Of Grammatology | Jacques Derrida, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 1997

Derrida_Jacques.md

The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing

Notice the emphasis on "question", "go by way of the question of being". The asking of that question, the pathway of thinking (cf. etymology of "method") is crucial for the quasi-transcendental strategy, to make difference felt before it is erased and assimilated again. The idea of thinking on the horizon, from a movement of transgression that does not definitely transcend.

Cf. citation on pages 23-24, and especially 61. Also cf. the idea of passage in aporia. Protevi argues that the “shift from deconstructive quasi-concepts to experience of aporia maintains a continuity of concerns with his earlier work, even if there is a sort of figure-ground inversion.” As we will see in the next quote, Derrida himself suggests this continuity in Psyche. See John Protevi, "Love," in Between Deleuze & Derrida, ed. Paul Patton and John Protevi (London: Continuum, 2003), 184.

Because it is indeed the question of being that Heidegger asks metaphysics. And with it the question of truth, of sense, of the logos. The incessant meditation upon that question does not restore confidence. (...) In examining the state just before all determinations of being, destroying the securities of onto-theology, such a meditation contributes, quite as much as the most contemporary linguistics, to the dislocation of the unity of the sense of being, that is, in the last instance, the unity of the word. (22)

The necessary, originary, and irreducible dissimulation of the meaning of being, its occultation within the very blossoming forth of presence, that retreat without which there would be no history of being which was completely history and history of being, Heidegger's insistence on noting that being is produced as history only through the logos, and is nothing outside of it, the difference between being and the entity—all this clearly indicates that fundamentally nothing escapes the movement of the signifier and that, in the last instance, the difference between signified and signifier is nothing. (22-23)

This proposition of transgression, not yet integrated into a careful discourse, runs the risk of formulating regression itself. One must therefore go by way of the question of being as it is directed by Heidegger and by him alone, at and beyond onto-theology, in order to reach the rigorous thought of that strange nondifference and in order to determine it correctly. (23)

About writing "being" crossed out, and how this is not merely a negative symbol:

The deletion is the final writing of an epoch. Under its strokes the presence of a transcendental signified is effaced while still remaining legible. Is effaced while still remaining legible, is destroyed while making visible the very idea of the sign. In as much as it de-limits onto-theology, the metaphysics of presence and logocentrism, this last writing is also the first writing. (23)

Cf. how Heidegger's recollective thinking (Andenken) of the history of being is, according to him, also a thinking on the way to another beginning of thought.

Cf. eschatology: right before the end, or at the end, the beginning is reappropriated so as to transition into a new beginning.

To come to recognize, not within but on the horizon of the Heideggerian paths, and yet in them, that the sense of being is not a transcendental or trans-epochal signified (even if it was always dissimulated within the epoch) but already, in a truly unheard of sense, a determined signifying trace, is to affirm that within the decisive concept of ontico-ontological difference, all is not to be thought at one go; entity and being, ontic and ontological, "ontico-ontological," are, in an original style, derivative with regard to difference; and with respect to what I shall later call differance, an economic concept designating the production of differing/deferring. (23)

Difference by itself would be more "originary," but one would no longer be able to call it "origin" or "ground," those notions belonging essentially to the history of onto-theology, to the system functioning as the effacing of difference. (23)

W.r.t. thinking the difference in ontico-ontological difference, again, the necessity if passage, twice:

It can, however, be thought of in the closest proximity to itself only on one condition: that one begins by determining it as the ontico-ontological difference before erasing that determination. The necessity of passing through that erased determination, the necessity of that trick of writing is irreducible. (23-24)

The hesitation of these thoughts (here Nietzsche's and Heidegger's) is not an "incoherence": it is a trembling proper to all post-Hegelian attempts and to this passage between epochs.

On deconstruction:

The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect it. Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, that is to say, without being able to isolate their elements and atoms, the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work. (24)

Linguistics and Grammatology

Digitalize old notes. Only added I needed now.

(…) the Phaedrus denounced writing as the intrusion of an artful technique, a forced entry of a totally original sort, an archetypal violence: eruption of the outside within the inside, breaching into the interiority of the soul, the living self-presence of the soul within the true logos, the help that speech lends to itself. Thus incensed, Saussure’s vehement argumentation aims at more than a theoretical error, more than a moral fault: at a sort of stain and primarily at a sin. (Derrida 1997, 34).

The reflection, the image, the double, splits what it doubles. The origin of the speculation becomes a difference. What can look at itself is not one. (36)

Deconstructing this tradition will therefore not consist of reversing it, of making writing innocent. Rather of showing why the violence of writing does not befall an innocent language. There is an originary violence of writing because language is first, in a sense I shall gradualy reveal, writing. “Usurpation” has always already begun. (Derrida 1997, 37).

Derrida refers to the inability of sciences to think their own transcendental origin and the relevance of asking such a question. However, the transcendental is part of the metaphysical system he is deconstructing. In what mode can then think something like transcendentality?

It is because arche-writing, movement of differance, irreducible arche-synthesis, opening in one and the same possibility, temporalization as well as relationship with the other and language, cannot, as the condition of all linguistic systems, form a part of the linguistic system itself and be situated as an object in its field. (Derrida 1997, 60).

Uit mijn bachelorscriptie:

Het is duidelijk dat het arche-schrift geen object kan zijn van welke wetenschap dan ook, omdat dat een afperking van een bepaald ervaringsgebied impliceert. De notie van arche-schrift lijkt eerder beroep te doen op een transcendentale ervaring. Dat wil zeggen het domein van de studie naar het arche-schrift is een ervaringsgebied dat betrekking heeft op de meest algemene mogelijkheidsvoorwaarde denkbaar, nog vóór de constitutie van welk object dan ook. Maar dreigt de deconstructie dan niet uit te lopen op een reconstructie van een transcendentale metafysica? Om te voorkomen dat de deconstructie niet een simpele herhaling wordt van het gedeconstrueerde11, is het nodig dat in het doorlopen van de deconstructie die doorgang van de deconstructie zelf zijn markering achterlaat: ‘To see to it that the beyond does not return to the within is to recognize in the contortion the necessity of a pathway. That pathway must leave a track in the text.’ (Bachelor thesis)

Without that, the decisive progress accomplished by a formalism respectful of the originality of its object, of "the immanent system of its objects," is plagued by a scientificist objectivism, that is to say by another unperceived or unconfessed metaphysics. (...) It is to escape falling back into this naive objectivism that I refer here to a transcendentality that I elsewhere put into question. It is because I believe there is a short-of and a beyond of transcendental criticism. To see to it that the beyond does not return to the within is to recognize in the contortion the necessity of a pathway [parcours]. That pathway must leave a track in the text. Without that track, abandoned to the simple content of its conclusions, the ultra-transcendental text will so closely resemble the precritical text as to be indistinguishable from it. (61)

For example, the value of the transcendental arche [archie] must make its necessity felt before letting itself be erased. The concept of arche-trace must comply with both that necessity and that erasure. It is in fact contradictory and not acceptable within the logic of identity. The trace is not only the disappearance of origin—within the discourse that we sustain and according to the path that we follow it means that the origin did not even disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin. From then on, to wrench the concept of the trace from the classical scheme, which would derive it from a presence or from an originary nontrace and which would make of it an empirical mark, one must indeed speak of an originary trace or arche-trace.

In other words, despite however problematic that is, there must be a transcendental moment, a "trick of writing" as Derrida said before (24) that must "make its necessity felt before letting itself be erased." Such a moment almost has an event character (the event of writing?). Without going through that experience (a passage, pathway) what Derrida tries to name is indistinguishable to the empirical letter.

The originary metaphor, 270: Section how Rousseau actually prefers metaphor versus the dead literalness of writing.