Turing's Cyberworld | Michael Eldred, in Information Cultures in the Digital Age, M. Kelly und J. Bielby (eds)

@digital ontology @digital hermeneutics @Eldred @Turing

Okay, this Eldred guy is the bomb. Totally worth it.

Abstract:

  • Employs digital ontology for deepening the idea of the Universal Turing Machine which is the "ontological blueprint for the basic unit of today's artificial cyberworld" (65)
  • What is "the spatiality and temporality of this artificial dimension to which humanity is today more than willingly exposed"? (65)
  • "Turing machine’s linear, logically causal ‘temporality’ shows up a contrast with the three-dimensional, ‘ecstatic’ temporality of the world shared by human beings." (65)

(In)calculable Cyberworld

The ontological idea that the world is fundamentally based on numbers:

The fascination with the possibility that the world could somehow, in its deepest ontological structure, be based on number has a distinctly Greek ancestry. (65)

This fundamental idea now takes very concrete form, as "we have managed to actually make an artificial world inhabited entirely by numbers that owe their existence to the laws of electromagnetism" (65)

This "cyberworld" is more than the internet. It is "an artificial dimension in which, or through (dia) whose medium, we human beings exist in an historically hitherto unknown way." (65-66)

How does this artificial cyberworld look like, and how does it differ from how numbers used to be written down?

A certain historical trajectory has attained its consummation with numbers themselves inhabiting their own artificial, physical realm, and we humans, mostly unknowingly, have intimate relations with them. Although numbers have always been written down and thus have achieved a physical presence in a matrix such as paper which could always be taken up again and read, the digital numbers circulating in the dimension of the cyberworld do not always patiently wait for us to read them as such, but unfold their effects independently of our immediate involvement. These effects are anything but merely numeric, like those of the abacus or the trusty pocket calculator. For an electrical engineer or a computer scientist, the cyberworld, comprising not just the internet, but the entire, global, more or less well-connected, patched network of digital devices of all kinds, including portables, wearables and implantables, is populated by strings of digital bits energized by electromagnetic fields and electric currents. (66)

Computer scientists have put effort into looking everything homely and comfy, so that we more or less forget that "all these familiar entities have been dissolved into bit-strings that are kept energized in their own, special, artificial, electromagnetic matrix, whether it be, say, the hard disk in a server or a little electromagnetic stick or a small disk." (66)

Leibniz: "Already 150 years earlier, Leibniz had dreamt of a “Machina Panepistemonica” (Leibniz, 2003) for a combinatorial calculus of justice." (66)

The Turing Machine is an ontological concept about the being of a computer:

The Universal Turing Machine casts (ontologically) the being of a computer, not merely a design for making one. Any particular Turing machine computes, binary digit for binary digit i.e. a finite binary number (bit-string) input into it literally bit by bit on the basis of a finite set of instructions (the program code) that, depending on which bit is being scanned at the current step, instructs the machine what to calculate (i.e. change the bit or leave it as it is), whether to move one space to the right or left (or stay where it is) on its linear memory-tape, and which instruction comes next. (66)

Eldred rephrases the Universal Turing Machine into a Turing copulator:

The Universal Turing Machine is a copulating machine that has one bit-string, the program code, copulate with another bit-string, the digital data-input, to generate a further bit-string as output. I call it therefore simply a (Turing) copulator. (67)

Eldred casts the whole domain of the digital in terms of the evolution and copulation of these Turing copulators, including corresponding diseases (viruses etc.):

In general, the program code is the ‘male,’ active, executable code, whereas the digital data-input is the ‘female,’ passive bit-string that suffers itself to be computed to generate a resultant, ‘offspring’ bitstring. But the data-input and data-output can contain also sections of executable code such as macros or computer viruses, trojans and worms. The cyberworld is driven by myriads of Turing copulators, each equipped with its own program code and ready to compute digital data input into it, thus generating yet more bit-string output that circulates in the digital electromagnetic matrix. Hence the cyberworld is a materialized concatenation of virtually innumerable Turing copulators. (67)

Likewise, bits need to be "implanted" (67) in electromagnetic media.

@Shannon W.r.t. Shannon:

Shannon’s theory of ‘communication’ (Shannon, 1948) is concerned primarily with the error-free transmission of an encoded digital (and, secondarily, analogue) ‘message’ without regard to its message-content, and is thus aimed at a mathematical solution to an engineering problem. (67)

However, this is where it gets interesting. All these bit strings they signify something (67).

The cyberworld is embedded in a "meaningful human world that is both spatial and temporal." (68)

"Hence the cyberworld has its interfaces with the physical world, which, in turn, is an aspect of the human world. The interfaces themselves are both physical and computable." (68)

Examples (68):

  • Thermostat collects data from the world (physical) in order to adjust systems in charge of heating. This again changes the state of the world (through the heater).
  • Screens (from bit-strings into wave-frequencies for colours)

This is where the hermeneutics come in!

Digital ontology and hermeneutics are connected because the information that is the fabric of the cyberworld is only information to humans. In other words, the hermeneutic "as" applies to the cyberdomain!

It is only a human observer who can see information as information. This as is the hermeneutic As, and human being itself is hermeneutic through and through; there is no such thing as a naked fact. Thus, for instance, a certain visual pattern on the screen is interpreted as a word in a certain language and understood (or not, i.e. understood as incomprehensible to that viewer), or it may be interpreted as an image of something. (It is not trivial that a human being can see something as something, and modern science invariably begs this question.) (68)

Both the input- and the output-interface involve human understanding and interpretation. The output-interface requires a human to understand the information as information in relation to the world. The input-interface requires human writing, either of a human writing bit-string code, or the interfaces captures some human activity/input.

The output-interface, ultimately with a human being who understands its world in a certain way, of course, is complemented by the input-interface and also by the human writing of executable bit-string code, which consists of impressing bits into the electromagnetic matrix. The input-interface may throughput physical data such as traffic-flow on a certain road or the light waves reflected from an object (photography), or it may digitize human writing of some kind signifying something or other. (68)

Eldred distinguishes between "information" in the CS sense (brute signals) and "meaningful inscriptions or messages" (68). What's super interesting here is that Eldred actually collapses this distinction again by arguing how these "brute" are also in a way messages. But perhaps it's not so much a collapse. Perhaps the point is that even determining a signal as a brute signal or as a meaningful message is already something that is pre-interpreted in the devices designed for reading or emitting these signals.

But even information in the sense of "brute" signals presupposes human understanding and are thus not "nakedly physical"

The latter are a setting-down in some sort of writing what a human being understands about something or other, whereas the former, say, the capturing of temperature signals that are passed on, presupposes a human understanding that has been able to construct a device susceptible to ambient temperature at some location (perhaps on a spaceship in outer space) that transmits a precise physical signal to another device predesigned to ‘interpret’ the signal as a temperature of so-and-so many degrees, registered by a definite number. Such signals have always been predesigned by some human understanding (that of a physicist, an engineer, etc.) and so are always already interpreted in a certain way, that is, these signals are not nakedly physical, but always already filtered by (technical) human understanding.

This is the crux!

Hence the physical transmission of signals within the cyberworld and through its interfaces with the surrounding physical world is, in one sense, purely physical and proceeds of itself, but, on the other hand, all these physical signals have been set up from the outset within a framework of (technical) human understanding to some purpose. (68)

This implies that, in a minimal sense, each physical signal already has a message character:

Both input and output data, whether signal or message, are therefore always already interpreted and understood in some way. Hence any physical signal is always also implicitly a message because it has always already been understood as such-and-such. This hermeneutic as is taken for granted unquestioningly by modern science that is per se blind to the phenomenon. For instance, a thermometer may receive energetic signals from the ambient environment, but these signals are such only within a technical-scientific world-interpretation, which we may label ‘Cartesian,’ that is historically relatively recent. The same goes also for the executable bit-string code that is impressed somewhere in the cyberworld’s matrix. Herein lies the astonishing achievement of Western arithmological thinking that has reached a sort of culmination with Turing’s ingenious casting of his universal digital copulator

The meaningfulness of signals thus depends on a technical-scientific world-interpretation. Can I connect this whole story to what Heidegger called the Gestell? The hermeneutic interpretation by which something becomes a message depends on a technological epoch.

A footnote on the remark why modern science is blind to this hermeneutic constitution per se:

Modern science is per se (i.e. science as science) blind to such considerations, because it regards itself as being beyond metaphysics, that is, it is blind to its own metaphysical foundations, including its own hermeneutic cast. Instead, it naively regards itself as dealing with naked facts. But all so-called facts are clothed hermeneutically, to which modern science is oblivious.

Another related reference for that idea of pre-interpretation:

The digital output has to be interpreted, or rather, is already pre-interpreted, by the device in which it is generated, either as a physical signal or as a meaningful sign. Thus the bit-strings are translated back into human understanding of something or other, a certain situation in a certain state, etc. as such-and-such. The physical signal received by a thermometer, for instance, may mean ‘too hot’ (say, for human comfort in a living room). (69)

But what's the difference between a regular tool and a executable bit-string of code?

Although any tool or artefact made by humans is always an embodiment of a certain segment of human understanding of the world (e.g. the humble potato peeler is cleverly designed to fulfil its function), executable bit-string code is a set of ‘materialized,’ step-by-step instructions for carrying out a computation on input data, and hence an outsourcing of a segment of human logical understanding of a certain situation that is inscribed digitally in the physical matrix of the cyberworld. Human logical understanding is not only inscribed in a medium, but acts there on its own.

Instead, humans encode the algorithm that then manipulates and copulates in the electromagnetic matrix, i.e. executes logical thinking without the need for a human to go through the steps.

@cybernetics @cyberworld

The meaning of "cyberworld" is that the manipulation of bit-strings are physical movements. In the sense that this has effects in the cyberworld and either directly or indirectly in the physical world with which it interfaces, the cyberworld is a way of "steering" the physical world:

The cyberworld and its effects on the environing physical world is thus set up, and works, in a causally deterministic way to bring about envisioned, precalculated changes, i.e. movements, of all kinds. This is the sense of the prefix ‘cyber-’ (from the Greek verb κυβερνᾶν ‘to steer,’ ‘to govern’) in ‘cyberworld’: it is an artificial dimension set up to control movement/change through algorithmic control over changes in bit-strings. Thanks to the global reach of the electromagnetic matrix, it is no exaggeration to say that in some sense humanity has (seemingly) achieved global technical-scientific cybernetic rule. (69)

When we speak about the cyberworld it is very easy to forget its materiality. But for example the "infiltration" or "implantation" of foreign bits of program code is something very real in a material sense: it can shut down a power plant. The cyberworld is a new domain for power struggles.

In view of the plurality of human actors intervening in the cyberworld, control over bit-strings and their physical and message effects is continually being subverted by hacking, viruses, trojans, etc. This opens the prospect of cyber-warfare, especially because military and industrial installations (e.g. a national electricity grid) are themselves today controlled by executable code that may be infiltrated by foreign bits of program code. In this sense, the invention and construction of the cyberworld as a material realization of myriads of concatenated bit-string copulators have merely opened up a new, hitherto scarcely conceivable dimension for the entire gamut of all-too-human power struggles and rivalry (to which I shall return below).

Spatiality of Turing's Cyberworld

Two spatial perspectives:

  • Engineer's perspective
    • "The engineer’s perspective, from the outside, is on a physically- located global network consisting of servers, routers, cables, satellites, user devices, machines and installations with digital interfaces, etc. All these technical things are located somewhere in physical space, say, in Phoenix, Arizona, or Bangalore, India or in orbit around the Earth." (71)
  • User's perspective of cyberspace
    • "Cyberspace, however, is the user’s inside spatial perspective on the cyberworld through which the user ‘sees’ the cyberworld’s denizens themselves, namely, the bit-strings. To ‘see’ inside the cyberworld requires a sensuous user-interface such as a (touch-) screen, keyboard, microphone, sound-card, etc. because users are sensuous beings who interact with the physical world in the present through sense organs. Hence the need for visual, tactile, audio interfaces through which bit-strings can show themselves as such-and-such, e.g. an image, a song, etc. Locations within the cyberworld are given by a bit-string address, say, an IP-address. These numeric addresses, which are ultimately just bit-strings, are, mathematically speaking, the vectors of a vector space. The user, however, usually sees only some kind of alphanumeric address, like a street name, on a screen. At that binary digital location, the user encounters a bit-string that, however, does not present itself simply as a bit-string of 0s and 1s, but as some sort of visual text or visual image or audio sound. This is because the bit-string has been translated electronically by clever executable code into a sensuous output for the user."

The "nearness" of everything in cyberspace is something Heidegger often has pointed out as characteristic for the Gestell (I should find a reference here). Eldred refers to Heidegger M. (1979). Sein und Zeit (15th ed.). Tübingen, Germany: Niemeyer. (Original work published in 1927)

In this way, any cyberspace location can be easily brought into proximity, usually with a single click of the finger on a pointing device or a tap on a touch screen. These two characteristics, namely, orientation and nearing, characterize existential spatiality (Heidegger, 1979; Eldred, 2009/2011). There is no need for the user to move bodily through space from one physical location to another for there to be such a thing as cyberspace.

The other reference is: Eldred M. (2009/2011). The digital cast of being: Metaphysics, mathematics, Cartesianism, cybernetics, capitalism, communication (1st ed.). Frankfurt, Germany: Ontos Verlag. 2nd extended ed. Cologne: arte-fact.org: §4. with an extensive bibliography.

Eldred actually explains the abstract spatiality of cyberspace in reference to Aristotle: "Indeed, vectors are simply the arithmetization of directed geometrical intervals, and geometrical entities are attained by simple abstraction from physical bodies, retaining a certain spatiality, as Aristotle demonstrated in his Physics; cf. (Eldred, 2009/2011) §2.1."

Temporality of Turing's Cyberworld

Humans can't read endless strings of 1s and 0s.

I'm interested in the term "time-clearing," as this seems to be a clear reference to Heidegger.

A computer, by contrast, is only capable of ‘reading’ successively a string of bits; it ‘sees’ only the single bit currently before its ‘eye’ (electromagnetic scanning head) in the physical, sensuous present, but not as present, since it is not exposed to the time-clearing at all. (72)

What we call "memory" in relation to computers thus is not really memory. There is just the present instruction to physically read a storage address that may have been previously visited and on which something is stored. Conversely "a human being can reread what she or he or someone else wrote down in the past, understanding it as a message from the past that is kept distinct from the present." (72)

Criticism on science and analytic philosophy:

Our human being is, most primordially, exposure to the time-clearing in which beings presence and absence, i.e. occurrents occur, and our minds (Eldred, 2015c) are witness to this spectacle of presencing and absencing. Modern thinking (namely, science and analytic philosophy), however, doesn’t get this; it overlooks the time-clearing and also inverts the relationship between mind and cyberworld: The mind itself is conceived, i.e. ‘modelled,’ as a kind of complicated data-processing computer in various variants of so-called computationalism. Turing himself wrote his 1936 paper as if the ‘computer’ he was speaking of were a human mind; he modelled human thinking itself on the logical computing machine whose ontological blueprint he lays out in detail. (73)

Eldred really takes this analogy of the mind as computation seriously and works out the analogy of "mind" as a Turing copulator. This analogy is really detailed and extensive, so look at the paper. I shows in an interesting manner how Turing copulators assume linear time and moreover cannot meaningfully have a conception of past or future.

Interesting that Eldred also makes a remark about how fundamental the issue on the energy of computation is. He seems to bring this point up also partly as an argument against the idea that the mind is basically a computer.

Its logical 'mind' 'sees' only a physically present bit, and its algorithm instructs it to move from one square to another, reading successively the bits on the square and sometimes changing them. To do this, a Turing copulator, although itself oblivious to time, needs a duration of time and also the power to drive its movements. (...) With the rise of the cyberworld, the focus on the issue of the energy supply for technologically controlled physical movements shifts somewhat from that of transportation and electrical appliances, machines and installation, to the energy that needs to be generated to power the bit-string-copulating movements of the cyberworld. A human mind, by contrast, doesn't require such high physical energy inputs for its cogitations. (75-76)

The Cyberworld Nested within the World

"the cyberworld is both entirely calculable and also incalculable"

  • calculable: each Turing copulator deterministically performs instructed movements
  • incalculable because 1) interaction between copulators becomes so complicated that it is intransparent and unforeseeable 2) malicious programming code can be inserted.

The cyberworld without time experience is however nested in the human world. What is interesting is that Eldred perspective really follows from Heidegger's philosophy on time and ex-istence. The human experience of the past implies the experience of an absence in the present, or the presence of an absence. This simultaneous presence/absence is quite literally illogical in the sense that it cannot be captured in the law of excluded middle.

The cyberworld, however, is itself nested within the world in which human beings exist. In its deepest ontological structure, this world is most primordially the time-clearing in which everything (and everyone) extended and physical takes its place; world only spaces itself within the time-clearing (Eldred, 2015c). To be human means to be ‘timely,’ i.e. stretched ‘ecstatically’ into the three temporal dimensions of past, present and future. Human being itself is existence, or ec-sistence, which means literally ‘standing-out’ in the world as embedded in its three-dimensional, temporally ec-static structure (Heidegger, 1979). Such three-dimensional ecstasy cannot be captured by any linear conception of time. In particular, ec-static human ec-sistence is able to bear the ambiguity of ‘simultaneous’ presence and absence, of which neither a logician nor a physical machine is capable. Hence human being itself is primordially illogical in the traditional sense of the logical ‘law of excluded middle.’

In order to have temporally, the cyberworld thus depends on its embedding in the human world.

Criticism on rigorous reductionism, the inside-outside distinction, and the preoccupation with the mind only dealing with what is present in front of ones eyes (and otherwise an inner representation): "How could such a physical brain, an intricate hunk of meat, 'represent' the temporal dimensions of past and future, since everything physical is there simply in the present?" (77)

The underlying concern is a Heideggerian one: "to be" supposedly is to "be present" and other temporal modes are forms of non-existence. Eldred really unequivocally underlines the Heideggerian perspective that being is time.

Moving on.

"The cyberworld enters here firstly as a medium for sending and receiving intelligible messages of all kind swhich may be in written, image or audio form." (77)

All old forms of communciation can be easily adapted by digitizing them.

"The cyberworld thus facilitates the communication of messages in ways that are novel re-imaginings of old problems fashioned upon older methods of communication, which are digitized. We are still adapting to this today." (78)

Because the cyberworld enables the sending of messages on an immense and new scale, new power struggles arise.

Eldred points to the decentralized characteristics of the internet:

In this way, centralized political control and centralized social control are subverted because all social and political power rests ultimately on its being recognized, and thus validated, by those subjecting themselves to it. Messages signifying non-submission to the powers-that-be contest that power at its core. (78)

Moreover, digital code can be used to control things and machines in the real world and are also in that sense a form of power.

@automation

This is the main interesting thought for me, in reference to Marx's critique of automation:

It seems at first that the cyberworld is a mightily useful tool for humanity to improve the lives of people on a global scale. However, since the first volume of Marx’s Kapital, the thought of the inversion of human users of tools into mere appendages of a machine has become familiar, and such an inversion is today taking place when users become ‘addicted’ to their digital devices and ‘controlled ’ by messages received out of the cyberworld. We have long since become entangled in the cyberworld’s web, and this entanglement is continually deepening. Only few critical minds are reflecting upon how human beings’ lives are becoming the appendages of bit-strings circulating through the cyberworld. (78)

Cyberworld as Playground for Power Plays

@capitalism

And capitalism:

Because of its essential mathematical abstractness, in turn, the cyberworld dovetails beautifully with the gainful game insofar as the efficient, automated, copulatory movement of bit-strings can enhance the productivity of all sorts of capitalist production and circulation processes in manifold ways, as well as accelerating the turnover-time of capital (2009/2011). (79)

But everything is recorded: - transaction details - online banking - digital data on movement of consumers - big data mining

Today’s capitalism is in large part the art of herding large masses of consumers, of manipulating them with clever advertising rhetoric whose sophistication reaches new heights with advanced tools of market research. The cyberworld provides a congenial medium for fast consumer feedback that can be fed immediately into product strategies as a factor in a cybernetic feedback loop. The collection of personal data on consumers therefore becomes a political issue, for private persons are overwhelmed by the digitally enabled possibilities for revealing who someone is and what his or her life-movements are.

Such data are interesting also to the state in its efforts to surveil the movements of its citizens and foreigners in many areas including tax collection, crime, political activity and political leanings, etc. The individual person is thus exposed to the danger of being stripped of the covering essential to freely leading a private life (Capurro, Eldred, Nagel, 2013).

Interesting:

  • "The danger is that the cyberworld will increasingly engulf human being without we human beings seeing clearly what is rolling in." (80)
  • Main fundamental point: We should "learn to see the historical origins of the simple ontological hermeneutic cast of our present age" (80)
  • "Without this hermeneutic, ontological compass, human being itself will remain blind and hence unfree." (80)