The Hermeneutics of the Technological World: The Heidegger-Heisenberg Dispute | Otto Pöggeler, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 1 (1),21-48.

@nuclear @physics @hermeneutics @technology @Pöggeler @Heidegger @Heisenberg

Discussion of the history up to the development of the atomic bomb. That's also where Heisenberg comes in.

Basic insight:

"Entirely new technologies have been developed in the twentieth century which have disclosed reality anew" (21)

"A business expert and engineer such as Taylor had conceived of a rational business organization which made human beings entirely supplementary to productive machines. 'Fordism' combined mass production with corresponding social changes." (22)

Pöggeler sketches the questions of artificial intelligence, and technologies (e.g. gen technology) to manipulate evolution rather than to accommodate it. (22-23)

In Being and Time Heidegger had reshaped the new phenomenological approach in philosophy to hermeneutics. If this hermeneutic phenomenology was not to remain a purely academic affair, it had to take real account of the fact that our world is determined above all else by technology. (23)

Is it not entirely clear to me what the main question is that Pöggeler asks

I. The Problem of Technology

Did findings of quantum physics that the observer plays a role, fit with Heidegger's own thought?

In 1953 the somewhat younger Nobel prize winner, Heisenberg, was not unknown to Heidegger; he was a fellow traveller, in any case a scientist who practised contemplation and thus built bridges between science and philosophy. In retrospect, Heidegger even thought he could see a parallel between his own philosophical breakthrough and Heisenberg's quantum physics. In 1927, Being and Time was published; Heisenberg had just pointed out that measurement of atomic events showed them as either particles or waves and thus to a certain extent as indeterminate. Could this proof not support Heidegger's thesis that the presence at hand of what is at hand (Vorhanden-sein des Vorhandenen) (for example in a scientific experiment) was depend- ent on what is ready to hand (Zuhandensein)?

Sciences are confronted with something that is given and that cannot be circumvented. Heidegger's perspective concerns a wider perspective wherein these different approaches are "to be reintegrated into a comprehensive whole" (25).

This is a setup for the main controversy between Heidegger and Heisenberg:

In each case nature and humankind, but also language and history, remain the unavoidable which lies before any access scientific theories have to what is real. For Heidegger it is not just a matter of underlining the legitimacy of the various means of approach; rather the various means of approach are to be examined as to their onesidedness and limitations and are thus to be reintegrated into a comprehensive whole. In Heidegger's opinion, however, Heisenberg's physics is driven by the tendency to absolutize and base science as the theory of reality on itself alone. (25)

For Heidegger, it is this "unavoidable" of every science that is to be questioned, of course, from within the historical limits of the current time. This historical perspective seems to dominate Heidegger's interpretation of technology, e.g. easily placing Goethe next to Newton.

Pöggeler asks a critical question to Heidegger: "Does the historical vitalization nd dramatization however not lead to a short-circuited hermeneutics, which does justice neither to the achievements of physics nor to the specifically 'modern' attitude to art?"

Chapter skipped from 25-34. I think it is worth reading, but it does not have priority for me right now.

II. Hermeneutic philosophy

Discusses Becker, who studied alongside Heidegger under Husserl.

About the essay "The Contemporary Relevance of Pythagorean Thought (Die Aktualität des pythagoreischen Gedankens)":

Concerning the Pythagorean idea that reality is at base expressible as numbers:

The Pythagorean idea that things are numbers aims at comprehending things according to their structure by means of numerically definable relations. This approach proved effective, for instance, for music: in the classical tradition of music the musically relevant tones can be produced by dividing the strings of an instrument according to numerical ratios. Kepler made various attempts to grasp in this manner the distance of the planets to the sun - that is, the harmony of the spheres. This did not, however, prove to be an effective method; rather it proved to be a misleading approach (which, though this position had become eccentric, Hegel once more repeated). But other Pythagorean approaches remained practicable. The symmetrical relation of top and bottom toward the centre allowed the invariant determination of a rotating body, i.e. the earth. Thus one could understand that our antipodes did not fly off, head first, towards the sky, any more than we did ourselves. Other theories of relativity up to Einstein's new definition of time and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle brought further gains in invariable knowledge. Heisenberg could put his Pythagorean physics in the vicinity of a certain kind of art; a mathematician such as Andreas Speiser showed how the symmetries of a Bach fugue were mathematically determinable (and this analysis could be extended to include the scroll ornamentation of Islamic mosques). But did not a will to prevail over nature and thus a technological orientation first bring to domination this 'Pythagoreanism' in modern science? (35)

Heidegger assumes that throughout history this idea remained present in à dormant state throughout an incubation period. Becker argues against this by pointing to Hellenistic astronomy. (Cf. 35)

On the importance of the idea of the mathematical and that it should not be contained to science. Cool citation:

The Platonic Academy rejected all those not familiar with 'geometry'. The required devotion to mathematics not only aimed at propaedentics but at catharsis. Max Scheler accepted this demand for phenomenological philosophy when he reconciled desire (Drang) with an intellectual orientation. For Becker, essence and Being, idea and history, are 'roots' from which reality grows. The intellectuality (Geistigkeit) of the mathematical has a structure similar to nature; however, the idea and the mathematical must not be classified solely under the natural sciences. (38)

Main question: how does technology provide a challenge and a danger for the modern world?

@AI Cool, introduction of artificial intelligence. If the technological perspective dominates, why do we not speed up the work towards annihilating ourselves in favor of AI?

In what sense may we find precisely in technology the challenge of the modern world? Surely ever-increasing technology is no blind fatum but an unavoidable destiny which needs to be accepted and moulded. According to Heidegger the danger in this challenge becomes acute when the technological approach becomes all encompassing. It then seems only consistent that human beings work toward annihilating themselves in favour of a more efficient artificial intelligence. (38)

Really too bad that Pöggeler does not provide a reference to Heidegger here! Does Heidegger make concrete remarks about AI somewhere?

Apparently there is also danger in new worlds being opened up by new instruments.

Similarly Becker considers the criterion for the danger of the challenge to be the fact that 'entirely new worlds are opened up' by new instruments. (39)

For Heidegger the peasant that cleared the woodlands was the prototype of dwelling on earth. But Pöggeler makes a skeptical remark here: those technologies that express the fundamental of reality change curiously often. Does the whole of reality change?

Those technologies which ought to reveal the basic tendencies of our times change rapidly, and so the talk of the nuclear age is soon replaced by talk of the age of information.

Actually, even the attempt to "master" nature and ward off its dangers show the finite and mortality of man:

Actually all technologies are partial; in particular such spectacular advances as nuclear technology and space flight remind, with their limitations, human beings of their finitude and impotence. Dramatizations fail to recognize what actually happened and is happening. The modern attempt to make human beings the 'masters' of nature at first had the sense of warding off natural catastrophes and epidemics. And even today it is erroneous to see the dawning of a possible new day only after the midnight reversal of the world's night. (39)

Left at middle of page 39.

Very complicated argument, but the core of the matter.

  1. There is a tension between the empirical and economical needs of physics and its theoretical ability to say something about what is:

Indeed, nuclear physics demonstrates impressively how much equipment is necessary even for theoretical work; and the building of the atomic bomb presupposes a developed economy with large projects. What develops in this manner as nuclear physics can nevertheless find its way to pure theory and can ask what actually is. Thus it remains inappropriate on the one hand to view science in general as Max Scheler, neo-Marxist authors, and Heidegger do, as knowledge-for-dominion (Herrschaftswissen), or as belonging to some technological interest and, on the other hand, to connect mathematical physics with a capitalist economics.25 The retreat to the greatest possible simplicity of mathematical formalism is connected in physics to verification in experiment. (39)

  1. Nuance (that I do not fully get): do the insights from quantum-physics say something about the high-level phenomenological insight that object and subject cannot be strictly separated, or does it warrant a search for a new smaller God particle?
    A sentence that grabs my attention is "the tactical, in which the ideal only finds its concrete actuality, can announce itself":

Yet this verification does not 'realistically' reintroduce any thing-in-itself. But Becker also opposes Weizsäckers tendency toward an idealistic continuation of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory: the reciprocal and mutual effect and interaction in experiments should not be taken prematurely as the unity of object and subject; in the recording of an experiment a 'that', a 'historical fact', emerges from the calculated probabilities. In this the Pythagorean-Platonic way meets its limit; the factical, in which the ideal only finds its concrete actuality, can announce itself. (So we can search anew for quarks as the elements of elementary particles.) (39)

The question thus is:

Ought we (with Heisenberg) to equate the tactical of the higher levels of reciprocal interacting (Wechselwirkung) between object and subject to an apparently certain accessible lowest level, or must we (with Heidegger) understand it from the ultimate and highest, from the historical experience of our own finitude? (39-40)

P.40 is a discussion of Heisenberg's fundamental attitude that there could be a Pythagorean-Platonic unity, a comprehensive theory, and how this attitude met heavy resistance from colleagues.

E.g. "Heisenberg's friend and companion Wolfgang Pauli ascribed 'atomic mysticism' to him" (40)

What had been spoken of much too crudely and misleadingly as a search for a universal formula, was born of a new confidence in a neoplatonic religiosity which, however, seen from a scientific point of view, remained questionable. (40)

This religiosity refers to an experience of the beautiful in the idea and vision of an elementary particle. The sublime experience of nature, but now not its grandeur but its smallest mystery.

Interesting remark from Bohr:

Heisenberg reports of the conversations that took place in Copenhagen after the Solvay conference in Brussels in 1927, that Niels Bohr considered it a misunderstanding to use 'the incomplete determinedness of events in nuclear physics' as an argument to prove 'that there was now room again for the free will of the individual as well as for the interference of God'. The question concerning the complete or the merely statistical determinedness of natural events and the question concerning free will he considered to stand in a 'complementary' relation!

New theme: a hermeneutics of nature:

The reflections on the origin of the work of art found in beauty a manner of the concealing/unconcealing of truth; from an opposition (Gegenstellung) to scientific representing (Vorstellen) and to technological producing (Herstellen) they sought to develop a hermeneutics of nature.

Is it not simple nostalgia that places the beauty of nature beyond technology?

Is this supposed to mean that physics, like medicine, encounters something that is unavoidably given, something inexhaustible, and that this questionable something limits scientific-technological work and is able to show the holy and the divine in a new manner from awe? The 1967 paper given in Athens still merges all of science and technology into one block of cybernetic control over the world (Weltsteuerung) in order, then, to contrast it with the awe experienced before Athena's present of an olive tree.

Here Pöggeler brings it together:

Of course, philosophy can no longer join Aristotle in determining the essence of things and assigning them their natural place; instead, according to Heidegger, art guides to place and creates places in which the essential makes of itself a present. The framing structure (Gestell) of the technological world and the fourfold of the cultic experience are to be intertwined into that event which leads each being into its own; however science and technology can give at best only negative indications of what is essential; only art presents the saving. (42)

What is the task of a hermeneutics of the technological world?

A hermeneutics of the technological world must discuss why science and technology, on the one hand, have acquired pre-eminence during a time of transition and catastrophes, and why they, on the other hand, in connection with the other spheres of the world, for instance, with art, find their limits. (42)

@Gestell @Geschick

As said before, for Heidegger it seems to be rather consistently the case that the dominance of technology was the destiny of the West (cf. Geschick):

Does the path to science and technology belong not only factually but essentially to European history which then prevailed and spread all over the planet? When Jaspers wrote about the origin and end of history Heidegger insisted in 1949 that the otherness of modern technology already has 'its essential origin in the Greek beginning, and only in the Greek beginning of the West'. (42)

See: Martin Heidegger und Karl Jaspers, Briefwechsel 1920-1963 (Frankfurt a.M., München, Zürich, 1990), p. 186. On what follows see Keiji Nishitani, Was ist Religion? (Frankfurt a.M., 1982), pp. 333ff.

Pöggeler adds a necessary nuance about this naive idea of the European origin of technology:

Perhaps the question whether technology is accidentally or essentially connected with European history is incorrectly framed. Technology might be linked to constants which belong to Nature and to the essence of human beings and to reality, but which attain its actuality only in certain historical expressions. Technologies do not form a solid block with a single tendency. They are capable of helping to stabilize what is most natural, for instance the heartbeat; they legitimately continue elementary practices, even 'magic'. But perhaps in the sphere of European culture, technology has thrown itself too onesidedly into that which is available to human beings out there in reality, or into that which seems to be available. Also, in the case of nuclear energy we are dealing with something that is natural and the discovery of which can never again be forgotten: if a God were to switch off the fusion reactor in the Sun, all life on Earth would have to die - at least after the millions of years it would take for the last rays to reach the Earth. (43)

Great citation: the hope in computers is to a great extent based on the ability to exactly formulate questions. But this idea

Today's hope in the power of computers fails to recognize, however, that the demand solely to formulate questions exactly and thus to translate them into the language of computers, is inappropriate when faced with the inexhaustibility of the intellect (des Geistigen). (43)

Cf. Karl Leidlmair, Künstliche Intelligenz und Heidegger (München, 1991).

And so moreover:

Thus the intellect compels human beings to 'ethics'. Heisenberg, who together with other nuclear physicists was caught in the net of politics, experienced only too clearly that it is not sufficient to conform to technological demands and to pursue 'great ends' together. On the contrary, Heidegger's dissolution of the 'moral' in the expansive creative process fails to recognize that it is entirely possible that good and evil in an 'ethical' sense are also at stake in such processes.

Side track, interesting remark w.r.t. the unified meaning of Being:

However it became clear to him that Being and Time remained phenomenon-blind in respect of the mathematical (and also in respect of the aesthetical as seen from modern art). Becker counterposes Heidegger's transcendence, that is, the concretization of the transcendental ego in historical Dasein, with that paratranscendence which gives independence to the self-sufficiency (Insichruhen) of ideas or essential forms (Wesengestalten). In his Contributions to Philosophy (Beiträge zur Philosophie) Heidegger took immediate exception to this distinction; he grouped it together with Nicolai Hartmann's ontology which also starts with questions of detail and rejects the questions of a unified meaning of Being. (44)

"Yet Heidegger believed that mathematics and ideas could be thought entirely positively from the 'event' (Ereignis) of the truth of Being." (44)