Derrida - The Postcard

Book by Jacques Derrida .

xi. Citaat van Heidegger uit On Time and Being: "A giving which gives only its gift, but in the giving holds itself back and withdraws, such a giving we call sending" (8-9) Ik neem aan dat in het Duits hier schicken staat

Envois

Het volgende citaat is belangrijk omdat het een diepe controverse toont tussen Derrida and Heidegger (specifiek: Geschick als een soort meta-geschiedenis).

15: "At bottom I am only interested in what cannot be sent off, cannot be dispatched in any case)." (15) I kept the parenthesis in to make explicit the period is not included in the quotes.

15: Anecdote about student asking why Derrida did not kill himself.

27 "Want to write and first to reassemble an enormous library on the courrier, the postal institutions, the techniques and mores of telecommunication, the networks and epochs of telecommunication throughout history—but the "library" and the "history" themselves are precisely but "posts," sites of passage or of relay among others, stases, moments or effects of restance, and also particular representations, narrower and narrower, shorter and shorter sequences, proportionally, of the Great Telematic Network, the worldwide connection." (27)

"Post" volgens glossarium: Derrida buit alle connotaties uit. Zie xxv-i. (Brief)post, ponere-positie (zoals de post van een wacht), de singuliere positie (een these, en ook 'a-these'). De post, als in het hele systeem van postlevering. Post/imposteur/impostor etc. In het bijzonder interessant is:

"Poser and pauser are homonyms, and the idea of stopping, halting, pausing, is intrinsic to the idea of the thesis, to being set in place at a post which one guards (see garder): thus Derrida calls the great philosophers masters of the post, interns of theses that bring things to a halt; but this immediately implies post in the sense of sending. The ambiguity inherent in "to post" -- to station and to send -- is played on throughout." (xxv-i)

"Restance" volgens glossarium: restance, rester. See 'To speculate," part I, note 5. Recall that an inheritance, a legacy, is what remains of one after one's death; see *legs. *

De betreffende vertalersnoot 5 op pagina 261: "Restance is the noun derived from the present participle of rester, to remain. (See also, for example, différance, revenance: these gerunds are all in the middle voice, between active and passive.) For Derrida textuality is a question of restance, of that which remains because it cannot be judged, the undecidable excess. Restance will be retained as a neologism throughout.\"

27 - "The wish to vanquish the postal principle: not in order to approach you finally and to vanquish you, to triumph over distancing, but so that by you might be given to me the distancing which regards me." (27) (This sentence is surrounded by empty lines, and can thereby hardly be taken out of its direct context. It stands alone in a way.)

Sending and death

33: Sending/destination implies death, analytically. By sending a love letter you kill the unique addressee you desire to reach:

Murder is everywhere, my unique and immense one. We are the worst criminals in history. And right here I kill you, save, save, you, save you run away [sauve-toi], the unique, the living one over there whom I love. Understand me, when I write, right here, on these innumerable post cards, I annihilate not only what I am saying but also the unique addressee that I constitute, and therefore every possible addressee, and every destination. (33)

Continuing on the same theme:

I kill you, I annul you at my fingertips, wrapped around my finger. To do so it suffices only that I be legible - and I become illegible to you, you are dead. If say that I write for dead addressees, not dead in the future but already dead at the moment when I get to the end of a sentence, it is not in order to play. Genet said that his theater was addressed to the dead and I take it like that on the train in which I am going writing you without end. The addressees are dead, the destination is death: no, not in the sense of S. or p.'s predication, according to which we would be destined to die, no, not in the sense in which to arrive at our destination, for us mortals, is to end by dying. No, the very idea of destination includes analytically the idea of death, like a predicate (p) included in the subject (S) of destination, the addressee or the addressor. (33)

The same idea of killing, page 112:

one kills someone by addressing a letter to him that is not destined to him, and thereby declaring one's love or even one's hatred. And I kill you at every moment, but I love you. And you can no longer doubt it, even if I destroy everything with the most amorous patience (as do you, moreover), beginning with myself. I'm destroying my own life, I had said to him [lui] in the car. If I address myself, as it is said, always to someone else, and otherwise (right here, again), I can no longer address myself by myself. Only to myself, you will say, finally sending me all those cards, sending me Socrates and Plato just as they send themselves to each other. No, not even, no return, it does not come back to me. I even lose the identity of the, as they say, sender, the emitter. And yet no one better than I will have known how, or rather will have loved to destine, uniquely. This is the disaster on the basis of which I love you, uniquely. You, toward whom at this very moment, even forgetting your name I address myself. (112)

Being delirious

you always accuse me of being "delirious," and you know very well, alas, what that means in our code (17)

See Hunter-On_Love_and_Derridas_Postcard.md : délire (delirious), dé-lire (dis-reading; undoing of reading).

The bad reader

Because I still like him, I can foresee the impatience of the bad reader: this is the way I name or accuse the fearful reader, the reader in a hurry to be determined, decided upon deciding (in order to annul, in other words to bring back to oneself, one has to wish to know in advance what to expect, one wishes to expect what has happened, one wishes to expect (oneself)). Now, it is bad, and I know no other definition of the bad, it is bad to predestine one's reading, it is always bad to foretell. It is bad, reader, no longer to like retracing one's steps. (4)

At the end of the book:

We had to eliminate all the bothersome witnesses, all the intermediaries and bearers of messages, one after another. Those that remain will not know how to read, they would go crazy. (249)

The difference between signer and sender, addressee with receiver/reader

That the signers and the addressees are not always visibly and necessarily identical from one envoi to the other, that the signers are not inevitably to be confused with the senders, nor the addressees with the receivers, that is with the readers (you for example), etc.-you will have the experience of all of this, and sometimes will feel it quite vividly, although confusedly. (5)

A letter can not arrive, therefore cannot arrive

No, the very idea of destination includes analytically the idea of death, like a predicate (p) included in the subject (S) of destination, the addressee or the addressor. And you are, my love unique [ ] the proof, the living proof precisely, that a letter can always not arrive at its destination, and that therefore it never arrives. (33)

In it I would have (practically, effectively, performatively) to make, but for you, my sweet love, my immense one, the demonstration that a letter can always - and therefore must - never arrive at its destination. And that this is not negative, it's good, and is the condition (the tragic condition, certainly, and we know something about that) that something does arrive-and that I love you. (121)

They will only have postcards from me, never the true letter

It is somewhat in order to "banalize" the cipher of the unique tragedy that I prefer cards, one hundred cards or reproductions in the same envelope, rather than a single "true" letter. While writing "true" letter, I remembered the first (one) coming of (from) you, which said exactly this: " [52 spaces] I would have liked to answer right away; but in speaking of 'true letters,' you forbade me to write any [52 spaces]." (11)

There is this idea that despite the adestinality of the postcard, there can be a secret communication between him and her (her?)

a kind of personal message, a secret between us, the secret of reproduction. They would not understand a thing about it. No more than about everything that we have destined each other. And yet it is a post card, two three identical post cards in the same envelope. The essential, if possible, is that the address be unique. What I like about post cards is that even if in an envelope, they are made to circulate like an open but illegible letter [52 spaces] (12)

Let everything become a postcard again, they will have only post cards from me, never the true letter, which is reserved uniquely for you, not for your name (moreover you have too many of them, now, names, and they are on all lips), for you. For you the living one. (81)

Particularities of post cards

  • One does not know what is the front or the back (13)
  • One does not know whether the text or the image is most important (13)
  • And qua text, the message or the caption of the image (13)
  • One often arrives home before the postcard arrives (12)
    • "I write you tomorrow but without a doubt once again I will arrive before my letter" (12)
    • "je t'écris demain mais járriverai sans doute, une fois de plus, avant ma lettre" (16, original)
  • They are addressed to someone, but readable to anyone
    • "they are made to circulate like an open but illegible letter" (12)
    • Why illegible?
  • Often just a sign of life; no time to write a long letter, I'll send you a postcard.

What does not survive the technological regime of telecommunications

to set all the bounty hunters off the track, leave them a photomaton, a post card in the style of a composite portrait, a placard or poster ("wanted"): let them desire to have his skin but without being able to do anything about it.

This is literature without literature, in order to demonstrate that an entire epoch of so-called literature, if not all of it, cannot survive a certain technological regime of telecommunications (in this respect the political regime is secondary). Neither can philosophy, or psychoanalysis. Or love letters. (197)

Postcardization; support before writing; support and destruction

(...)

and then they are all dead, and then because of the clichés the letter is immediately dispersed or multiplied, a divided echo of itself (finally it consists only of its "proper" support, or almost, and this support is already a reproduction, which moreover, like every support, is something less than ideal, and therefore can be destroyed without remaining), it is lost for the addressee at the very second when it is inscribed, its destination is immediately multiple, anonymous, and the sender, as they say, and the addressee, yourself, my belowed angel" (79)

The procedures of "routing" and of distribution, the paths of transmission, concern the very support of the messages sufficiently not to be without effect on the content, and I am not only speaking of the signified content. The "letter" disappears, others must be found, but this will be simultaneously the unlimited empire of a postcardization that begins with the trait itself, before what they call writing (even before mail as sticks-messages and as quippos), and the decadence of the post card in the "narrow" sense, the decadence which for barely more than a century, but as one of the last phenomena, a sign of acceleration toward the end, is poart of the "classic" postal system, of the "posta," of the station in the mail's making its (a)way, of the "document" to be transmitted, support and message." (104)"

In everyday language the post, in the strict sense, is distinguished from every other telecommunication (telegraph or telephone, for example, telematics in general) by this characteristic: the transport of the "document," of its material support. (104-105)

Delirious letters (and de-reading, de-liré)

And then I am not writing falsely knowledgeable letters in order to keep me from the delirium which possesses me, I am writing delirious letters, knowledge walls them up in their crypt and one must know crypts, delirious letters on the knowing letters that I make into cards. I summon them to appear, that's all. (96)

Also revisit this remark, the reading becomes increasingly delirious towards the end:

We had to eliminate all the bothersome witnesses, all the intermediaries and bearers of messages, one after another. Those that remain will not know how to read, they would go crazy. (249)

The chance can only come from you

You will tell me that this apparently disdainful detestation (it's not that) contradicts both my cult of post cards and what I state about the impossibility that a unique addressee ever be identified, or a destination either, therefore. Nor therefore an answer or a responsibility. And that this is not in tune with the fact that a letter, at the very instant when it takes place (and I am not only speaking of consciousness), divides itself, puts itself into pieces, falls into a post card. Well yes, this is our tragic lot, my sweet love, the atrocious lottery, but I begin to love you on the basis of this impossibility; the impasse devoted to fate cannot leave us to await anything from a chance to see it open itself one day. (81)

Dan volgt er een ingewikkelde passage over @impasse die denk ik in de context van Agamben erg interessant is. Zie aporia_impasse.md .

Derrida eindigt:

This chance (affirmation without exit) can only come to us from you, understand? Do you understand me? Do I have to invent another name for you so that you give us the chance?

A dialogue on "What is destination?"

And this short philosophical dialogue for your distraction: "--What is it, a destination? --There where it arrives. --So then everywhere that it arrives there was destination? --Yes. --But not before? --No. --That's convenient, since if it arrives there, it is that it was destined to arrive there. But then one can only say so after the fact?" --When it has arrived, it is indeed the proof that it had to arrive, and arrive there, at its destination. --But before arriving, it is not destined, for example it neither desires nor demands any address? There is everything that arrives where it had to arrive, but no destination before the arrival? --Yes, but I meant to say something else. --Of course, that's what I was saying. --There you are." (244-245; 261-262 in French edition)

Have a look at What is destination?

At certain moments, nevertheless, I attempt to explain myself ...

(...) I call upon a procedure, manipulation, techniques: counterfires, extinctions of voices, fire extinguishers. This was in February 1979 (letters 4,5, and 6 retain the exposition of several instruments), in March and April 1979 (instructions will be found in the letters of March 9 and 15, somewhat more thought out), finally July 26 and 31 of the same year. (4)

  • Feb 1979, 4: p. 175-176
  • Feb 1979, 5: p. 176-178
  • Feb 1979, 6: p. ?

There does not seem to be a sixth letter.

These letters are pretty much over the place, but a common motive is talk of destruction; a burning principle: what to keep, what to burn?

I am reflecting upon a rather rigorous principle of destruction. What will we burn, what will we keep (in order to broil it better still)? The selection [tri], if it is possible, will in truth be postal: I would cut out, in order to deliver it, everything that derives from the Postal Principle, in some way, in the narrow or wide sense (this is the difficulty, of course), everything that might preface, propose itself for a treatise on the posts (from Socrates to Freud and beyond, a psychoanalysis of the post, a philosophy of the post, the of signifying belonging or provenance, psychoanalysis or philosophy operating since, on the basis of the posts, I would almost say: on the basis of the nearest post office, etc.). (176)

Letter and postcards, (non-)difference

In parenthesis:

for a post card is never but a piece of a letter, a letter that puts itself, at the very second of the pickup, into pieces, and every piece appears simple, simpleminded, ingenuous and above all indivisible, unanalyzable (67)

Letters are always post cards:

letters are always post cards: neither legible nor illegible, open and radically unintelligble (unless one has faith in "linguistic," that is grammatical, criteria: (etc. ...) (79)

Postcard is a "dead letter".

Differing from a letter, a post card is a letter to the extent that nothing of it remains that is, or that holds. It destines the letter to its ruin. (249)

Geschick; the destiny or destinality of being

Zie latere notes. Even snel nu opgetekend.

The principle of destruction (cf. Heidegger); "What will we b urn, what will we keep (in order to broil it better still)?" (176)

Special attention for the sentence "The selection [tri], if it is possible, will in truth be postal" (176).

The schicken, i.e. sending but also the sorting, ordering of the destiny of being (Geschick) is itself postal. In other words, sending and selecting, ordering go hand in hand. Derrida says: "I would cut out, in order to deliver it, everything that derives from the Postal Principle" (my emphasis, 176).

Zie p. 191-192. (Ook verwijzing naar Nancy).

Thoughts

What Derrida here calls 'the postal principle' is a certain logic of destination and a-destination which necessarily implies the possibility of not arriving at the destination. In this the distance between sender and addressee plays an important part: the distance between sender and addressee requires the sending to go by way of a medium (instead of 'immediate' telepathy) which makes possible that what is sent is lost in the process of transportation. But as we will see, although this distance inevitably presents itself as a limitation for anyone who wants to send something, it is also the precondition for anything to be sent at all.

In order to show that, I suggest to look at the phenomenon of telepathy. In a way telepathy makes sending impossible: the one becomes the other. Something is 'sent' (a thought, a content, a meaning), but it arrives im-mediately. Nothing is hold back in the sending. But can we then still say that something is 'sent', that is, from the one to the other? In telepathy one sends a thought to an other, but insofar as telepathy is immediate the difference between the one and the other can hardly be maintained. The thought of the one is also the thought of the other through the telepatic connection. Sender and receiver are the same: the receiver knows in advance what is sent, what is sent is immediately received. But can we really call something a sending if in fact -- as in this 'perfect' communication -- nothing is communicated, and nothing is really received that was sent off, somewhere else, over a spatial and temporal distance.

I will argue that the logic that ties 'sending' to a 'holding back' of something in the sending is what essentially links Derrida's thoughts about envoi with Heidegger's notion of schicken. As we have seen, in Heidegger's conception of 'sending', a certain holding back is essential.

Maybe, in another sense, telepathy drives the postal principle to its most subtle expression. That is, that also in telepatic sending, although one becomes the other, a minimal difference between the sender and what is sent still maintains itself -- in other words, an essential but imperceivable holding back that prevents the sender from sending himself wholly.

Being sends itself, almost telepatically, with an imperceptible difference, in beings. The 'almost' is decisive here, since for Heidegger, we can never equate being with beings, although at the same time, being is nothing outside of beings. It only on the case of this 'impossible' (kan ik dit zo zeggen?) difference, in other words, a minimal holding back, that it is possible for being to send itself off.

To send oneself: one needs a difference with the other in order to sent oneself off to someone who receives, and at the same time this difference prevents someone from sending himself wholly. Derrida's working out of this logic in love letters performatively underlines this tension insofar as one desires to give oneself wholly to the other in love, one wishes to sends oneself wholly to another. The materiality of the medium, of the postcard in this case, painfully shows the futility of such an attempt. But -- there is again and again this double movement -- as at the same time this impossibility of sending oneself wholly is what makes both love and the love letter possible: is it not the case that one loves another, an other? This is I think, in the above quote, why one would want to vanquish the postal principle. If in the experience of love one wants to completely share oneself with the other, one wants to vanquish every difference and distance that would prevent the fulfillment of this sharing. However, as the sender of the love letter is painfully aware of this impossibility, he remarks "not in order to approach you finally and to vanquish you, to triumph over distancing" (27). If the distance between oneself and the other is conquered (as the vanquishing of the postal principle would imply), the other that is loved is also vanquished. And with the vanquishing of the other -- the fulfillment of desire in which everything other is eradicated, 'aufgehoben' in the same -- the possibility of receiving an answer to the sending of the love letter, a sending-back, is also made impossible. The desire to vanquish the postal principle that what is sent off might initially be read, following the above logic, as wanting to eradicate every distance with the loved one. But instead, the sender cherishes the distance because it is his only hope of receiving an answer, a sending-back, from the other, the loved one: 'but so that by you might be given to me the distancing which regards me' (27, my emphasis). The sending-back is in turn an act of distancing you from me so that the sending is able to address me, although I might not receive it.

We can understand the whole logic of Heidegger's ontological difference as part of the more general logic of the postal principle (and everything it implies concerning sending). As in telepathy, the ontological difference brings the logic of sending to a most tense expression. Even if the sender (Being) and the receiver (beings) are somehow 'the same' -- we must insist on this -- the one and the other need to retain a minimal difference for there to be any sending. Being is not a being, and yet, is nothing outside of beings, since it is the being of beings. It cannot be something, for that would make it a being. In this 'nothing' the imperceivable yet constitutive difference resides. (Dubieuze formulering)

Zie de brief van 5 & 6 september 1977

everything begins, like the postcard, with reproduction. Sophie and here followers, Ernst, Heinele, myself and company dictate to Freud who dictates to Plato, who dictates to Socrates who himself, reading the last one (for it is he who reads me, you see him here, you see what is written on his card in the place where he is scratching, it is for him that is written the very thing that he is soon going to sign) again will have forwarded. (63)

n the case of a letter we normally understand there to be a sender that signs the letter and an addressee to who the letter is destined. However, in the principle of sending Derrida discerns a logic wherein the sender disappears in what is sent, and addressee is not present as a specific subject for who the letter is exclusively destined (i.e. its readability, from the moment that it is written, implies the possibility of others reading it, of interception, and of not reaching the addressee). In Derrida's appropriation of Heidegger's thought on being/beings, this logic shows itself at its limit, where there is no longer any being that sends -- 'nothing' sends -- and the addressee is any being in sofar as it is. There is a sending, although nothing is sent.

Finished, the post, or finally this one, this epoch of the destinal and of the envoi (of the Geschick the other old man would say: everything is played out in this, once more, and we will not get around Freiburg, let it be said in passing. Geschick is destiny, of course, and therefore everything that touches on the destination as well as on destiny, and even on "sort"-it means "sort," as you know, and there we are close to the fortune-telling book. I also like that this word also says address, not the address of the addressee, but the skill of whoever's turn it is, in order to pull off this or that, chance too sometwhat, one decionary says the "chic"-I'm not makint it up! And schicken is to send, envoyer, to "expedite," to cause to leave or to arrive, etc. (63)

N.B. the opening bracket is never closed... as far as I can see.

'When Being is thought on the basis of the gift of the es gibt (sorry for the simplifying stenography, this is only a letter), the gift itself is given on the basis of "something," which is nothing, which is not something; it would be, hmmmm, like an "envoi," destination, the destinality, sorry, of an envoi which, of course, does not send this or that, which sends nothing that is, nothing that is a "being," a "present." Nor to whoever, to any addressee as an identifiable and self-present subject.' (Envois 63)

Is is then the case that Being sends itself to itself (beings in their Being)? How does it answer? Does it collect itself in epochal representations?

'The post is an epoch of the post, this is not very clear, and how can I write you this in a letter, and in a love letter, for this is a love letter, you have no doubt, and I say to you "come," come back quick, and if you understand it it burns up the road, all the relays, it should not suffer any halt, if you are there---' (63-64)

Geschiedenis / erfenis / naar jezelf sturen / jezelf addresseren

52 - 'The presumptive heir, Plato, of whom it is said that he writes, has never written, he receives the inheritance but as the legitimate addressee he has dictated it, has had it written and has sent it to himself.' (Envois 52)

Passage on ateleia:

No, philately does not mean love of distance, of theterm, of the telos or of the tele-, nor the love of letters, no, my very near one full of sun, it is a very recent word, it is only as old as stamps, that is of the State monopoly, and it treats of ateleia (the facteur, not the truth). Ateleia is franking, the exemption from taxes, whence the stamp. It is true that it maintains therefore a relation with one of the sense of telos: acquittal, exemption, payment, cost, expenditure, fee. From acquittal one could go to gift, offering, and even, in Sophocles, marriage ceremony! Phila-tely then is love without, with/without marriage, and the collection of all stamps, the love of the stamp wit or without stamped love." (55-56)

Throughout Envois it seems the "who" of addressing is more important than the "what". Cf. "Troubling Lines" in Going Postcard (I believe).

And it is indeed to someone else that we address ourselves (57)

'When I say that I address myself, I address myself one point that's all. Not in order to say this or that, a message or whatever, not even a message that I address to myself, I try to stretch myself a bit, I address myself in the way one arches oneself' (Envois 58)

In response to someone copying the letter that Derrida asked to burn. Mourning/memory; internalization of a lost letter.

'I love you by heart, there, between parentheses or quotation marks, such is the origin of the post card. And of all our cheap lithos. P. asks D. to reread before burning, so be it, in order to incorporate the letter (like a member of the resistance under torture) and to take it in him by heart. Keep what you burn, such is the demand. Mourn what I send to you, myself, in order to have you under my skin. No longer before you, like someone from whose gaze you could turn away, rejecting his advances, your object, but within you, speaking to you and kissing you without interruption even before you have the chance to breathe and to turn around.' (Envois 60)

Ook hier weer: een addresseren dat voorafgaat aan de boodschap. Analoog aan hoe Zijn zich toezendt. Hier wordt zichzelf addresseren niet geïnterpreteerd als een boodschap sturen vanuit zichzelf naar zichzelf, maar als zichzelf toesturen, zichzelf als zodanig geven (misschien kunnen we zeggen: in het geven opgaan, er niets buiten zijn). In die zin is het gegeven dat de brieven van Derrida zelfverklaarde liefdesbrieven zijn (er is geen manier voor mij E.W. om te controleren of Derrida daadwerkelijkheid verliefd was, of diegene aan wie de brieven zijn geaddresseerd heeft bestaan, of alles fictie is, 'slechts' literatuur etc.) niet onbelangrijk: het is een concretere (ontische?) aanduiding van het zenden van het Zijn dat zichzelf geeft, maar om zich te geven ook zichzelf moet achterhouden, zich moet terugtrekken precies als 'niets'. De liefhebbende kan zichzelf alleen geven wanneer hij zich niet helemaal geeft. Een minimale differentie tussen zelf en ander, zender en geaddresseerde, moet bewaard blijven precies om de liefdeservaring van de ander in mij en van mijzelf in de ander mogelijk te maken. (Hoe verhoudt dat zich dat de verhouding Zijn/zijnden: het Zijn 'in' de zijnden, het Zijn dat niet losstaat van de zijnden. Scheve analogie?)

STEM. De stem van een ander spreekt aan in mij. // De stem van het Zijn.

Kunnen we dan zeggen: het Zijn stuurt zich toe bij wijze van liefde, zich dusdanig verliezend in de geaddresseerde dat het niets meer is dan het addresseren zelf, dan de toezending van een 'niets'? In de volgende passage zijn meerdere verbanden te leggen met Nancy en wat Derrida over Nancy schrijft.

  • De sharing of voices als gedeelde aanraking (hier ook in het 'medium' van de stem).

  • De partage als theia moira, wat op diens beurt weer diens relatie heeft met Geschick en *schicken. *

  • De relatie van het geschenk en liefde, en die op hun beurt weer met de stem (de stem van het Zijn, het delen van stemmen)

'We are monstrous angels, all this bad economics, this expanded energy, this time that we will have spent analyzing the tax that we pay in order to remain together, the price that it costs, the impossible calculations, the qualitative registers yes my dear of evaluation, the moreor less sublime profits of sublimation, the secret debts, the charges on the suffering of the others within us, these set-by-step discussions, these interminable analyses, all our rationcinations would have been ignoble, the oppositie of love and the gift, if they had not been made in order to give us again the time to touch each other with words. What counts and is counted then, is what we do while speaking, what we do to ecah other, how we again touch each other by mixing our voices. Not that (no kidding) the infinite subtleties of the do ut des would have the upper hand on us, nor its ungraspable ruse, but so that you are there, and your voice again--- proximity loves me, this is what I say to myself, she still loves me since she is speaking to me. She is not here but there, she is speaking to me, she brings me near to myself who am so far from everything. She touches me, she takes me in her voice, while accusing me she cradles me again, she makes me swim, she engulfs me, you becloud me like a fish, I let myself be loved in the water.' (Envois, 56)

Techology and the end of the post! Prophetic:

We are writing the last letters, "retro"letters, love letters on a bellépoque poster, but also simply the last letters. We are taking the last correspondance. Soon there will be no more of them. Eschatology, apocalypse, and teleology of epistels themselves. (62)

Interrupted by blanks.

For the same reason there will be no more money, I mean bills or coins, and no more stamps. (62)

Van welke pagina is het volgende citaat?

'These guardians belong, like that which they believe they guard, to the same great epoch, to a great halt, the same, which forms a set with itself in its postal representation, in its belief in the possibility of this type of correspondence, with all its technological conditions. By hiding this condition from itself, by living it as a quasi-natural given, this epoch guards itself, it circulates within itself, it automobilizes itself and looks at itself, up close to itself, in the image that it sends back to itself—by the post precisely." (62)

  • dit stuk gaat over de closure of metaphysics als zelf-representatie van metafysica.

Postal principle & Ontological difference: How can being not arrive? Er is natuurlijk de withdrawal of being. Dat is duidelijk. Maar hoe zou het 'onderscheppen' van de post eruit zien? Wie doet dat? Wie bemiddelt in deze bemiddeling?

  • Interruptie / onderschepping: het gaat niet zozeer om een feitelijke onderschepping, maar om een structurele onderschepping. Citaten uit brief van 3 september:

"I felt, at the second that I was writing, that this letter, like all the others, was intercepted even before any hands could be put on it, any accidental interruption" (Envois 51)

The (eschatological, apocalyptic) desire for this history of the posts worldwide is perhaps only a way, a very infantile way, of crying over the coming end of our "correspondence"—and of sending you one more tear. (67)

The Geviert too, the loveliest post card that Martin has sent us from Freiburg, but he already was forwarding it moreover (67)

History: a sending was already forwarding something else.

About a letter being lost (and it being lost in advance):

All the precautions in the world are taken in vain, you can register your envois with a return receipt, crypt them, seal them, multiply coverings and envelopes, at the limit not even send your letter, still, in advance it is intercepted. It falls into anyone's hands, a poor post card, it ends up in the display case of a provincial bookseller who classifies his merchandise by name of city (I confess that I have often dug around in them, but only for you, searching for memories of our cities that would have transited into other memories, other histories, preferentially from before we were born, in the belle époque). Once intercepted-a second suffices-the message no longer has any chance of reaching any determinable person, in any (determinable) place whatever. This has to be accepted, and j'accepte. But I recognize that such a certainty is unbearable, for anyone. O One can only deny this self-evidence, and, by their very function, those who deny it most energetically are the people charged with the carrying of the mail, the guardians of the letter, the archivists, the professors as well as the journalists, today the psychoanalysts. The philosophers, of course, who are all of that at once, and the literature people. (51)

In advance, d.w.z., het betreft hier mogelijkheidsvoorwaarde. Ook wanneer er feitelijk niets verstuurd wordt, is de interruptie de mogelijkheidsvoorwaarde van het sturen. Is de withdrawal of being de interruptie?)

Kan ik de logic van sending en de logic vd postal principle gelijkstellen? (de laatste is specifieker gebruikt: iets kan ook niet aankomen. Dat veronderstelt natuurlijk wel de hele logica van zenden)

Beings sends itself off, it is alwasy a being that receives.

Being sends itself as beings (a history of beings)

REORGANISEREN, STAAT ALLEMAAL NIET IN VOLGORDE

For they know, all of them, what to destine means! This is the unity of the epoch, from Socrates to Freud and a bit beyond, the great metaphysical pancarte'' (84)

‘within every sign already, every mark or every trait, there is distancing, the post, what there has to be so that it is legible for another, another than you or me, and everything is messed up in advance, cards on the table. The condition for it to arrive is that it ends up and even that it begins by not arriving. This is how it is to be read, and written, the carte of the adestination.’29 Na een directe verwijzing naar sending & schicken en Heidegger --> Uitbreiding zenden naar geschiedenis vh zijn uberhaupt: ‘great sorting center’ en let op: ‘obliterated’ / withdrawal. : ‘Master stroke and great theater (without representation or mastery, which is even more accomplished), this connection: very great post, right, every (a)way must go through it, pass by it, sooner or later, through this great sorting center, must have itself taxed, stamped, and above all obliterated, after having acquitted itself of the sum due to the memory of the proper name whose effigy you see here, with, in the background, the mountains and the forests of Freiburg’ (31-32)

‘No, the very idea of destination includes analytically the idea of death, like a predicate (p) included in the subject (S) of destination, the addressee or the addressor. And you are, my love unique [ ] the proof, the living proof precisely, that a letter can always not arrive at its destination, and that therefore it never arrives.’ (33) ‘Epoch, that is, halt, and post.’ (42) POSTAL PRINCIPLE: ‘And it is the postal, the Postal Principle as differential relay, that regularly prevents, delays, endispatches the depositing of the thesis, forbidding rest and ceaselessly causing to run, deposing or deporting the movement of speculation.’ (54)

‘If what is called the post in the usual sense, in the strict sense if you wish, what everyone believes they understand under this heading ( a same type of service, a technology which goes from the courrier of Greek or Oriental antiquity, along with the messenger who runs from one place to another, etc., up to the State monopoly, the airplane, the telex, the telegram, the different kinds of mailmen and delivery, etc.), if this post is only an epoch of the envoi in general—and along with its tekhnē it also implies a million things, for example identity, the possible identification of the emitters and the receivers, of the subjects of the post and of the poles of the message—, then to speak of post for Geschick, to say that every envoi is postal, that the destinal posts itself, is perhaps a “metaphoric” abuse, a restriction to its strict sense of a sense which does not permit itself to be narrowed into this sense. Doubtless this is what Martin would object.’(64) ‘The thing is very serious, it seems to me, for if there is first, so to speak, the envoi, the Schicken reassembling itself into Geschick, if the envoi derives from nothing, then the possibility of posts is always already there, in its very retreat [retrait]’ (64) --> Thematiek uitgewerkt in Envoi ‘If I take my “departure” from the destination and the destiny or destining of Being (Das Schicken im Geschick des Seins), no one can dream of then forbidding me to speak of the “post,” except on the condition of making of this word the element of an image, of a figure, of a trope, a post card of Being in some way. But to do it, I mean to accuse me, to forbid me, etc., one would have to be naively certain of knowing what a post card or the post is. If, on the contrary (but this is not simply the contrary), I think the postal and the post card on the basis of the destinal of Being, as I think the house (of Being) on the basis of Being, of language, and not the inverse, etc., then the post is no longer a simple metaphor, and is even, as the site of all transferences and all correspondences, the “proper” possibility of every possible rhetoric. Would this satisfy Martin? Yes and no.’ (65) ‘This is where things are the most difficult: because the very idea of the retreat (proper to destination), the idea of the halt, and the idea of the epoch in which Being holds itself back, suspends, withdraws, etc., all these ideas are immediately homogenous with postal discourse. To post is to send by “counting” with a halt, a relay, or a suspensive delay, the place of a mailman, the possibility of going astray and of forgetting (not of repression, which is a moment of keeping, but of forgetting). The epokhē and the Ansichhalten which essentially scan or set the beat of the “destiny” of Being, or its “appropriation” (Ereignis), is the place of the postal, this is where it comes to be and that it takes place (I would say ereignet), that it gives place and also lets come to be.’ (65) ‘This is serious because it upsets perhaps Heidegger’s still “derivative” schema (perhaps), upsets by giving one to think that technology, that position, let us say even metaphysics do not overtake, do not come to determine and to dissimulate an “envoi” of Being (which would not yet be postal), but would belong to the “first” envoi—which obviously is never “first” in any order whatsoever, for example a chronological or logical order, nor even the order of logos (this is why one cannot replace, except for laughs, the formula “in the beginning was the logos” by “in the beginning was the post”). If the post (technology, position, “metaphysics”) is announced at the “first” envoi, then there is no longer A metaphysics, etc. (I will try to say this one more time and otherwise), nor even AN envoi, but envois without destination. For to coordinate the different epochs, halts, determinations, in a word the entire history of Being with a destination of Being is perhaps the most outlandish postal lure. There is not even the post or the envoi, there are posts and envois. And this movement (which seems to me simultaneously very far from and very near to Heidegger’s, but no matter) avoids submerging all the differences, mutations, scansions, structures of postal regimes into one and the same great central post office.’ (65-66) --> Cf. ENVOI. Dat is precies waar Derrida Heidegger steeds vna blijft bedenken: waarom is Geschick voor Heidegger een zo duidelijke eenheid? Over de metafoor kwestie: ‘By no longer treating the posts as a metaphor of the envoi of Being, one can account for what essentially and decisively occurs, everywhere, and including language, thought, science, and everything that conditions them, when the postal structure shifts, Satz if you will, and posits or posts itself otherwise. This is why history of the posts, which I would like to write and to dedicate to you, cannot be a history of the posts: primarily because it concerns the very possibility of history, of all the concepts, too, of history, of tradition, of the transmission or interruption, goings astray, etc.’ (66) ‘And then because such a “history of the posts” would be but a miniscule envoi in the network that it allegedly would analyze (there is no metapostal), only a card lost in a bag, that a strike, or even a sorting accident, can always delay indefinitely, lose without return.’(66-67) ‘(...) the post office is a church in which secret rendez-vous are given, Notre-Dame on Sunday afternoon in the crowd, at the time of the organ concerts, or a Great Synagogue in all its brouhaha, at the end of Yom Kippur. Everything is possible there. When I enter the post office of a great city I tremble as if in a sacred place, full of refused, promised, threatening pleasures.’ (69) 124: hele pagina over Dead Letter Office. Er wordt gesproken over DLO als ‘division of dead letters’ : ‘ “Division of dead letters” is a stroke of genius. Myself, I say “division of living letters,” and this is what more or less amounts to the same.’(124) ‘I do not for an instant believe in the neurosis of destination, as I said the other day. On the day that they can tell me what they are thinking under the headings “fate,” “destiny,” or “destination” especially, then we will talk about this again (...) And then the historical teleology to which it leads directly, that letter that always arrives at its destination.’ (144) ‘I was saying that “epoch”—and this is why I am interrogating myself on this subject—remains, because of the halt, a postal idea, contaminated in advance by postal différance, and therefore by the station, the thesis, the position, finally by the Setzen (by the Gesetzheit des Sichsetzens that he talks about in Zeit und Sein). The postal principle does not happen to différance, and even less to “Being,” it destines them to itself from the very “first” envoi. Now there are also differences, there is only that, in postal différance; one can still, by means of a figure folded back over onto itself, name them “epochs” or sub-epochs.’ (191) etc.

‘The master-thinkers are also masters of the post. Knowing well how to play with the poste restante. Knowing how not to be there and how to be strong for not being there and to make wait, for as long as what there is that is strongest within one demands—and to the point of dying without mastering anything of the final destination. The post is always en reste, and always restante. It awaits the addressee who might always, by chance, not arrive.’ (191) ‘And the postal principle is no longer a principle, nor a transcendental category; that which announces itself or sends itself under this heading (among other possible names, like you) no longer sufficiently belongs to the epoch of Being to submit itself to some transcendentalism, “beyond every genre.” The post is but a little message, fold (pli), or just as well. A relay in order to mark that there is never anything but relays.’ (191-192). M.b.t. NANCY: ‘In a word, this is what I am trying to explain to him. Teknē (and doubtless he would have considered the postal structure and everything that it governs as a determination (yes, precisely, your word), a metaphysical and technical determination of the envoi or of the destinality (Geschick, etc.) of Being; and he would have considered my entire insistence on the posts as a metaphysics corresponding to the technical era that I am describing, the end of a certain post, the dawn of another, etc.); now tekhne̅, this is the entire—infinitesimal and decisive—différance, does not arrive. No more than metaphysics, therefore, and than positionality; always, already it parasites that to which he says it happens, arrives, or that it succeeds in happening to [arrive à arriver].’ (192) ‘The entire history of postal tekhne̅ tends to rivet the destination to identity. To arrive, to happen would be to a subject, to happen to “me.” Now a mark, whatever it may be, is coded in order to make an imprint, even if it is a perfume. Henceforth it divides itself, it is valid several times in one time: no more unique addressee.’ (192)