Derridabase | Geoffry Bennington, 1999
Authors:
Chapter on writing
@writing
And even if I am prudent or modest enough to write nothing compromising, writing is essentially falsifiable: if one is not a priori certain of reaching the right addressee, neither is the addressee a priori certain of the identity of sender or signatory.
@tradition Concerning the tradition of assigning and condemning writing as secondary to speech that Derrida noted:
The frequency and consistency of this configuration in this whole tradition, through all the epochs one might distinguish in it, suggest that this relationship with writing must have something to do with what linked these texts into a tradition which has wanted to be one tradition: and, as we shall see, the idea that the traditionality of tradition cannot be thought outside a certain relation with writing, which seems to be a hypothesis, is in fact an analytical consequence.(46)
Pick out: "the traditionality of tradition cannot be thought outside a certain relationship with writing"
The usual display of Derrida's reasoning about writing.
The famous and much misunderstood generalization of the term "writing" or "archi-writing," in tight collaboration with the terms "trace," "différance," and "text," proceeds according to a striking clarity and simplicity, given the enormous difficulties it implies. First of all, the features which distinguish the traditional concept of writing are isolated, then it is shown that these elements apply to the traditional concept of speech as much as to writing; finally there is a justification of the maintenance of the term "writing" for this general structure. Briefly: "writing" implies repetition, absence, risk of loss, death; but no speech would be possible without these values; moreover, if "writing" has always meant a signifier referring to other signifiers, and if, as we have seen, every signifier refers only to other signifiers, then "writing" will name properly the functioning of language in general. (49-50)
We shall see why only the hypothesis of the proper name is false here, and that to say so implies that we shall in some sense transgress the limits of language, which will explain why, as we have already announced, Derrida's thought is not essentially a philosophy of language (50, my emphasis)
Reference to the "delay" of writing in sending. This delay is even anticipated by the one who writes "I am dead (when you read this)" before a suicide or execution.
Writing communicates my thought to far distances, during my absence, even after my death. At the moment of reading my letter, the addressee knows that 1 might have died during the time, however minimal it may be, between the moment at which the letter was finished and the moment of its reception. The "delay" affecting writing gave rise, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to a whole literary debate as to the possibility of writing without falsity or impropriety the sentence "I am dead" in a letter written just before a suicide or execution: and the same question could be asked of a will. (And we shall see that the question of literature hangs on this point too. )
Death, readability, writing:
All sorts of accidents can prevent my letter surviving me de facto: but de jure a letter which was not readable after my death would not be a letter. It is not necessary for me to be dead for you to be able to read me, but it is necessary for you to be able to read me even if I am dead. Derrida calls this sort of possibility (here, the possibility that I be dead) an essential or necessary possibility (U, 47ff. ; M, 316). My mortality (my finitude) is thus inscribed in everything I inscribe (GR, 69; SP, S4ff. ). (50-51)
Death in this context does not refer to a de facto death, but to a de jure absence of the writer with respect to what he writes:
What is here called "death" is the generic name we shall give to my absence in general with respect to what I write whether this absence be real or an absence of attention or intention or sincerity or conviction. . . When you read me, not only do you not know whether or not I am dead, but whether what I write is really what I meant, fully compos mentis, at the moment of writing, etc. That there be this fundamental and irreducible uncertainty is part of the essential structure of writing. (51)
N.B. compos mentis: "in possession of his spirit/mind" / wilsbekwaamheid.
The same works in the other direction. You write not knowing whether the text will reach the intended addressee.
I do make a remark in my own thesis that sending nevertheless always presupposes an addressee despite these complications. Bennington remarks something similar here, and again, this is not a point about "the empirical existence of this or that addressee in particular". In reference to a previous remark, Bennington says:
I write "you" to re-mark the fact (already marked in the mark) that my text presupposes an addressee. (51)
In direct reference against one side-effect of the phrase "death of the author", namely that this would simultaneously be the birth of the reader (everyone is the reader, yay). Bennington polemically states that we should of course also consider the death of the reader too, in the sense of death described before.
To write is to know a priori that I am mortal, but that the addressee is mortal too: to read is to know a priori that the author is mortal, but that I, the reader, am mortal too. Which suggests that the two "activities" of writing and reading interact otherwise than in the obvious symmetry that constitutes their usual concept, but also that we must beware of celebrating too quickly the "death of the author" and believing that this death can be paid for by the "birth of the reader." (52)
Interesting remark about another aspect of a writer's relation to his own mortality: the idea that a writing preserves his name through "posterity" or "the judgment of history". These are basically a fantasy of "a totalized addressee" (52). In this particular sense, the death of the (intended, immediate) reader follows from the death of the author. Cf:
We should have to say, rather, that the death of the reader (and therefore of interpretation in its usual form) is an analytic consequence of the death of the author: no doubt every author writes in relation to his own mortality-but for the survival of his name: we shall come back to this and that of his immediate readers, but all the while fantasizing a totalized addressee, called posterity (or the judgment of history)-it would be necessary to show that this fantasy, which is made possible by the structure that we have begun to pick out, is simultaneously rendered unrealizable by it.
Why? Well the whole distinction between sender and addressee is itself not stable: "the distinction that starts them off is threatened by their rigorous development" (53)
Here, the customary divisions between author and reader, sending and reception; dispatch and arrival are not watertight. As author, I am already addressee at the moment I write. One can of course maintain, with Blanchot, that no author can really read himself, but the fact remains that in order to write I must read myself, if only in a minimal sense, in the moment that I write. (53)
The connection between a fundamental passivity and inspiration interests me here. Thinking of Verhoeven, but also Nancy's sharing of voices.
Inspiration: "dispossessing me of my writing in its act before it begins"
For we move easily from this originary complication of the opposition writing/reading to the idea of the absolute priority of a certain writing one reads (and in the end the already-thereness of language) , which souffle what I write, in the double sense of dictating my text to me and simultaneously dispossessing me of my writing in its act before it begins (WD, 1 69-95) -what is usually called inspiration . There would thus be a fundamental passivity (GR, 66) preceding the activity/passivity opposition. (54)
If we destabilize the difference between sender and addressee, do we then cross out these words from our lexicon? Is everything now just chaos and can we not say anything more?
Firstly:
as we are trying to show a priori, the deconstruction of metaphysical oppositions does not lead to an undifferentiated and homogeneous confusion or chaos, as people have sometimes made out, but to a situation in which absolutely singular configurations have a chance to be events. (54)
"Absolutely singular configurations have a chance to be events" (54)... That's quick remark that perhaps is very important for my own work. What does it mean to have a chance to be an event? Is this the deeper philosophical impact of the destabilization of sender and addressee into a plurality of sendings (envois)? Namely that this means: considering sendings as events? And moreover, that have a chance to be events. Is this an affirmation of their contingency?
Secondly:
The fact remains that the unity of the act of writing and/or reading is divided; the gap thus introduced between the agencies of "sender" and "addressee" (but also within each of these agencies) implies, at the least, that writing can never fully "express" a thought or realize an intention (D, 225, 248; LI, 5,5ff. , 1 28; M, 1 59, 223, 322; POS, 33 - 4): not, as we shall see, that we can henceforth cross the words "intention" and "expression" from our lexicon-but they are already carried off or away in writing.
Conclusion:
The necessary possibility of the death of the writer, in this extended sense, thus makes every sender an addressee, and vice versa. This "death" opens writing to the general alterity of its destination, but simultaneously forbids any sure or total arrival at such a destination: the presumed unity of a text, marked in principle by its author's signature, thus has to wait on the other's countersignature (55-56)
In my thesis I do not include the last sentence, but since I discuss countersignature anyways, I should.
57-62: The iterability of the sign and related issues. Saussure's langue and parole.
Remark on the difference between philosophy and human sciences. On the importance of asking transcendental questions to not fall back into naivite (cf. 62):
The "linguisticist" objection fails, then, while telling us something about the relationship between deconstruction and the "human sciences" in general: it is possible to show that the latter must always presuppose the validity of certain philosophical distinctions if they are to do their work, that they always give rise to (later we shall say that they vomit) at least one transcendental term that they are constitutively incapable of questioning, at the very moment at which they attempt to absorb or reduce philosophy to the status of being no more than a more or less illusory product of anthropological, sociological, or linguistic operations. (61)