Die Aufklärung in the Age of Philosophical Engineering | Bernard Stiegler, 2013, Digital Enlightment Yearbook
@enlightenment @stiegler @engineering @digitalization @grammatisation
The abstract is absolute shit, the introduction is better:
Public access to the web is twenty years old. Through it, digital society has developed and spread throughout the entire world. But has this society become mündig, that is, mature, in Immanuel Kant’s sense, when he used this term to define the age of Enlightenment as an exit from minority, from Unmündigkeit [1]? Certainly not: contemporary society seems, on the contrary, to have become profoundly regressive. Mental disorders, as well as environmental, economic, political and military problems, do not cease to proliferate and increase. And while traceability continues to expand, it seems it is mainly being used for behaviour profiling, and thus to increase the heteronomy of individuals rather than their autonomy. (29)
There are many ways in which digitalisation clearly holds promise, and socialising digitalisation in a reasoned and resolute way is (I am convinced of this) absolutely imperative if the world is to escape from the impasse in which the obsolete consumerist industrial model finds itself. But if this is the case, then this socialisation in turn requires the creation and negotiation of a new legal framework that itself presupposes the formation of new ‘Enlightenments’. (30)
Argument for internet access as a universal right, see:
Berners-Lee and Harry Halpin, ‘Defend the Web’, Digital Enlightenment Yearbook 2012, available at: http://www.digitalenlightenment.org/upload/pdf/3-7.pdf
This article is a response to that article, according to the report at https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/98898/reporting/en .
Digitalization since 1992 has set off a chain reaction, a tsunami, that could have devastating effects.
1) Disrupt mental capacities * See Nicolas Carr, The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains 2) "And this tsunami – and that has, by his own account, significantly disrupted the mental capacities of Nicholas Carr himself. And this tsunami threatens to wipe out all the inherited structures of civilisation on every continent, which may in turn produce immense disillusionment and tremendous disaffection [5]."
See [5]: See Bernard Stiegler, The Decadence of Industrial Democracies: Disbelief and Discredit, 1 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), and Uncontrollable Societies of Disaffected Individuals: Disbelief and Discredit, 2 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
We thus need to rethink the relationship between technology and law. Framed in terms of writing and the farmakon, because the law is based on writing. Later Stiegler also says that in Greek times both the law and geometry where based in writing (cf. 31).
The negativity of this new state of affairs continues to gain ground. Faced with this, we must assert the necessity and the positivity of a new state of law. And this means turning to the question of the relationship between technology and law. What we refer to as the law is in fact founded on writing. Now, digital technology constitutes the latest stage of writing. And just as in the age of Socrates writing was a pharmakon, so too, today, we can say the same about the digital: it can lead either to the destruction of the mind or to its rebirth; to the destruction of spirit or to its renaissance. (30)
Main claims:
- a new rule of law founded on digital writing presupposes a new age of Enlightenment(s) (30)
- which must take into account the limits of Aufklärung in terms of Tim-Berners Lee concept of "philosophical engineering"
- The philosophy of the transcultural "worldwide experience of the web" cannot only take into account digital lights but also its shadows. (31)
We should learn to deal with the pharmacological character of writing, also of digital writing. (31)
Writing and Enlightenment: Kant writes about (especially printed) writing as the condition of enlightenment. "But there is never light without shadow" (31). Figures like Adorno and Horkheimer showed the shadows of Enlightenment.
1
Is alphabetic writing a stable universal structure of language and thought?
Berners-Lee and Halpin: we need a philosophy that conceptually underpins the web (31-32).
But if this is what Berners-Lee and Halpin propose, it is precisely because the web is a function of a digital technical system that could be otherwise, or which could even disappear. And if they argue that this is a right, it is because this philosophy and this stability must support the need to ensure not only a certain conception of the internet, its functions and its goals, but the sense of mental, intellectual, spiritual, social and noetic (the latter in Aristotle’s sense) progress that digitalisation in general must constitute. (32)
The web is a function of a digital system that could disappear! Some people talk about superintelligence as if out of nowhere it's going to take over and be fully autonomous. But we should not forget that any such system is 1) dependent on the underlying technological infrastructure that 2) could disappear when it is not maintained anymore.
Main points, cited in full from p. 32:
- first, the digital technical system constitutes a global and contributory publication and editorialisation system that radically transforms the ‘public thing’, given that the res publica, the republic, presupposes a form of publicness, of ‘publicity’ – what the Aufklärung called an Öffentlichkeit – sustained by publication processes
- second, this publication system is inscribed in the history of a process of grammatisation, which conditions all systems of publication: the concept of grammatisation, as forged by Sylvain Auroux, provides important ingredients for the discussion inaugurated by Tim Berners-Lee around what he referred to as philosophical engineering.
Stiegler explains his extension on grammatisation:
I have myself extended this concept by arguing that, more generally, grammatisation describes all technical processes that enable behavioural fluxes or flows to be made discrete (in the mathematical sense) and hence to be reproduced, meaning all those behavioural flows through which are expressed or imprinted the experiences of human beings (speaking, working, perceiving, interacting and so on). If grammatisation is understood in this way, then the digital is simply the most recent stage of grammatisation, a stage in which all behavioural models can now be grammatised and integrated through a planetary-wide industry of the production, collection, exploitation and distribution of digital traces. (32)
This section is relevant for me! It offers a conceptualization of how the introduction of the digital "grammatisation" implies a restructuring of human behavior. For example, automatisation processes imply 1) the discretization of preceding steps in the production process and 2) tracking processes at each step (Cf. literature on "capture model"). In this sense the "production, collection, exploitation and distribution of digital traces" (32) is relevant. Because automatisation requires efficient process tracking, human behavior needs to be reorganized so that it is trackable. This is a push towards digitalization because digital traces are so efficiently trackable.
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The grammatisation of behaviour consists in a spatialisation of time, given that behaviour is above all a form of time (a meaningful sequence of words, an operational sequence of gestures, a perceptual flow of sensations, and so on). Spatialising time means, for example, transforming the temporal flow of a speech, such as the one I am deliver- ing to you here and now, into a textual space, a detemporalised form of this speech: it is thus creating a spatial object. And this is what is going on, from alphabetic writing to digital technology, as Walter Ong made clear:
The Ong quote states that print and computers continue what writing initiated, namely a "reduction of dynamic sound to quiescent space" (32)
See: Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 81.
Writing is making a sound (or any behavior that develops in a temporal sequence) into a spatial object. There are various supports for such a spatial object, e.g. a clay tablet or a silicon memory chip. Stiegler calls the sequence of this support stages of grammatisation. Each type of support affords particular operations (cf. 33)
The spatialization of a temporal object (cf. Husserl's spoken language) creates a synoptically visible object. (Spoken language is also material; the difference is the manner in which a spatial object becomes visible).
Synopsis (33):
- Analytic / discretized
- Synthetic / unified
The spatialization thus makes an object manipulable insofar as it now becomes visible and subject to analysis.
This allows (33):
1) Analytic operations the object; produce intelligibility 2) One can manipulate minds with these objects
Grammatisation instance of "technical life" (Georges Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological 1991, pp.200-201)
Example:
Grammatisation begins during the Upper Paleolithic era, some two million years after technical life first arose. It enabled mental and behavioural flows to be made discrete, and thus enabled new mental and behavioural models to be created. In the course of materialisation, and the spatialisation in which it consists, the constitutive elements of grammatised mental and behavioural flows are made discrete, and temporal mental realities, which have become identifiable through lists of finite, analysable and calculable elements, are modified in return. The visible and tangible reality emerging from this spatialisation constitutes an ob-
Tertiary retention
Husserls primary and secondary retention:
- Primary retention: (perceptual flux) the retention during a perception, in the present, by which it unifies that perception through the temporal process of that perception. Retention but not yet memory. Phenomenon presented in light of a different aspect, based on different primary retentions.
- Secondary retention: (memory) constitutive element of a mental state that is always based on memory. Requires that the first retention of an experience that is lived through, imprint in the memory that may reactivate the original experience.
- Tertiary retention (Stiegler): beyond the cerebral (perceptual flux) and the psychic (mental state of memory) into the technical (technical materialisation)
But a retention, as deriving from a flux and emerging from the temporal course of experience, can also become tertiary through the spatialisation in which consists the grammatisation (and more generally, in which consists any technical materialisation process) of the flow of retentions. This mental reality can thus be projected onto a support that is neither cerebral nor psychic but rather technical. The web grants access to such a space, through which shared, digital tertiary retentions are projected and introjected, constituting as such a new public, global and contributory space, functioning at the speed of light. (34)
Ambiguity: "element of mental that is always based on memory": is the mental state always based on memory, or the secondary retention?
What does "introjected" mean here? (Discussed in section 4)
Projection in this sense is what allows the emergence of new kinds of mental representations
The web is a space of digital tertiary retentions. This space is:
1) public 2) global 3) contributory (what does that mean? That as a result of 1 and 2 it is a shared space?)
Stiegler's question:
What light and what shadow, what Enlightenment and what Darkness, can and must this bring us? (34)
3: Archeology and organology
Foucault and the Archeology of Knowledge.
Knowledge is above all a collection of archived traces, that is, ordered and modelled traces, thereby constituting an order - and submitted to this order and to this model, which orders these traces. Knowledge, modelled in this way, thus conserves the trace of the old from which it comes, and of which it is the rebirth and the transformation, through a process that Plato described as anamnesis. (34)
How does the following relate to tradition?
The conservation of traces of the past is what enables the constitution of circuits of collective individuation across time and in the framework of a discipline. Such disciplines govern the relations between minds, which individuate themselves in concert, and in the course of intergenerational transmission, through which a transindividuation process is concretised, producing what Gilbert Simondon called the transindividual and forming meanings. The conditions of this process, however, are over-determined by the characteristics of grammatisation, that is, by the characteristics of the archival supports that are the tertiary retentions of different epochs: ideograms, manuscripts, texts, prints, records, databases, metadata, and so on. (34)
Foucault: knowledge is essentially archived. The materialization is the production of knowledge. It is thus not the case that there first is knowledge, which is then subsequently materialized in the archive. (34-35)
Stiegler calls this a form of hyper-materiality because it should be thought beyond a matter-form opposition. (35)
A study into the hyper-materiality of knowledge must be situated into a "general organology" of technical life. There are three types of organs that are interdependent:
- physiological organs
- technical organs
- social organisations
They co-evolve. Maryanne Wolf says that brains (physiological organs) are written by social organisations in a very literal sense. The invention of alphabetic writing wrote our brains into "reading brains" (cf. 35)
We are now in the transition to a "digital brain". How do we guide this transition? What should we preserve from the reading brain?
What is the web and its role in this process, then?
The emergence of digital technologies, of the internet and the web, which is also the age of industrial tertiary retention, is obviously the new page (a hypertextual and hyper-material page) on which is being inscribed and read (in HTML5) the history of thought – through what must be understood as a new system of publication constituting a new public thing, a new res publica.(35)
4
Once again: retentional forms of mental content allow them to be controlled. E.g. by exteriorizing thought processes, something like basic calculation and later geometric reasoning became possible. Cf. Husserl's origin of geometry: origin of geometry founded on literar tertiary retention (36)
This process has been concealed by the fundamental ontology / metaphysics of pure thought before the impurity of this exteriorisation.
Today, grammatisation continues to spread and accelerate, and it transforms all forms of knowledge. And this is occurring at a time when we are also learning from neurophysiology that cerebral plasticity – and the transformation of what Maryanne Wolf calls ‘mental circuitry’ through the introduction of tertiary retentions (literal tertiary retention, for example) – is thinking: thinking consists in the production of new circuits, through the materialisation process that comes to modify existing circuits, and sometimes to destroy them, the question being to know what must be ‘preserved’.
The reasoning:
1) If thinking is grounded in cerebral plasticity of the mental circuitry (i.e. thought is the modification of existing circuits to create new circuits) 2) And if grammatisation is able to write these circuits 3) Then grammatisation directly affects the way we think. 4) And then the mind "is constituted through the introjection of tertiary retention" (36)
Introjection and constitution of the mind:
The mind, then, is constituted through the introjection of tertiary retention, and today this has become visible, because neurophysiologists can study it experimentally. These researchers are equipped with tools and apparatus designed to observe mental life, that is, the movements occurring within the cerebral apparatus, such as introjection, but also and above all between this apparatus and the tertiary retentional apparatus deriving from grammatisation, that is, from the projection of the mind outside itself. (36)
I do not have perfectly clear what the difference between projection and introjection is.
Great passage. What does it mean that the exteriorisation of the mind is the condition of its constitution? This seems paradoxical, contradictory even.
The fact that the exteriorisation of the mind is the condition of its constitution means that the mind cannot be some pure substance that, by exteriorising itself, alienates itself through this exteriorisation. The constitution of the mind through its exteriorisation is its expression, resulting from a prior impression. The projection of the mind outside itself constitutes the mind through its materialisation and spatialisation as a movement: the mind is as such mobility, motility and emotion (and this is how we should interpret the theses of Antonio Damasio) (36-37)
But still, the Socratic fear of exteriorisation without return is possible. To constitute a mind, projection must be interiorised again, individuated, transform into secondary retentions. (37)
Joseph Epstein writes that "we are what we read". In light of Stieglers story this statement now has a fundamental importance:
In other words, even when they speak, and express themselves orally, literate human beings are reading themselves and interpreting themselves to the letter. That is, they are ‘literally’ in the course of writing themselves, given that everything they read is inscribed within their brains, and given that everything they read reactivates and reinterprets the previously written, and textually written, circuits of their secondary retentions: literate human beings speak like the book that they are and that they read.
5: Reactivation of the Enlightenment project in the age of the web?
We should ensure that the writing of the brain does not result in incapacitation, the inability to think for oneself (37). This requires a suitable reinteriorisation. This process, about the question what we should preserve, can be guided by social organs that mediate the interaction between the physiological and technological.
This means that the interiorisation of technical organs by the cerebral organ, which is thereby reorganised, constitutes a new stage of thinking only on the condition that social organisations exist to ensure this interiorisation – such as, for example, the paideia (education) practiced at Plato’s academy. The question of what must be preserved thus involves not just cerebral circuits, but social circuits. (38)
The danger of automation!
We cannot re-constitute internet access, therefore, without completely rethinking the formation and transmission of knowledge with a view to ensuring a historical understanding of the role of tertiary retention in the constitution, as well as the destruction of knowledge, and with a view to deriving, on this basis, a practical and theoretical understanding of the digital tertiary retentions that transform cerebral and social or- organisations. Without such a politics, the inevitable destiny of the digital brain is to find itself slowly but surely short-circuited by automata, and thus find itself incapable of constituting a new form of society with other digital brains. (38)
Automatisation and digitalisation! The contradictions of automatisation.
Automatisation makes digitalisation possible, but although it immeasurably increases the power of the mind (as rationalisation), it can also destroy the mind’s knowledge (as rationality). A ‘pharmacological’ thinking of the digital must study the contradictory dimensions of automatisation in order to counteract its destructive effects on knowledge. The point is not merely to ensure that there is a right to access the internet, but of having a right and a duty to know (through education) that invisible automatisms exist, and that these may elude digital brains – and may manipulate these brains with- out teaching them how they should themselves be manipulated, how they should be handled. (38)
E.g. neuromarketing exploits low-level automatisms of the brain.
It is a question of articulating the social web with the semantic web in an intelligent way. The social web and the semantic web must not be opposed, but rather composed – through social and educational organisations that must themselves be completely rethought on the basis of this perspective. It is thus a question of what we, at the Institut de recherche et d’innovation, call transindividuation technologies, through which the organs of contributive society must be constituted. (38)
Some ideas
Traditions of the digital Digital traditions
The classical hermeneutical model of tradition is challenged by the contemporary context of digitalization and the web.
The web as a shared space tertiary retention. Collective distributed memory. Certain sedimentations of meaning. Stagings of dialogue. Hermeneutical model always presupposed a shared horizon. Global space of the web space: radical confrontation with a anonymous, other.
there is no consistent identity management system on the web.
People such as Walter Benjamin and Agamben were worries about the end of tradition: what do we do when tradition is a transmission that does no longer transmit anything? Understandable in context of Heidegger, where tradition is a "nothing" that is transmitted. What does it tell us?
Can we reiterate this question in a contemporary context in relation to the web? How must we think of tradition in relation to the transmission of meanings on the internet? Or does the web completely displace conceptions of tradition that were commonsense before?
Tradition in the age of the web.