A paradigm shift in Heidegger research | Thomas Sheenan, Continental Philosophy Review 34, 183-202, 2001
Authors:
Introduction
Two major paradigms of Heidegger-scholarship in the US:
1) Existentialist (e.g. Thomas Langan) 2) Classical paradigm (e.g. William J. Richardson), relying on: - the Kehre is shift in focus from Dasein to Sein - interpretations of Dasein and Sein to support that claim
Richardson's position: "After the turn, Being/aletheia is no longer understood as a horizon projected by Dasein, within which beings are encountered and discovered as true."
Richardson, "Martin Heidegger" in From Phenomenology to THought, Errancy, and Desire (17-19):
"Rather, it is experienced as an active force, a process that assumes an initiative of its own by revealing itself to Dasein - but concealing itself as well."
Nowadays, this position diffused across a spectrum, that Sheenan orders from "right to left" (I changed his order of presentation).
1) Ultra-orthodox (e.g. Heidegger Studies journal - hier zit Vincent Blok in het bestuur). Heidegger Gesellschaft. 2) Center right, orthodox. Focus on strict commentary. Scholars dedicated to getting Heidegger right, meticulous close reading. E.g. Theodore Kisiel, John van Buren. 3) Center-left: liberal-assimilationists, focused on dialogue. "Beyond getting Heidegger right, these scholars seek to put his work into dialogue with other contemporary philosophers and perhaps to amend or correct him in the process." (p. 185). E.g. engagements with Derrida, Levinas, but also Wittgenstein, pragmatism etc. Hubert Dreyfus is an example in the US. 4) Ultra-left, rejectionist wing, "Heideggerians against Heidegger", attacking the core of Heidegger's philosophy after Nazi revelations.
What all these variations share, is that they still exist within the classical paradigm of Sein, Dasein and the Kehre from Dasein to Sein.
Sister Constantia's Exam
"There was a time, not long ago, when doing Heidegger did not mean sacrificing analytic precision, when terms had crisp edges as well as elegance (I think of Richardson’s book), and when explaining Heidegger did not mean straining to be a bad poet. But let us leave all that to the tender mercies of Sister Constantia. It is time to wake up from the nightmare."
Although the Beiträge is horribly written, and needlessly difficult, and is more a collection of notes than a book, Sheehan does consider the Beiträge to show how settled readings of Heidegger are in need of major revisions.
Farewell to "being"
In the secondary literature there exists great confusion around the use of the word "being". Distinguish...
- das Seiend vs das Seiende
- das Seyn
- das Sein des Seienden
- das Sein selbst
- das Seiendsein
- das Sein, with "Sein" crossed out
- das Sein in "die Wesung (or Wahrheit or Lichtung) des Seins."
Sheehan gives some examples of common uses and remarks why they are confused.
"Other blue book entries reveal that many Heideggerians still believe that "being" is Heidegger’s central topic. By first positing the ontological difference between being and entities and then opting for the "being"-side, they think they have arrived at die Sache selbst. But to the contrary Heidegger has shown that all philosophy posits the ontological difference and enjoys an understanding of Sein (he mentions Aquinas in particular)--and yet never escapes from metaphysics (GA 15, 310.12-15)."
So, in this paradigm, Heidegger was no longer understood as the thinker of human existence, but as the thinker of being. But... is Sein really Heidegger's main topic? Sheehan considers this to be the greatest misconception that should be corrected by now.
- "das Sein [ist] nicht ... das eigens zu Denkende" (SD, 44.6-7).
- Heidegger's issue is "ganz anderes" from Sein (SD, 22.5).
- The crossing out of the word Sein underlines the distance between "being" and his own main issue (Ga 9, 385.5)
- "and in 1969 he reiterated what he has been saying for thirty years: die Sache selbst is not "being" but something prior (SD, 77.18-19)."
- Also it is not the meaning of being that is at stake here, because for Heidegger it is clear what being means throughout history: "From the dawn of the Greek world down to the dusk of our own century," he writes, "Sein has meant only one thing: Anwesen" (GA 9, 400.20-23)." (p. 189)
Explanation of why being is not the main issue for Heidegger and should not be identified with die Sache selbst, explained in Latin (I love this guy):
The issue is not:
1) quidquid est, whatever is, das Seiende. 2) quidditas of quidquid est, Seiendheit 3) esse, Sein contracted in any est (cf. Thomas Aquinas) 4) est (simpliciter) of any quidquid est, "since in Heidegger's phenomenological perspective est never appears alone but always in conjunction with an Entwurf des Seins, an act of "taking-something-as"." (p. 189)
Another main danger of the focus on "being" is that is reifies into this big being beyond beings.
"In this aggrandized and reified form, Big Being ends up performing a host of extraordinary activities (all in the middle voice, we are told): it conceals itself and reveals itself, withdraws itself yet dispenses epochs of being, calls out to us while abandoning us to technology, wraps itself in mystery and yet occasionally pulls aside the veil to show Itself to select human beings -- nowadays only to paid-up Heideggerians." (p. 189)
N.B. This is a very interesting (and funny) remark. I think in my own work there is a great risk that people misread it in this way. I could cite this passage to make clear I do not intend this reification, despite using some of the terms Sheenan mentions here.
N.B. I should think about whether the "phenomenology of the inapparent" I quote in my thesis is faulty of a similar mistake.
The farewell to being does not mean that we should discard Heidegger's innovations and position in his phenomenological-hermeneutical approach to ontology, merely to distinguish it from the main issue of Heidegger's thought. Sheehan lists some points about Heidegger's relevant use of the word being. I like these the most:
- "In theoretical activity we take X as something. In practical activity we take X as for something." Examples: 1) take Socrates as an Athenian (the apophantic "as" from SuZ). 2) take up a rock as suitable for hammering (the hermeneutical "as"). In both cases "the first name of "is" or "being" is the "as" of an act of taking-as". (p. 191)
- Both in the apophantic subject-predicate (S-and-P?) framework and in the "tools-for-tasks framework of practical operations", is "being" "a matter of the synthetic-differential relation between things and human interests: it is about the sense that things have in the light of those interests." (191). "So yes, "being" is the "presence" of things, but that presence is always the current sense that things have in relation to, and within the world of, human concerns (GA 2, 201.8-14)." (191).
This thesis of Heidegger ("Sein = Anwesen = Sinn") is not his center of thought, but "a phenomenological-hermeneutical rewrite of traditional metaphysics and epistemology - it merely does Husserl's homework for him."
The thesis that being only makes sense in relation to a human concern, is a thesis Heidegger never dropped. Another quote that I like in this context is: "Before homo sapiens evolved, there was no "being" on earth: it did not lurk within things, waiting to be discovered; it was not hiding in the wings, waiting for a Dasein to come along so that it could reveal itself."
I think that quote is important for my characterisation of "sending", and a specification of how we should think of the human as the proper addressee of being. I think this quote could actually be used as an example of how for Derrida sending and sending-back are related; how there is not a uni-directional transference from who sends to who receives, and specifically how we can make sense of this when sending is understood in an ontological context. That "being" is sent, does not mean that it was posted at the great post office of history, waiting for someone to come and pick it up at the mailbox so that it can reveal its contents. No, strangely enough that being is "sent" means that being cannot be understood outside of this relation between its recipient, that, cf. Derrida, in order to receive must send as well.
So despite the human being the proper addressee of being in Heidegger's thought, as I claimed, the way the human "receives" being depends on how he "sends back" through his own human concerns in the world, and the attitude through which the sending of is received. That also reinforces why the attitude of the addressee is formative of how sending is received. ("wonder", "shock" in the new beginning of thought.)
Die Frage nach dem Da
So... what is the point of Heidegger then?
"His own issue is: What makes taking-as (and thus any occurrence of "being") possible? Note that Heidegger's focal topic is not "being" but that which "gives" being. The Sache is not "as" or "is" in any form, what what makes possible any "as" or "is"." (p. 192)
There are various ways to express this. I summarize them here:
1) Welt. "As the realm of possible taking-as, the world is the "meaning of being" (GA 9, 201.30-32). It is what makes possible all instances of "is." Die Welt weltet: The world is what gives being." (p. 193) 2) Lichtung. "To "clear" something means to free it from dumb lethic "thereness" by relating it to human purposes." (p. 193) 3) Da. "The Beiträge and other texts show that Heidegger understood the Da not as the "there" but as das Offene or die Offenheit, the "open" (GA 65, 328.28, etc.)." (p. 193).
According to Sheenan, they are therefore the same thematic as Welt and Lichtung, and they constitute die Sache selbst.
No there there
"The most extraordinary thing about all of Heidegger’s thought, both early and late, is his unwaivering insistence that human being is that "open" and thus is “the thing itself.” From the beginning to the end of his career, he never got beyond that point." (p. 193)
Sheehan's thesis, surrounded by supporting claims: "What Heidegger is expressing in both the earlier language of Geworfenheit and the later language of Ereignis is that being-open is the ineluctable condition of our essence, not an occasional accomplishment of our wills. It is our "fate," the way we always already are (GA 2, 431.16-17)" (p. 194).
Fate, ref.
"his point is that human beings are the Da not occasionally or by their own choice, but of necessity. We cannot not be the open (the possibility of taking-as) just as we cannot not be our own minds." (p. 194)
Central formulation of this two-unity: "Without us, there is no open at all; but with us, the open is always apriori operative." (p. 194)
So against the old paradigm, Sheehan here claims that the fundamental issue of Heidegger has been the same throughout his whole oeuvre, despite the usual distinction into Heidegger I and Heidegger II.
Sheehan's claim:
- A human being’s raison d’être is to-be-the-open (= to be able to takeas). The facticity of our "cannot-not-be-the-open" is what Heidegger calls our “belonging” to the open (das Zugehören).
- But reciprocally, the open or Da functions only as long as there is human being. This necessary grounding of the open in the human is what Heidegger calls the open’s "need" of human being (das Brauchen). (both from p. 195)
This means that belonging to the open and that the open needs us are two complementary expressions of the very same facticity. (p. 195)
The reciprocity of this apriori interface between Da and Sein (called Dasein) is what is expressed in die Kehre. This term does thus not refer to something that happened at some point in Heidegger's career in the 30s, but is a name for the structure of openness (p. 195).
"Indeed, "Das Da-seyn 'ist' die Kehre" (GA 71, ms., 118.11)." (p. 195)
The Kehre never took place
What is usually meant by the turn is captured by the phrase die Wendung des Denkens which does refer to a historical moment of a shift in thought.
Heidegger tried to presesn die Kehre with the term Ereignis, that emphasizes that "the open must be always already opened up (geworfen, zugeworfen; Zuwurf) if there is to be any taking-as (Entwurf)." (p. 196).
Ereignis: The opening of the open
Whole etymology of Ereignis, that I'm not particularly interested in.
"If we can call Ereignis an event at all, it is the “apriori event” of the opening up of the open. And clearly this apriori event is less about “appropriation” or “enowning” than about “opening up and appearing.” Nonetheless, this is not to entirely exclude “appropriation” as a possible translation of Ereignis. That word might work – but only if we understand the proprium of appropriation as the opening up of openness (cf. SD 24.5–7, 28–29)." (p. 198)
What, then, clears the clearing?
"Whether as Welt, Lichtung, Da, or Ereignis, Heidegger’s focal issue is the open that gives all forms of being and all epochs in the history of being." (p. 198)
Heidegger's answer: "As Heidegger puts it: “What withdraws from us draws us along with it by that very withdrawal” (WD, 5.37). Of course that sentence has to be interpreted in terms of aprioriperfect aspect (GA 2, 114, n.): that which is intrinsically withdrawn has always already drawn us out and opened us up. "Entzug ist Ereignis" (WD, 5.27): the-intrinsically-withdrawn has apriori opened the open." (p. 198)
But, Sheehan asks, what then is this that is always already withdrawn?
He strongly rejects an answer that reificates being again into this "Big Being" and that hypostasizes "das Sichentziehende into Being Itself in its absential mode (the "Lethe") and then have It (whatever "It" is) do the withdrawing, the opening-of-the-open, and the giving-of-being. But this would only be metaphysics in its most banal and vulgar form, the destruction of everything Heidegger stood for." (p. 198-199).
I think this remark is very important. When speaking of the withdrawal of being, I should make very clear that it is not simply "being" but then in the mode of absence ("lethe"), or in its being forgotten. I have this section in my thesis where I speak about how recollecting being does not counteract forgetfulness, but only deepens the importance of withdrawal. I should add a sentence there, about what that means. It means that withdrawal is the very thing that gives being, the opening-of-the-open, and not a characteristic of "being" itself, which is we can summarize as being "presence".
Todo: check how I use "lethe" in my thesis, what significance do I give it?
So again, what is that which withdraws essentially?
"Heidegger gives a quite different answer to the question "What is das Sichentziehende?" If metaphysical closure, full self-presence, and perfect self-coincidence were the measure of complete being (to teleion), then for Heidegger human openness is intrinsically "in-complete" (atelés). Ever unfinished and always on-the-way, we may think of ourselves as stretched out towards full self-presence, but we never arrive there. Our lack-of-fullbeing is what makes us be human." (p. 199)
The big answer thus is: finitude!
Add this to the section where I say: "It thus seems we arrive at a crossroads", and where I speak of the "proper addressee" of Heidegger.
What is important about this passage for my thematic of sending, is the concept of arrival here. Derrida seems to accuse Heidegger of still presupposing being in its unity by presupposing a unity in withdrawal, of that which sends. However, it is a big question whether this constant condemnation of Heidegger by Derrida, does Heidegger just, as it can be argued based on Heidegger's Beiträge (cf. Sheehan) that that which withdraws is in fact the human finitude by which we never fully "receive" being (to say it in terms of the post), i.e. that when being is finally understood as presence (as Derrida is so keen of pointing out), that the human exactly does not reach complete self presence. (cf Sheehan 199).
Or said differently, that although the human is the addressee of the openness of being in Heidegger's work, that the address never fully arrives. The arrival is always something of the future in Heidegger's Beiträge, not in a temporal sense, as if we just have to wait a bit longer, but in the fundamental sense that this non-arrival itself is essential, the mark of human finitude, and the very thing by which "it gives being".
Big conclusion and wrap-up, quoted in its entirety because it's awesome and lucid:
"Therefore, Ereignis is not Big Being or the “Lethe,” operating from some Beyond and heteronomously “appropriating” us into a place other than ourselves. Rather, our finitude is the absence that opens the open: Der Entzug ist des Da-seins (GA 65, 293.9) Our finitude makes all “as”-taking and “is”-saying possible by requiring us to understand things not immediately and ontically, as God does, but indirectly and ontologically (= imperfectly), through their being (GA 3, 280.30–31). Our finitude, and it alone, is the intrinsically hidden mystery, overlooked in fallenness and embraced in resolve: das vergessene Geheimnis des Daseins (GA 9, 195.23). Our finitude is the “it” that “gives being” and that is responsible for the various dispensations in die Geschichte des Seins. In the language of Zeit und Sein, our finitude is what erreicht die Zeit (opens the clearing) and schickt das Sein (makes possible all taking-as)." (p. 199)
Conclusion
"If there were time to work this out more concretely, I would interpret this finitude by way of Heidegger’s discussion of pa¯Joj and toÜ paJhtiko¯n in Aristotle. Pa¯Joj is our “being-exposed,” another name for openness. By its very nature openness cannot be a©paJh¯j, an isolated and self-contained individual (Dasein as Ayn Rand or as Aristotle’s God) but is always-already extended and exposed, not only able but also needing to be affected by others: approached, touched, engaged. Human openness is always co-openness (Mitdasein). Our sociality -- co-extensive with finitude, and its first gift -- is what makes it possible and necessary to take-as and to understand “is.” Our sociality is die Sache selbst."
Dit doet me denken aan wat ik steeds terug vind in het werk van Cornelis Verhoeven. De passiviteit (... in pathos, of zelfs extase) is de sfeer waarin betekenisvolle activiteit plaats vindt. De zone van het aangeraakt worden, het openstellen van de meest eigene sfeer waarin we onszelf het makkelijkst juist zouden kunnen opsluiten.
Wat ook een interessant verband voor een paper zou kunnen zijn: in zijn boek over het enthusiasme behandelt Verhoeven ook Hegel, waarbij het enthusiasme en bijbehorende passiviteit juist betekent: openstaan voor het ding zelf. Dat is vrijwel precies de conclusie die Sheehan hier ook trekt op basis van Heidegger (en toont maar dat Verhoeven echt een Heideggerian is, zonder steeds over Heidegger te schrijven).