivm Bartleby’s experiment. Dit is waarom Barlteby’s experiment geen destructie is, maar een decreatie. Zie ook het citaat hieronder: we komen te laat! We komen niet tot een ervaring van het niets door te vernietigen.

47:

‘No annihilation [Vernichtung] of all of [ganzen] be-ing comes about in dread, though just as little do we carry out a negation of be-ing as a whole [im Ganzen] in order to reach no-thing in the first place. Apart from the fact that the express making of such a negative statement is foreign to dread, we have always come too late with the very negation that is supposed to give us no-thing. No-thing comes to pass long before that. As we have said, it happens "at one with" be-ing as a whole that is slipping away.’

47-48:

‘This [falling] back before [Züruck vor . . .] takes its point of departure in no-thing. It is not a pulling in on itself, but rather essentially a turning away. The turning away, however, is as such an expelling of be-ing as a whole that lets it slip out of one’s grasp. The whole rejecting expulsion of be-ing as a whole that is slipping away, which is the way dread closes in on existence, is the essence of no-thing: nihilation [Nichtung]. Neither is it an annihilation of be-ing nor does it come from [entspringt] negation. Nor can nihilation be accounted for by annihilation or negation. No-thing nihilates of its own.’

  • Hier zien we al voorafgeschaduwd hoe Ereignis en Enteignis samen gaan.

49:

‘In adding “and not no-thing” we have not, however, added a clarification, but rather the predecessive potential [vorgängige Ermöglichung] of the openness of be-ing in general. The essence of the originally nihilating no-thing is found in this: it brings about being there first of all, before [vor] any kind of be-ing.’

50: Transcendence & vasthouden aan het niets.

50:

‘With that the answer to the question about no-thing is found. No-thing is neither an object nor, above all, be-ing. No-thing comes neither in and of itself nor along with be-ing, upon which it depends all the same. No-thing is the potential for a manifestness of be-ing as some such thing for [für]* human existence. No-thing does not primarily provide the antithesis of be-ing, but is originally of the very essence. The nihilation of no-thing happens in the be[ing] of be-ing.’

51, fragmenten:

‘must we not then remain permanently suspended in this dread in order to be able to exist at all?’ ... ‘no-thing is at first and for the most part disguised in its originality.’ (...) ‘No-thing in its nihilating refers us right to be-ing. No-thing nihilates without fail [unausgesetzt], but without our really knowing about this event [Geschehen] in the sense of the kind of knowing that helps us get by on a day to day basis.’

54: Original dread ‘is permanently on the verge [zum Spring]and yet only seldom comes into play to hold us in suspense.’

54:

‘The beholdenness of existence to no-thing on the basis of hidden dread makes man the placeholder of no-thing. We are so finite that we are not even able to bring ourselves face to face with no-thing by our own will and resolve. So deeply is mortality buried in our existence that it denies our freedom its very own and deepest finiteness.’

55, over negativiteit in de metaphysische (onto-theologische) traditie:

‘Here no-thing is the antitheses of authentic [eigentlich] be-ing, of the summum ens [the highest thing, the things most beyond us]’

56:

‘This simple historical reminder marks [zeigt] no-thing as the antithesis of authentic be-ing, that is, as its negation [als dessen Verneinung]. But when no-thing somehow becomes a problem, this opposing relation does not merely experience some sort of more meaningful determination, but rather awakens for the first time a authentically metaphysical interrogative disposition toward the be[ing] of be-ing. No-thing does not remain the indeterminate opposite of be-ing, but rather discloses itself as belonging to the be[ing] of be-ing.’

58, sterke claim: ‘Metaphysics is the basic event of existence. it is existence itself.’

58:

‘Because the question about no-thing that we have gone into was actually asked of us, we have therefore not brought in metaphysics form the outside. Nor have we just “changed [our] position.” We cannot put ourselves in another position at all, because inasmuch as we exist, we already stand within it.’

59:

‘Philosophy comes about only through our own life’s undergoing a curious engagement [Einsprung] with the fundamental possibilities of existence as a whole. (...) ‘finally, letting this suspense range out into what it permanently swings round to in the basic question of metaphysics which no-thing itself forces on us: Why be-ing, after all, and not rather no-thing?’

POSTSCRIPT TO “WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?” (1949 [1943])

60: ‘Metaphysics is the history of this truth.’

62: Three misunderstanding on Heidegger’s lecture. Vooral A en B zijn relevant m.b.t. Bartleby.

a) ‘The lecture makes no-thing a general object of metaphysics. But since no-thing is the null and void pure and simple, such thinking leads to the view that everything is nothing [alles sei nichts], so that it is not worthwile either to live or die. Such a “philosophy of no-thing” is full-blown “nihilism.” b) ‘The lecture elevates an occasional (and depressing mood at that) to being the only fundamental mood. But since dread is the psychological condition of “those who have anxiety” and of being a coward, such thinking is denied the high-spirited mien [mind?] of courage. Such a “philosophy of dread” cripples any willingness [Willen] to act.’ c) The lecture comes out against “logic.” But since the intellect contains standards of figuring (out) [Rechnen] and organizing, such thinking consigns judgements about truth to a chance mood. Such a “philosophy of mere feelings” endangers “exact” thinking and the certainty of action.’

Centrale passage! 62-63:

‘This absolutely other to all be-ing is the not be-ing. But this no-thing comes to pass as be[ing]. We call off thinking too hastily if we give the mere null and void as an easier explanation of no-thing and equate it with the unreal [Wesenlosen]. Instead of such eagerness to give in to empty astuteness and abandon the puzzling ambiguity of no-thing, we must arm ourselves in single-minded preparation for experiencing the vastness of that in no-thing which gives warrant [die Gewähr] to any sort of be-ing. That is be[ing] itself. Without be[ing], whose unfathomable but as yet undisplayed nature sends us no-thing in essential dread, all be-ing would remain in be[ing]lessness [Seinlosigkeit]. But this, too, as the abandonment of and by be[ing], is not in turn a void [nichtig] no-thing, provided that something else belongs to the truth of be[ing] which is never, present as be[ing] without be-ing, that nowhere is be-ing without be[ing].’

The silent voice of being, 64-65:

‘An experience of be[ing] as what is other than all be-ing is a gift of dread, provided that we do not avoid the silent voice that attunes us to the terror of the abyss. In reference to this essential dread, admittedly, if we wilfully abandon the train of thought of the lecture, we absolve dread from having any voice [Stimme] in the determinate mood related to no-thing (...)’

65:

‘Therefore such anthropological probing [Beforschen] of man always remains beyond any possibility of following the train of thought of the lecture, since beyond attentiveness to the voice of be[ing], it goes into the attuing [Stimmen] that goes beyond this voice by means of which man by nature [in seinem Wesen] learns to experience be[ing] in no-thing.’

That there is something rather than nothing, 65:

‘Readiness for dread is “saying ‘Yes’” to the urgency to fulfull the highest claim by which man’s essence is affected. Called by the voice of be[ing], only man in the midst of all be-ing experiences the wonder of all wonders: that be-ing is.’

— Noot 188: ‘Variant: Man experiences that there is be-ing, not no-thing. This becomes the basis for consciousness, which is after the fact of having come to know [bewusst] about be-ing.’]

POTENTIALITY 66:

‘In the abyss of terror courage recognizes the scarcely traversed scope [Raum] of be[ing] in light of which [aus dessen Lichtung] any [kind of] be-ing first comes back to that in which it is and can be.’

66: ‘To be sure, essential thinking is rather an eventuality of be[ing].’

NOTHING & ESSENTIAL THINKING, 68:

‘Thinking whose thought does not only not figure out but is determined above all by what is other than be-ing we call essential thinking.’

70: Bedanken & Andenken

70: ‘Giving something up is inherently [heimisch] in the nature of the eventuality as which be[ing] has man caught up in speaking on behalf of the truth.’

71:

‘Thinking of be[ing] seeks no support from be-ing. Essential thinking pays attention to the hesitant indication [Zeichen] by the incalculable and recognizes in it the arrival from time immemorial of the inevitable. Such thinking is attentive to the truth of be[ing] and in this way helps along the be[ing] of truth that finds in its place [Stätte] in historical humanity [geschichtlichen Menschentum].’

71: ‘The search [Sucht] for aims befuddles the clarity of dread-ready reticence about giving up oneself which has something deathless about it.’

  • Cf. Bartleby. Met opoffering is hier niets verloren. We zouden met een knipoog kunnen zeggen dat ‘niets’ gewonnen is. Enteignis gaat samen met Ereignis bij Heidegger. Hier komt mijn vermoeden dus weer naar voren, dat bij Agamben het denken van contingentie net wat radicaler is, bij hem de dreiging van nihilisme nog groter, minder makkelijk geneutraliseerd dan Heidegger pretendeert te doen.

71:

‘Only when the language of historical man is put into words has it reached its own proper depth [ist sie im Lot]. But if it has found its depth, then it is given a sign of the guarantee of the silent voice of a hidden source.’

73:

‘One of essential sites [Wesensstätte] of silence is dread, in the sense of the terror in which the abyss of no-thing is the right thing for [stimmt] man. No-thing as the other than [das Andere] be-ing is the veil of be[ing]. In be[ing], every venture [Geschick] of be-ing has already been consummated at its inception.’

  • oftewel, het niets wordt eigengemaakt als de sluier van het zijn, oftewel in termen van simpele verborgenheid: zonder deze sluier, wordt ook niets ontsluierd.