Detraditionalization | Edited by Heelas, Lash, Morris

@tradition @detraditionalization

Tradition and Self in a Mediated World - John B. Thompson

@Thompson

'As traditions lose their hold in many spheres of social life, individuals are obliged increasingly to fall back on their own resources to construct a coherent identity for themselves.' (90)

'It is difficult to understand the persistence of traditional beliefs and practices in any terms other than those of regression or reaction.' (90)

'To view the persistence and renewal of tradition as merely a defensive reaction to the process of modernization is to fail to see that there are certain aspects of tradition which are not eliminated by the development of modern societies, aspects which provide a foothold for the continued cultivation of traditional beliefs and practices in the modern world.' (90)

The nature of tradition

"Edward Shils (1981) notes that, in its most general sense, 'tradition' means a traditum - that is, anything which is transmitted or handed down from the past (p. 12)." Citaat invoegen in voorstel

Four aspects of tradition:

1) Hermeneutic 2) Normative 3) Legitimation 4) Identity

Main claims of Thompson:

1) There is a gradual decline in the traditional grounding of action and in traditional authority (normative and legitimation aspects) 2) But the hermeneutic and identity aspects remain relevant for making sense of the world (hermeneutic) and as a way of creating a sense of belonging (identity aspect). 3) Tradition retains significant in a transformed form: "the transmission of the symbolic materials which comprise traditions have become increasingly detached from social interaction in a shared locale." (94) 4) "traditions will be sustained over time only if they are continuously re-embedded in new contexts and re-moored to new kinds of territorial unit." (94)

Summary: The "decline of traditional authority and the traditional grounding of action does not spell the demise of tradition but rather signals a shift in its nature and role, as individuals come to rely more and more on mediated and de-localized traditions as a means of making sense of the world and of creating a sense of belonging."

Tradition and the media

@media

"In the absence of material fixation, the maintenance of tradition over time requires the continual re-enactment of its symbolic content in the activities of day-to-day life. Practical repetition is the only way of securing temporal continuity." (97)

"the fixing of symbolic content in media products (books, films etc.) provides a form of temporal continuity which diminishes the need for re-enactment. Hence, the decline of the ritualized aspects of tradition (such as church attendance) should not necessarily be interpreted as the decline of tradition as such: it may simply express the fact that the maintenance of tradition over time has become less dependent on ritualized re-enactment." (98)

"the uprooting of traditions was the condition for the re-embedding of traditions in new contexts and for the re-mooring of traditions to new kinds of territorial unit that exceeded the limits of shared locales." (99)

Summary:"under influence of media the transmission of tradition becomes deritualized and depersonalized, and delocalized.

The uprooting and re-mooring of tradition

"By insisting on the distinction between authentic and artificial traditions (and relegating the former largely to the past), this line of argument fails to grasp the significance of the fact that traditions have become increasingly interwoven with mediated symbolic forms." (103)

Clash of traditions: "It creates a kind of cultural restlessness which is constantly shifting directions, assuming new forms and departing from established conventions in unexpected ways." (106)

Identity, Meaning, and Globalization: Detraditionalization in Postmodern Space-time Compression

(Did not read whole article yet. Came back because of a reference)

The past in ruins?

(...)

"Seeing the past (tradition) in ruins and the present (modernity) as its ruination is now 'traditional' for us." (114)

stereotypical modernist vision of tradition: "constructed as 'something' valuable that is passed on to posterity, from the past to the present. This reified interpretation of tradition begins with the first definitions given by Gross (...) To identify tradition, Gross goes back to the Latin verb tradere, which implies transmitting or giving something up or over to another, since Roman jurisprudence saw this practie as what legally constituted making a bequest or inheritance. Traditio is the process of giving, traditum is the thing being transmitted." (114)

"Traditions, as thing-like containers, therefore become discrete vessels 'carrying' a certain cargo of spiritual value or moral meaning." (115). Naïef beeld van overdracht, waarin traditie een neutrale morele inhoud zou hebben die louter een beetje wordt aangetast on the go: "Old containers, ancient chests, and sacred closets are opened to reveal contents of continuity, cohesion, and community that are named and passed along in discussions via some immanent traditional grammar." (115)

Gross (which Luke is discussing here), is critized for having a naive image of tradition, and for even contributing a misplaced social agency to traditions themselves as the effectors of traditional continuity. (116)

Instead, Luke states, with reference to sending, receiving, transmitting:

Traditions are no more than traces of practices, signs of belief, and images of continuity revealed in human thought and action, which are continuously sent and chaotically received throughout all the generations. All the members of any generation are not identical in either their reception or their transmission of tradition. What any ritual, every value, all interpretations, or each practice ultimately means is impossible to determine with any real continuity or total certainty. (116)

"the conceptual customs of social theory that respect the prevailing disciplinary theoretical traditions of dividing the world into static tradition and dynamic modernity should be ignored." (117)

(...) Rest van artikel nog niet gelezen

Community beyond Tradition | Paul Morris

Summary from introduction:

"Paul Morris (chapter 12) rejects a unitary understanding of universalistic community, instead arguing for the need to recognize that there are (and should be) different forms of community. In contrast to other contributors, the notion of re-traditionalization is here used to refer to the development of 'tradition' itself, so that paradoxically, 'traditional' communities are 'communities' beyond tradition'.

Def: "Re-traditionalization is the parallel process in which the 'tradition' to be overcome (detraditionalized) is constructed in opposition to, and normally as an earlier stage of, the detraditionalized present. This redefining and reworking of the past actually creates that past." (224)

"Community, whatever our understanding, in order to be community, must have duration and thus must necessarily entail some notion of tradition" (224)

De beweging van detraditionaliseren construeert tegelijkertijd de traditie die het meent te overwinnen. Dialectiek, in het voorbijgaan aan de traditie wordt krijgt de traditie vorm: "These two intimately connected, and mutually constitutive, processes redefined a new mode of detraditionalized 'identity' and constructed a retraditionalized model of the tradition that was to be 'overcome'. Parallel to the modern discourse of the freedom of the individual, and a necessary part of it, we also find the organicist model of the traditional life that it claimed to supersede (prejudicial for some, romantic for others). As a community undergoes detraditionalization, its 'past' becomes frozen, as it were, in its re-traditionalized ('pre-modern') form. The ancient traditions, that the conservatives among us seek to revive and recover, are the co-=products of the very detraditionalizing held to account for their demise." (225)

Conclusie van dit inzicht, verwijzend naar de modernistische poging gemeenschap voorbij traditie te denken: "paradoxically, we find that the attempt to go beyond tradition actually (re)constructs those very traditions and leads us back to 'traditional' communities. The community beyond tradition is tradition itself." (225-226)

De hedendaagse tijd van contingentie is ook die van gemeenschap, het verlangen ernaar: "Zygmunt Bauman is surely right when he writes that postmodernity which he glosses as the 'age of contingency'is also 'the age of community': 'of the lust for community, the search for community, the invention of community, imagining community'(Bauman 1991 ... )" (225)

Marxisme is een voorbeeld van een poging om een gemeenschap voorbij traditie te denken, d.w.z. gemeenschap als een vrije aggregratie van individuen. De stelling van Morris is dat gemeenschap met het individu als beginpunt tekortschiet in diens opzet. (226)

Interessant genoeg sluit het process van detraditionalizatie gemeenschap niet noodzakelijk uit. Vb. Christelijke modellen van gemeenschap, en de analoge natiestaat: "The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theorists of the 'state' revived this Augustinian model, replacing the individual Christian who overcomes his isolation by participating in corpus Christi, the life (body) of Christ, with the individual citizen who overcomes his separateness by participation in the 'body politic', in the life of the state. This participation was to create the national community. Paul's demand that the participants (in Christ) be detraditionalized in terms of ethnos and gender, is paralleld in the modern state by insistence that the differences of occupation, locality, dialect, race, gender and religion are irrelevant to the individual's absolute status as a participating citizen. This is the basis of the claim that the modern liberal programme created a 'neutral' space - beyond tradition and community - in order to allow for the 'new community'. An alternative formulation of this thesis is that 'democracy' requires 'the absence of community' as its foundation (Lasch, 1991, p. 464). The state and the citizen are mirror images of each other - each is an absolute subject in a philosophical sense. The model of the nation-state as national community has been a most significant alternative to 'traditional' community.' (227)

Nation as community

Focuses mainly on the failure of the nation-state to provide a strong sense of community, and on forms of communitarism trying to provide answers. In particular Taylors communitarism:

"Taylor seeks to rescue authenticity from liberalism. He argues that for our values (indicated by choice) to be meaningful at all, some values (choices) must be more significant than others. (...) Our choices only make sense against the background of our language and culture, our embeddedness in our communities and their prior hierarchical ordering of the relative importance of the particular values to be found, and/or desired, in that community." (230)

De strategie van Taylor is dus Kantiaans: gemeenschap is de mogelijkheidsvoorwaarde voor authentieke menselijke keuzes, waarbij word verondersteld dat bij keuzes sommige keuzes waardevoller zijn dan anderen. Deze waardestructuur is gevormd precies door een gemeenschap. Doel is vervolgens om mensen zich bewust te laten worden van deze vergeten voorwaarde, en ze te overtuigen zich in te zetten voor gemeenschap.

Being-in-common, or community

"Postmodern and post-structuralist theory has, in a sense, been the attempt to re-think community, although often this has been rather obliquely." (232)

Special focus on Nancy. The main question of Nancy in this regard is: "Can we think of community without locating its origin in some notion of the subject (individual or collective)?" (232)

"Like the communitarians, he argues that our singularity arises only out of community and that the loss of community to 'political and technical economies' heralds the loss of our 'selves'."(232-233)

"Nancy denies that the answer to this question lies in any fusion of singular beings into a common substance (people, spirit, nation, fatherland, destiny, or generic humanity). (...) He labels this 'realisation of the essence of a community'(as 'common being'), 'communion'. (...) Being-in-common is not some feature added on to the life of the singular being but is integral and constitutive. We are only separate (singular) because of our being-in-common - 'ithout community we are deprived of our finite existence'. Communion can only generate common being but never the being-in-common of singular beings." (233)

"Nancy parts company from most of the communitarians over their narrative of the loss of past community (transformed into 'an association of forces and needs', that is, 'society') and the need to regain or reconstitute it. He is too much of a modern to fail to recognize the re-traditionalized picture of the paradise that we have lost as just that: a world in which goods and services were fairly distributed, authority was justly exercised" ... etc. (233)

Het verlangen naar gemeenschap vertrekt vanuit de wens een gebroken geheel weer samen te lijmen. Het individu wordt dus voorgesteld als een geisoleerd fragment.

"The only allowed aggregations of individuals have, according to Nancy, been forms of communion. But what is this individual? Nancy insightfully defines the individual as 'the residue of the experience of the dissolution of community'." (234)

"Although in one sense the story of the West is a history of the loss of some ideal community, this has become so acute that modernity can almost be defined by its images of lost community." (234)

De oorsprong hiervan zou Christelijk zijn. "He even suggests that 'the thought of community may be only the modern withdrawal of God' and that community has now come to occupy the place formerly inhabited by the sacred." (234)

"The craved-for resurrection of communion ('communal fusion') can only serve to destroy community and communication, and dissolve the 'irreducibly singular'." (234)

"Community, he reiterates time and again, is not a product of fusion; in fact, it is not a project at all" (234)

"Nancy understands community to be a rupture of the totality of Being, a violation of the subject (individual or state)." (235)

... "community presents to us our births, deaths, and existence outside of ourselves. Thus, Nancy can write, 'outside of the community there is no experience'. He therefore considers the loss of community to be an ontological disaster, nothing less than the 'privation of being' (ref). Community consist in the exposure of finite singularities, a finitude that cannot be overcome by the communion of these singularities in a totality immanent to their common being." (235)

"It is for this reason that community is not something to be produced but a single ontological order where finite identity is shared, an experience that is constitutive of singular beings." (235)

On myth, its importance and danger for community: "As the origin, will and destiny of the absolute community is narrated, the community is revealed to itself. The repeated recitation of myth founds and re-founds the community. Communion is the submerging of all singular beings in one completed, common identity of all in one body." (235-236)

"The community on the very brink of communion (totality) can be ruptured ('interrupted'); when at the edges of the communion, the singularity of those present reveals itself. This takes place when singular beings reach out to one another, touch on another and separate themselves from each other, 'thus communicating and propagating their community', that is, their being-in-common (ref, 63-71). The interruption of community has 'a singular voice'. The interrupted (inoperative) community is the community as it resists the immanence of communion." (236). Lekker duidelijk weer Nancy.

"Literature is the interruption of myth. While myth is the voice of the communion, literature is always the voice of a singular being." (236)

"Nancy, like the communitarians, assumes a prior existing community in order to account for the singular being." (236)

"Nancy offers us the most original and insightful re-thinking of community as the relational, differential being-in-common of innumerable singular beings. The inoperative community does allow for singular difference." (237)

"Nancy's community is a secularized and inverted postmodern version of Christian communion. It is also constructed as an antidote to that communion, in that, as there is no longer a God (for Nancy), we are finally liberated from the 'unattainable communion' of Christianity (and its modern, secular successors), leaving us free to 'share in community' -- community beyond tradition (ref, 110-150)." (237)

"Nancy's attempt to theorize community while paying due regard to singularity raises important issues as to this very possibility. Aristotle claimed that there can be no science of that which is unique." (237)

"Agamben contends that while the state can recognize any identity and allow any singularity that can be included in some identity, it cannot allow singularities to form a community without affirming any identity at all. He imagines a community where singularity is 'not mediated by any condition of belonging... but by belonging itself'. These singularities cannot, by definition, form a society and as they have no discernible identity of belonging they do not, and cannot, seek recognition by the state. (...) He envisages the impending collapse of the state undermined by the 'coming community', the community beyond tradition." (237-238). Ook niet bepaald duidelijk.

Communities of assent and descent

Two heuristics for community:

Community of descent - Jewesh model: cultural continuity by matrilineal descent or conversion. Culture and religion overlap. Descent communities are inherently pluralistic as identity does not depend on ideology but is vouchsafed by descent.

Community of assent: Christian Pauline model. "Assent communities are always built out of, and posterior to, communities of descent. (...) the assent community is a voluntary association" (238). "The communities of assent are normally missionary, reflecting their potential universality. Religion and culture become distinguishable, the former being the 'assent package'" Cross-cultural, assent well defined in rules etc.

Paradox of assent community: "One of the great paradoxes of assent communities - a structural or design fault? - is that their assent hierarchies define assent packages in terms of external challenges, which serve to create and name outside groups (heretics or heathens), so that the very attempt to formulate the conditions of universal communion is thwarted by the parallel construction of those still beyond assent!" (240)

"Assent, as the formation of the single subject, leads to unicity, coercion and imperialism. It can also lead to education and 'progressive' programmes as it seeks to coerce and remake those outside into perfect assenters. The descent model, whith its pre-social, pre-linguistic, self-understanding of its own connectedness, can lead to indifference to those with different lines of descent. In the former, community is always an unfinished task. While in the latter, community has the character of concrete, physical facticity." (241)

"Issues of boundaries, qualifying periods of residency, and the construction of the consensus and compromise necessary for political action, all tend to be just as effective at creating outsiders as they are at constructing the unity subject (body) of the 'community'.

Mijn eigen continuity vs discontinuity vraagstuk:

242: gemeenschappen van afkomst laten hun identiteit en continuiteit veel minder afhangen van overeenkomstige geloven (zoals voor 'communities of assent' geldt). Zij kunnen daarom veel meer pluralistische opvattingen, veel 'dissent' verdragen.

'In assent communities there is a metaphorical appropriation of 'naturalness' (or, descent), which serves to efface the physical dimensions of the connections of birth (one form of the detraditionalization of descent - 'to be born again', or the prioritizing of class, or other assent category over 'descent'). We can see this metaphorical appropriation most clearly in the case of the construction of ethnicity, when it takes the form of a detraditionalization of the community of birth and formation, reconstructed as the unicity of the ethnos (a communion, or absolute subject)." (243-244)

"Descent, in this sense, is the limit-concept of the liberal notion of self-making. It is that which cannot be wholly constructed, that which is undeniably the case that serves to link a singular being to her community of birth, experience and death. Communities of descent in this way obscure and conceal their own origins. No individual or group of individuals can found such a community - for only communities of assent have such originary events. Communities of descent do have myths but only myths of their eternal descent, not of their point of inception. For every single person their community is already in existence before them and continues with, or without them." (244)

"It is difficult to account for the priority of belonging over the details of assent, without reference to some notion of the 'given', along the lines of descent." (245) Relevant for voorstel?

'The axiomatic character of descent makes little sense when analysed in terms of rational calculation. There is, however, a recognition of the possibility of non-assent communities in the work of a number of theorists. Bataille's formulation of such a 'community' beyond assent is that of two lovers. The contemporary revival of interest in friendship and intimacy also reflects this concern."

Connection between members in descent communities: "unasked for, unquestionable, beyond construction."

Wanneer over "community voorbij traditie" wordt gesproken gaat dat over "assent community", verondersteld in pure vorm.

Conclusion

"The current critiques of modernity allows us to re-think community beyond tradition (the traditions of the modern) and to recognize the importance of communities of descent: not as an anachroinism but as another form of community."(246).

Over model dat descent weer in oogschouw neemt: "Only such a model can allow for the unique singularity of each member. Membership, in this sense, will no longer be tied to assent, and thus those who are unquestionably connected are free to be their singular selves."

Beyond a simple choice for assent or descent: "'Individuals' are already connected to existing communities, and the recognition of assent and descent allows us to maintain difference while consciously constructing communities of assent." (246)

"We are bound to work collectively for an assent community beyond tradition that will actually allow us to walk together, but this should not be at the expense of our already-existing communities of descent." (246)

Tradition and the Limits of Difference | Scott Lash

Main thesis: the philosophy of difference can, by its core assumption of radical difference, not include a genuine conception of tradition. This is due to the fact that they cannot think the intersubjectivity, solidarity, recognition necessary for tradition.

"Another group of thinkers has aspired to 'deconstruct' these notions of rationality. Yet in doing so they have not in any sense taken seriously or even re-problematized the issue of tradition, but have pushed the destruction of tradition even further." (250) ** Citeren voorstel: when I talk about the lack of "constructive" insights **

'And recognition presupposes not just blind alterity but understanding, a certain kind of intersubjectivity, and some sort of shared tradition. The problem is that the most inspiring of today's intellectuals, the organic intellectuals of deconstruction politics, give us only a notion of difference, to the neglect of solidarity and tradition."

"I want to argue that without a notion of tradition the politics of difference, like liberalism and Marxism, cannot talk meaningfully about temporality or values." (252-253)

"All three of these thinkers - Heidegger, Levinas and Derrida - turn the tables on Husserl and deconstruct the reflexive attitude in favour of the natural attitude. The problem is that none of their versions of deconstruction gives space for intersubjectivity within this natural attitude. Thus their notions of difference lack tradition and exclude the possibility of solidarity." (253)

Deconstruction: Phenomenology versus Finitude

Niet echt interessant. "For Derrida the scientist assumptions of structuralism, as well as their substantialist conception of the relations of elements, would be very much in the tradition of Kantian finite totality." (256)

The Sign: Difference and Natural Attitude

Shit ton of name-dropping...

"Heidegger, like Husserl, looks at knowing (or in this case disclosure) via a temporality of consciousness (Dasein). For Heidegger this contains moments of past, present and future. The past moment he calls Befindlichkeit, literally 'finding oneself', and specifically, for Heidegger, 'finding oneself thrown' (in a Kierkegaardian sense) into existence (p. 135). We should note here that Dasein's access to truth via the past has nothing to do with tradition, with, as in Gadamer, a previous historical intersubjectivity of experience. It has to do with no intersubjectivity at all, but instead the immediacy of throwness or mood. The future moment of the temporality of Dasein's access to the truth of beings is called Verstehen, or understanding. It has to do with the projection of future horizons against which the being of beings disclose themselves (ibid, p. 145). But compare this with the notion of understanding (Verstehen) in other phenomenological accounts such as Schutz. For Schutz, as for Weber and Scheler, 'understanding' is specifically differentiated from 'meaning' in that it entails intersubjectivity. It has to do with Verstehen of the other, not of objects or experience (Schutz, 1974, pp.127-8; Srubar, 1988)." (261)

"Difference had nothing to do with the same and the other. It had to do not with an exploration of 'the limit' or 'the frame' of Husserl's I-it relation in order to find 'the trace' of the I-thou. It was instead the displacement of Husserl's I-it relation with Derrida's own spatio-temporally deferred I-it. The other is nowhere in sight." (261). (De "it" van Derrida is dan de tekst).

Temporality and intersubjectivity

Argument: reflexive vs natural attitude. Authors that prefer the reflexive attitude do not have a solid basis to think tradition. Natural attitude authors do: Hermeneutics in natural attitude Gadamer + Heidegger. Unfortunately, Heidegger does not conceive of other Dasein's. Boehoe. His notion of horizon is oriented to the future for Heidegger, whereas tradition requires a stronger reference to the past.

"The point is that to take solidarity and tradition seriously is not just strongly to thematize, not just the I-it but also the I-thou; it is also fundamentally to break with the reflexive for the natural attitude." (263)

Again, very bad paragraph. Namedropping without proper explanation of concepts. Not worth it. Main message: "Experience is always mediated through a body, an habitus, which itself is learnt and infused with the intersubjectivity of tradition." (265)

Time against Being

Focus on Levinas.

"Il y a" versus "Es gibt":

"Here 'being' is developed in Levinas's famous notion of the 'il y a'. Levinas (1990, pp.10-11)) specifically distinguishes his notion of being from Heidegger's 'es gibt', in which being gives in a 'plenitude' of 'generosity'. It gives by filling and fulfilling the being of beings, as well as the being of Dasein, which it fills as the opening through which the being of beings is disclosed. Levinas notes that his notino of being as the 'il y a' is not generous but empty and stingy. It is also impersonal ...

"Beings or existens for Levinas are not the condition of possibility of being, but the bustling of being is being without existents, being without beings. This is because existence denies existents by engulfing them. Being denies beings (or Seienden) of their alterity, of that part of them which is not captured by their essence, by their categorial structure, by their mode of existence. As Dasein or consciousness, Being for Levinas would force human beings to the 'transcendental reducing' or 'disclosing' animals. Those parts of us as human existents, which are exterior to our capacity as disclosing or reducing animals, is denied by Being."

Smv. the "Good" is beyond being (Plato). A movement towards the good hast to break through transcendental consciousness and the categories of being as 'the same'. As something beyond being, the other becomes unmediated, unrepresentable, unknowable, infinite... but nevertheless hopefully 'proximate'.

"Levinas is proposing effectively a shift towards the natural attitude, and to a sort of intersubjectivity in the natural attitude. But unlike Schutz or Gadamer this intersubjectivity is a matter of not knowing the other; it is not all based in a notion of understanding. Without understanding, recognition, I submit, is impossible and solidarity unattainable." (267)

Conclusions

"If we were to read this sociologically, with say Weber, we would understand what Levinas calls phenomenology in terms of the universalism of modernity, and ontology as the particularism of tradition. What Levinas is thus saying is that ontology or tradition is just as rationalist, just as conitivist, just as epistemological as modernity. And that history - whether in tradition or modernity - must be rejected for this primordial moment of the time of the other - which is for him the only time that matters. He is saying by implication that this time is so old as to be not only pre-modern, but pre-traditional." (270)

Het geneuzel over Levinas is bijzonder oninteressant. Pas als hij daarover ophoudt en daadwerkelijk aan de conclusie begint, maakt Lash interessante opmerkingen (die echter niet erg gefundeerd lijken).

The overall argument of the paper was that deconstructive thought is not able to conceive of tradition, because of its overly focus on 'the other' and its limited appeal to solidarity and recognition. However, in Lash's final plea he refers to the plenitude of the 'es gibt' as his hope for a more productive thought of tradition from the deconstructive angle. This is precisely what my current phd-proposal suggest, albeit from a different angle.

"If there is anything that militates against any possible notion of solidarity, any notion of 'the we' in a conceivable politics of deconstruction, it is -- despite its name -- its incessant constructionism. Hence not just gender but sex is constructed, science is constructed, identity is constructed, objects are constructed. But what about es gibt. What about 'the given'? To the extent that we are born or thrown or throw ourselves into a set of already existing forms of life, to the extent that we have a habitus, to the extent that we are our practices, human beings are not just 'anything goes' individualists, but alongside their constructions, find themselves substantially enracinated in this sort of 'given'. Without some sort of 'given', some sort of plenitude of forms of life which fill us up as subjects, no understanding, no recognition -- either of same or other -- is possible. Without some sort of given, values cannot be, but only the norms of procedure, or the anti-normative and anti-valuation of the 'anything goes'." (272)

"But who then is the giver of this given? It need not be God, Christ, the state or the family. Perhaps we are all potentially givers of this given, of die Gabe or the gift. Perhaps the given has to do with the reciprocity of symbolic exchange -- in which the gift is not only sweetness and light, but generations of revenge." (272).

Suddenly an open misplaced digital twist, never mentioned before in the article:

"But how can this be possible in an age, not of symbolic exchange, but of dead, digitized symbols; not of forms of life, but a virtualized habitus? This is what can be understood as the question of 'reflexive community', comprising a reflexivity radically divergent from the phenomenological reduction." (272)