Post/Card/Match/Book/"Envois"/Derrida | by David Wills, SubStance, Vol. 13, No. 2, Issue 43 (1984), pp. 19-38

Authors:

Discusses the Envois "in the light of narrative and its relations with communication theory"

Envois is, in fact, less than that correspondence, it is already a selection (19)

That the Envois are a selection is interesting to point out because Heidegger's concept of schicken implies ordering; ook: een bloem-schikking.

Narrative

Wills' definition of narrative (p. 20):

  1. Something that presupposes an end and thus a destination
    • Wills points to a difference between "telling" and "telecommunication" here, but I do not quite get his point
  2. presupposes an order, a certain sequentiality.
    • discussed in relation to "the address, the prestidigitation, or Derrida's notion of an open letter, the text as graft and corruption."

N.B. "prestidigitation" means "sleight of hand".

Narrative implies some idea of an event; something has to happen; the story follows from something else that happened. (20)

Wills engages with the relevance of psychoanalysis as well. Of course, Derrida's work is indeed coined against that "letter that always arrives at its destination"

Thus for all its linguistic structure, for all the possibility of its being writing-like a letter or, as we shall see, a postcard - the unconscious is more of a chart or a map than a card. And thus for all the importance it attaches to the signifier, Lacanian psychoanalysis still maintains a type of determination or determinism. (20)

What assumptions does Lacan make about the letter (Poe's stolen purloined letter, I think) according to Derrida (outlined by Barbara Johnson):

  1. "the letter as signifier is not only material but also indivisible" (21)
  2. "that Lacan's conception of it neglects what is so aptly called its frame of reference" (21)

"Able to be written by its receiver"

Derrida would want to conceive of a letter which is both irretrievable and destructible; both inconsequential and able to be written by its receiver, rather than simply having its receiver written into it in the form of an address. (21)

Derrida's letters thus frustrate both aspects of narrative, vs end/destination and order:

  1. vs. destination: a letter can always not arrive, cannot arrive.
    • "Hence, if the letter can not arrive, quite simply, it cannot arrive. That is to say, the sense of arriving must henceforth be made somehow to support the chance or possibility of its own contradiction" (Wills 22)
  2. Was implied somewhere else above, I guess.

What is destination?

Great passage:

And furthermore it follows, given that chance and that threat, that the notion of destination, the certainty of arrival, cannot constitute the conception of the letter unless it be accompanied by a system of control (a metaphysics of presence, for instance) which assures delivery to the proper address. Otherwise destination could only be defined by the event of arrival itself, and not with any certainty by the event of dispatch (22)

  1. The idea of destination "cannot constitute the conception of the letter unless it be accompanied by a system of control (a metaphysics of presence, for instance) which assures delivery to the proper address" (22)
  2. If you leave aside these control mechanisms; post office etc.; then destination can "only be defined by the event of arrival itself, and not with any certainty by the event of dispatch" (22). My thoughts:
    • If Heidegger leaps out of the metaphysics of presence into the Geschick he sets aside one control mechanism; and the sending of being has no teleological end.
    • Indeed: nothing guarantees the arrival of being except through the event of this arrival as such (the giving of the gift of being). At this point Derrida's aptly expresses Heidegger's thought.
    • But there are two points where
    • But the Geschick itself is a sorting after their arrival; a selection of sendings; but Derrida would not pretend we cannot make a selection; indeed; his own letters are also a selection, remains of a destroyed correspondence, the burning marks visible as omissions and apostrophes. Heidegger's Destruktion resembles Derrida's "burning principle": what to burn, what to keep? (see ref). And what we keep, we keep only to broil it a bit longer; cf. what we keep is decided from the future point of what is worthy of thought; this does not mean its safe from non-delivery etc.
    • How to think the postal regime of the Geschick: Derrida suspects this selection is still made such that it maintains a control mechanism for the delivery of being; to save it from all its displacements (first of all the essential translations) since the inception of philosophy. **But the Heidegger of the Geschick still controls the circulation of being as an empty signifier **
    • However, where the difference between Derrida and Heidegger is clear, is that even when destination can only be defined by the event of arrival itself (Derrida and Heidegger agree) the idea of a unique or proper idea goes; for Heidegger however it's first of all the human who's the proper addressee of the sending of being; and more specifically the poets and the thinkers.
    • And why is human the proper addressee of being? Because
      • He does not simply receive the being (the openness in which phenomena appear).
      • But is destined as the one that also knows how to think the event of sending itself; the only one who knows how to "read" it's address and stands up to say "it is me this is addressed to"
      • Cf. the difference between receiving and reading (see Hunter)
      • The remaining question then is: is Heidegger a bad reader of the postcard of Being?
      • The identification with the addressee is hardly avoidable when reading; Derrida himself describes this act of becoming the addressee
      • Hunter: what is required "a certain kind of delirious reading would accept the address and its inevitable a-destinality"
      • Cf. does Wills speak of a paranoid reading in this context?

This refers to the following passage from the Envois:

And this short philosophical dialogue for your distraction: "--What is it, a destination? --There where it arrives. --So then everywhere that it arrives there was destination? --Yes. --But not before? --No. --That's convenient, since if it arrives there, it is that it was destined to arrive there. But then one can only say so after the fact?" --When it has arrived, it is indeed the proof that it had to arrive, and arrive there, at its destination. --But before arriving, it is not destined, for example it neither desires nor demands any address? There is everything that arrives where it had to arrive, but no destination before the arrival? --Yes, but I meant to say something else. --Of course, that's what I was saying. --There you are." (244-245; 261-262 in French edition)

The postcard as dead letter:

The interest of Envois derives from its entertaining a set of paradoxes which base themselves on t he contradictory structure of the postcard as dead letter-gone astray, readdressed, mishandled, lost, awaiting destruction. This by extension being the structure of any letter, any literature, the moment it is sent. (22)

An interesting contention: does Derrida then preach the truth of adestination?

The postcards might be accused of assuring the truth of adestination, but the paradoxical construction of Envois, the facts of the very personal address and the very desperate message, ensure instead that both destination and adestination remain subject to chance; or, more precisely, that the matter of arrival, which would confirm either way, remains subject to chance. (22-23)

Summary:

To repeat, the message does not constitute itself as message in the sense of communicated message until it arrives at a destination; and as long as that destination cannot be assured by the sender, the message cannot be constituted as such by the sender. Thus in spite of the gaps and omissions of Envois, in spite of its recourse to the rhetorical figure of the apostrophe, there is no guarantee that the "real" message has been omitted. The postcards may or may not contain the message to which they keep referring, that relating to her determination; and it remains, in the reading, simply a matter of chance, depending utterly on the chance implicated in the matter of arrival, into whose hands they fall. (23)

Paranoid reading

Question: Is adestination the communication of a truth?

The idea that adestination communicates a truth is "undone by the process of reading":

Moreover, according to the structure of the text, any attempt to reduce the notion of adestination to the communication of a truth, or to see the mechanism of the postcard as assuring the inviolability of an unspoken truth, is undone by the process of reading, whereby there immediately exist at least two addressees - her and the reader - and no guarantees about which messages are addressed to each. (23)

The letters Derrida sent are supposedly addressed to some unknown female; but they are also addressed to us, as readers.

Wills thus engages in a sort of paranoid reading:

That, at least, is where I tend to receive the postcards, and inasmuch as I tend to see that bind as a setup, a trap, I would seek to make a reading which somehow defuses the trap, albeit in the impulse of a paranoid response. Paranoia, after all, being a trope unpredictable and generous enough to allow for the plurality, excess, distortion, and virulence of the postcard. (23)

What Wills does now is clever and very nuanced.

His paranoid reading is this idea that all this talk of postcards there is an out-clause between Derrida and her; which requires the plot between them, "involves the reader's connivance" (24). Cf.:

Let everything become a postcard again, they will have only post cards from me, never the true letter, which is reserved uniquely for you, not for your name (moreover you have too many of them, now, names, and they are on all lips), for you. (The Postcard, 81)

The postcard's difficulties for literary criticism, narratology, and psychoanalysis

The postcard, in my opinion, therefore requires, demands, the slim chance of a particularly determined reader to rescue it from comparison with the logic and economy of Lacanian psychoanalysis,however generous its system might seem at the outset. This then is a matter to which I am bound to return. (24)

p.24: examples of how the postcard raises issues literary criticism had hoped to solve already. See notes on The Postcard, "What is peculiar about post cards?"

On the impossibility of a history of the posts (which I cite in my thesis).

Skipped a whole bunch

...

I should basically carefully reread the last half of this paper. But for now, the first half was of main interest.

Delirium

For if to read is lire, then a deconstructionist reading would be akin to le délire, to which the author himself alludes.

See The Postcard, page 96.

Apocalypse

From the beginning the cards are on the table (look back ref later, Wills doesn't give it).

That is to say, from the moment the idea of the beginning came to be undermined from within by the idea of the end; once the end was not simply the destination, but part of the contradictory constitutive structure of the event itself; once upon a time, always already. (35)

The impossible paradox about which Envois has been contrived, the semisystematic misaddress of messages disseminated on the offchance that his all-important one will get through to her, is in fact the paradox of his impotence before the fact of the fire, the final end of him and her. (35)

Conclusion is on the status of literary criticism.