The Significance of Digital Hermeneutics for the Philosophy of Technology | Arun Kumar Tripathi, Information Cultures in the Digital Age, in M. Kelly und J. Bielby (eds.)
This is actually a pretty bad article, but contains a general oversight and some pointers for further reading. Nothing is really worked out in detail, the text remains superficial. I also think it sometimes does not faithfully cite and copies original wordings almost exactly, presenting it as a paraphrase instead.
The easiest way to understand the non-neutrality of a technology is that we try to consider how experience is mediated by the technologies we use. (143)
One way of investigating this mediation of experience is through "material hermeneutics," which deals with "the art of embodied interpretation of material culture and technologies." (143)
But there is a new approach: digital hermeneutics:
In my chapter, I will demonstrate that a newer approach of hermeneutics, digital hermeneutics, applies to the concrete praxis of technologies such as internet technology and cyberspace Digital hermeneutics is understood as the encounter between hermeneutics and digital technologies that is deeply rooted in material culture Th e main purpose of this essay is to seek out the importance of digital hermeneutics for the philosophy of technology Th e hermeneutics of technology is understood as a hermeneutics of practice in the understanding of technologies, which is culturally and socially embedded Th is cannot be done with semantics; rather this digital hermeneutics as a material hermeneutics can be explored with human embodiment. (143)
Evaluating technology and culture. Two basic approaches, from Irrgang and Don Ihde.
Irrgang: "Irrgang develops a concept which identifies technological know-how (technisches Koennen) as a foundation for the meaningfulness of knowledge—which deals with social, institutional, cultural and ethical elements in society." (144)
What's particular about this approach is that technologies are "understood as cultural instruments" (143) Interesting, as this expresses a relation between technology and meaningfulness.
The adaptation of technology reveals a social and cultural status that is not inherently present in technology. Therefore, technology must be modelled on certain culturally shaped ideals of security, on ideals of the user or of the environment. However, handling technology is a cultural evaluation criterion; it is frequently shaped by prejudices (e.g. concerning users) or by one’s own conceptions of security and environment. These unconscious prejudices and cultural orientations have to be admitted, reflected and discussed. This is the main task of reflection on technology and culture (Irrgang, 2002a; Irrgang, 2002b; Irrgang, 2006; Irrgang, 2008). Indeed, the first explicit title which employs the term “philosophy of technology” comes from the 1877 book published by Ernst Kapp (1808–1896), Kapp was one of the 19th century’s “left Hegelians,” as was his slightly younger peer, Karl Marx (1818–1883), who stood at the origin of what was to become philosophy of technology as a thematic, sub-disciplinary field within philosophy (Ihde, 2004).
Summary of the main point:
Don Ihde, Peter-Paul Verbeek and Bernhard Irrgang plead that philosophy of technology is necessarily concretist and “materially” oriented—insofar as the technologies operate materially at whatever level. Such material operations, as they conclude, display patterned, structured, and while multistable, limited sets of possibilities. (144)
Relevant citations:
- Ihde, D. (2004). Philosophy of technology. In: P. Kemp (Ed.) World and Worldhood / Monde et Mondanéité (Philosophical problems today volume 3) (pp. 91-108), Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
- Ihde, D. (2009). Postphenomenology and technoscience: The Peking University lectures, New York. NY: SUNY Press.
- Irrgang, B. (2009) Grundriss der Technikphilosophie: Hermeneutisch-phänomenologische Perspektiven [Philosophy of technology: Hermeneutics-phenomenological perspectives]. Wuerzburg, Germany: Koenighausen & Neumann.
- Verbeek, P. P. (2005). What things do: Philosophical reflections on technology, agency, and design. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
David Kaplan emphasizes that recent philosophy of technology focuses on (hermeneutic) mediation of experience:
David Kaplan argues “recent philosophy of technology examines the way that our technologies form the background, context, and medium for our lives, shaping our culture and the environment, altering patterns of human activity, and influencing who we are and how we live” (Kaplan, 2006, p. 47). Don Ihde (2009) has already taken steps in the direction of applying Ricoeur’s notion of indirect, mediated experience to our experience of technology (Kaplan, 2006, p. 49). Kaplan argues “Our experience is technologically-mediated when, for example, we view the world through glasses, talk on a telephone, tell time on a watch, or read a speedometer. Ihde notes how devices that are read exhibit the hermeneutic character of a technology particularly well” (Kaplan, 2006, p. 49).
Historically Kapp's theory of human extension states that "Ihde claims, technologies are material extensions of human embodiment." (Cf. Ihde 2004, p.94)
This view is coming under pressure. Okay, a hand axe is an extension of the human body because people cannot chop wood with their hands (cf. 145). "Likewise, all technical artifacts such as laptop and pen can be explained, similarly, to be extensions of the human body (Vries, 2005, p. 68)."
But is this extension theory still feasible/realistic when technologies become increasingly complex and pervasive? Like the emergence of an "infosphere?" (cf. Floridi). The "extension" theory relies on analogies to the human body; doesn't seem appropriate here anymore. This is where Don Ihde's post-phenomenology comes in.
Don Ihde's Postphenomenology and Rafael Capurro's Criticism
What's the core point of postphenomenology?
Postphenomenology focuses on how human-technological devices affect intentionality through meaning-making practices. But it does so with rigorous scrutiny of particular technologies, rather than technology-in-general as Heidegger had done. Once philosophy of technology reached its late 20th century state, it had become obvious that praxis oriented philosophies such as phenomenology or pragmatism were better suited than logic- or theory-centred analytic approaches to study the cultural and socio-historical effects of technological transformation (Ihde, 2009).
The classic phenomenologists were interested in intentionality but not so much "in the technological tools of meaning-making practices." Postphenomenology adds this material focus.
Postphenomenology continues the relational ontology of a world (but note that relational ontology is not unique to postphenomenology). (cf. 146)
Because postphenomenology focuses on the interrelation/co-constitution of humans and technologies in a world, there are many variations to be studied. A particular method that postphenomenology adds w.r.t. earlier pragmatism is a "variational analysis" i.e. trying to find invariances in technological interactions.
Capurro's critique:
Captivatingly enough, Ihde’s postphenomenology is still a phenomenology, that is, it is observation (a revised form of phenomenology). Ihde observes how tools are embodied but this presupposes that the body is something different from a tool. The other alternative is McLuhan: tools are enlargements of the body which is, Capurro thinks, almost animistic. (147)
According to Capurro the concept of body (organon) is itself a technological concept, see Capurro 2005, 2008. (cf. 147) "In other words, the birth of technology is coupled with the transformation(s) of our body through technology" (127). "Capurro argues that much of what we are doing today is instantiating technology in bodies!" (148)
The idea of our body is often an ontological presupposition. Capurro pushes us to think our conception of the body is changing. It is being digitized:
"Capurro argues, that we are facing today the digitized body, that is, body as (digital) data." (148))
Interesting, Verbeek pointed out that this relationship between tech, body and self is relatively unexplored in his own mediation theory based on postphenomenology: Verbeek-Fatum_Interview_Mediation_Theory.md
Technics as Embodied and Hermeneutical
Questions of contemporary philosophy of technologies (Irrgang 2009, 2014). These questions are literally cited from page 148. But Tripathi opens with a citation mark that doesn't close anymore... Unclear what is his and what is Irrgang's.
- “How is it that human behaviours and embodiment affect the associated social and cultural factors?
- How do we relate to technologies in the lifeworld? What kind of relationships stand in direct correlation to technologies? How does the lifeworld shape technology and, conversely, how does technology shape the lifeworld?
Ihde, searching for invariances in human-tech relations, identifies several sets of relations, summarized here by Tripathi on page 149:
- "embodiment relations", see Ihde 1990
- devices for experiencing lifeworld that also "alter and modify our perception of the world" (149)
- mundane
- "glasses, hearing aids, writing implement and handheld tools" (149)
- "hermeneutic relations"
- Involving instruments we read rather than tools we use
- non-mundane
- "clocks, thermometers, spectrographic devices and other technologies with visual displays which must be interpreted to be understood" (149)
- "alterity relations"
- technologies that appear as "other", possessing relative independence
- "toys, robots, ATM machines, computer games and visual technologies that we interact with as if they are autonomous beings"
- "background relations"
- "form the context of experience in a way that is seldom consciously perceived" (149)
- "lighting, air conditioning, clothing technology, shelter engineering, and the various automatic machines that operate in the background of our lives, subtly affecting our everyday experience (Kaplan, 2004, p. 91)"
Verbeek's technological mediation builds forth on these relations. (Are these relations also mentioned in Materializing Morality?)
Quote from Verbeek 2008, p. 94:
Technologies are not neutral instruments or intermediaries, but active mediators that help shape the relation between people and reality. This mediation has two directions: one pragmatic, concerning action, and the other hermeneutic, concerning interpretation.
See:
Verbeek, P. P. (2008). Morality in design: Design ethics and the morality of technological artifacts. In P. E. Vermaas, P. Kroes, A. Light, S. A. Moore (Eds.), Philosophy and design: From engineering to architecture (pp. 91-103). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer.
Hermeneutics of Technologies
- Classic hermeneutics: text interpretation
- Philosophical hermeneutics: historical character of understanding, always already understanding in a particular way, dialogue, fusion of horizons etc.
- New: hermeneutics applies to the praxis of science and technology and also constitution of scientific objects (cf. 150)
Newer forms of hermeneutics:
- Ihde's variant is know as material hermeneutics
- "Material hermeneutics is the art of deploying new variations on old themes to help interpret and understand technologies." (150)
- "Ihde rejects the Diltheyan divide between the humanistic and natural sciences and argues broadly for a hermeneutic approach capable of characterizing both sets of disciplines." (150)
- "Irrgang (2009) and Steinert (2010) argue that hermeneutics of technology opens a new horizon and meaningful sphere of technology use." (150)
- Again, the following quote indicates a focus on meaning, but does not work it out. Could look into this later.
- "Further, Irrgang (2009) illustrates that a new hermeneutics of technology, which is deeply sedimented in materiality, gives us a new meaning of technology in their usage, and at the same time, such new hermeneutics also illustrates the sense and nonsense (Tripathi, 2015a) that this might involve."
- This seems to be the point: "Irrgang (2009, p. 11) argues for a new material hermeneutic of technologies through which one can get the meaning of technologies in their uses, even in the success and failures of their routine interpretation and interpolation." (150)
Interesting remark (finally, I'm inclined to say):
In fact, Ihde’s aim in Expanding Hermeneutics is to show that science is a profoundly hermeneutic activity, and that hermeneutics, therefore, is not limited to the humanities (Verbeek, 2003). Material hermeneutics retains the imperative for critical, interpretive work, which all hermeneutics requires, but it is more a perceptual than a linguistic interpretation. After all, much of natural science solely investigates the non-speaking, non-writing, non-linguistic phenomena that is quite removed from the social scientific interests that underpin this other realm (Ihde, 2009).
Significance of Digital Hermeneutics in Material Culture
Starting points of digital hermeneutics:
- Hubert Dreyfus: What Computers Can't Do
- "Another key contribution to digital hermeneutics was Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores Understanding Computers and Cognition. A New Foundation for Design (Winograd & Flores, 1986). In the preface they write: “We encounter the deep questions of design when we recognize that in designing tools we are designing ways of being” (Winograd & Flores, 1986, p. xi)." (151)
The road to digital hermeneutics:
Hermeneutics has been, as Capurro (1990, 2001, 2006, 2010) tries to show in his work, intimately connected since the 1970s with digital technology. After having passed through critical theory (J. Habermas), critical rationalism (K. Popper), analytic philosophy (L. Wittgenstein), deconstructivism (J. Derrida), the phenomenology of the symbol (P. Ricoeur), psychoanalysis (J. Lacan), dialectic materialism (A. Badiou), mediology (R. Debray), the hermeneutics of the subject (M. Foucault) and particularly through Gianni Vattimo’s “weak thought” (pensiero debole), to mention just some prominent contemporary philosophic schools, hermeneutics is today facing the challenge arising from digital technology becoming what Capurro calls digital hermeneutics.
@information retrieval
Capurro's dissertation on information retrieval as an interpretation process sounds interesting. He basically shows how something like "information retrieval" is not neutral and shows the main characteristics of information processes.
See hermeneutics_and_information_retrieval.md
Conclusion: Significance of Digital Hermeneutics as Material Hermeneutics
"It is evident then that our instruments and technologies operate in hermeneutic ways." (154) Cf. Verbeek: when you see a baby on an echo, the baby is perceived in a new manner as a subject that might potentially have a disorder.
This is repetition, but the point is valid. Material hermeneutics implies that hermeneutics does not only apply to the "social, cultural, and historical dimensions of science" but in fact also "applies to the very praxis of science and to the constitution of scientific objects (Ihde, 1997)" (154).
The examples with technological imaging show that the use of technological instruments mediates the perception of reality, through a process of interpretation (because these instruments must be interpreted in order to mean something about the world). (Example not in text): You must interpret what 20 means on a thermometer in order to know what it says about reality. (And it matters a lot whether you interpret this as Kelvin or Celcius).
Ends with some generic remarks.