Derrida and Heidegger | Thomas Sheehan, 139-157
Authors:
Introduction
I agree with the following statement:
"what remains unchanged in these later discussions is Derrida's fundamental claim: that while he may not have replaced Heidegger, he has in some sense surpassed him insofar as his own thought of différance is anterior to Heidegger's ontological difference and the truth of being." (p. 139)
This can already be seen in Of Grammatology, and also in the accusations I mention in my thesis: that as a philosopher of difference Heidegger's thought somehow still revolves around a sort of hidden unity, which is "being". It is dubitable whether this is a good reading of Heidegger.
In this article Sheehan will look at Derrida from Heidegger's viewpoint (usually the opposite is done). Specifically he will discuss the relation of Dasein and being.
1) Review Derrida's critique on Heidegger w.r.t. Dasein and being. 2) Argue that Derrida's interaction with Heidegger cannot really be called "criticism", based on what Derrida does (deconstruction, retrieval, undecidability).
Small tale on Left and Right Heideggerians: How to understanding being (das Sein)?
1) Right Heideggerians: "emphasizes the presential dimension of being, even if it be a deferred presence, a future "new advent" of being as presence after the period of technology and the Gestell." (p. 140) 2) Left Heideggerians: "emphasizes the absential dimension of being: its receding character, its mysteriousness, the primacy of difference over any form of presential identity - in short, the primordiality of the abyss that Heidegger, using the Greek word, entitled Lethe." (p. 140)
Both can be found in Heidegger's work. Derrida in his early work however makes claims that cannot be found in Heidegger's work as clear as he presents them.
"Derrida claims to have discovered that Heidegger malgré soi is a victim of the very tradition he tried to overturn, that he is a hidden metaphysician replete with logocentrism and a teleology of being as pure presence. To put it succinctly, Derrida has exposed Heidegger to be Right Heideggerian" (p. 141)
Nuance I should include in my thesis when I write about the complete arrival of being. Indeed, as Vincent Blok remarked, it is somewhat of a strawman to pretend that this emphasis on arrival is a simple return to a metaphysics of presence (as is a returning intuition of Derrida's), as it is stressed that this arrival, the advent of being, is essentially futural. Nevertheless...
Sheehan's argues that despite early Derrida's misreading of Heidegger, Derrida still succesfully made his point: "Regardless of whether that was his intention, Derrida, I believe, has made such a convincing case for the ineluctability of asymptotic difference over against all systems of identity that he has destroyed the metaphysics of being-as-presence, including the Right Heideggerians' "new advent of being," once and for all." (p. 142)
To be clear, Derrida also does not fit the absence-over-presence of the Left Heideggerians, as the difference between presence and absence becomes undecidable for him. (cf. 142)
Derrida's Reading of Heidegger
"It accuses Heidegger of being an unwitting co-conspirator in the very metaphysics of presence that he claimed to have overcome. Derrida asserts that "the Heideggerian problematic is the most 'profound' and 'powerful' defense of what I try to call into question under the rubric of the thought of presence."" (p. 143, Derrida quote comes from Positions, 73 (54) )
The theme for which Derrida saw the theme of presence reappear in Heidegger's work is that of Eigentlichkeit, from authenticity up until Ereignis.
Sheehan reiterates his own point (of a later paper, see Sheehan "Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research"):
Heidegger's main topic is neither human essence (some subjectivity), neither being as a heteronomous power, but the bond that holds them dynamically together.
"This bond is the movement of finite disclosure which issues in accessible, intelligible entities and which happens only in the disclosive movement of the human essence." (p. 143)
Ereignis is Enteignis. I'm slightly confused about why aletheia and Ereignis seem to be identified with each other in next quote. Also, the Heidegger quotes are without clear reference:
"the happening of intelligibility is always circumscribed by an outstanding and ungraspable limit (ende, Grenze), an unpresential but nonetheless experienceable dimension that rules within any present world of sense. Heidegger expressed this point by saying that the "coming into its own of a finite world of sense" (Er-eignis or aletheia) is scored in the key of "never fully coming into its own" (Ent-eignis or Lethe). This happening of sense is always an asymptotic or differential pres-absentiality about which one can say little more than "it happens."" (p. 144).
Because being "authentic" for the human is at the same time to realize one's "being eccentrically dis-owned, by being self-transcendent towards the differential pres-ab-sential happening of sense" (p. 144), therefore "the owness of Dasein and of being is "dis-owned-ness," the finitude of movement and difference." (p. 144).
Sheehan proceeds to summarize how Derrida simply identifies das Eigentliche with "the proper" and then with "self-presence", proceeding to interpret the voice of reason in terms of self-affection, completely unrelated to anything other than itself, i.e. self-presence. (144-145).
That is, despite the fact that Heidegger explicitly states the self-transcendence of Dasein.
Exposition of Derrida's use of the word logos: 145-146.
"Logos for Derrida is the discursive dream of nous, which in turn is the normative instance of being: the perfect interiority of the soul in living presence with itself." (p. 145).
"In the classical Greek vision, being in its ideal state is transparency and perfect identity, clarity and stability. Because to be means to be translucent (first of all to oneself), then to the degree of one's own self-clarity, all else is correspondingly clear." (p. 146)
Anaxagoras' over nous: empowers everything; everything in classical metaphysics is regarded from the viewpoint of the perfect.
Aristotle's and Neo-Platonist position in line with that:
"In GOd, where there is no obscurity, nous and nooumenon are one and the same. But in human beings, whjere obscurity is admixed with clarity because of the diminution of noetic power, nous is tarnished with the imperfection of having to move through (dia) the interconnections of things in discursive progress towards clarity. Thus it is bound up with dia-noia, that is, with logos taken as the faculty of differential synthesis and diairesis and thus as the basis of apophantic speech." (p. 146)
What is "doing" / poiein:
"Rather, as already in Plato, it is the bringing of something from non-being into being, from non-presence into present and therefore knowable reality. Dianoetic logos can know things onlyu because, according to Aristotle's metaphor, the nous poietikos first "brings them to light."" (p. 146)
"Aristotle saw nous, when it operates with diminished intensity in man, as either divine or "the most divine element in us." Clearly, then, the logocentric world of discursive metaphysics is a noocentrism manqué, a dream of theological self-presence." (p. 146)
So rough summary: knowing in the classical metaphysical framework of thought requires "clarity": if the faculty of knowing is perfectly self-present, not diluted by anything other than itself, then instead of knowing through regarding the interconnections of things, the intellect is so transparent that it is fully receptive to the things as they are in themselves. In the perfect case of pure self-presence and transparency, a.k.a. God, this means that nous and nooemenon are the same because the knowing intellect is completely filled by what is known. Thinking the imperfect from the perfect, the power of nous in its imperfect form has "knowing power" to the extent that it shared in the divine intellect. It is a matter of methexis, participation.
"Thus man's nature is to be a kinetic pros ti, a self-transcending analogical referral to the divine." (p. 147)
"In carrying out this reference of himself to God, man likewise enacts the teleology of the cosmos and brings the entire created world back to the divine. This principle of the teleology of cognition as a supplement of noetic self-identity runs through the whole of classical metaphysics." (p. 147). Followed by examples throughout history.
Prachtige passage:
The Ariadne's thread of this metaphysics of identity is the thesis that all knowing, all logos as a prolepsis of nous, is a "krisis"or "krinein:" a "critical" measuring of the finite objects of one's congition, on the basis of a prior "critical" measuring of the distention of dianoetic logos as an anticipation of full noetic self-presence. The human knower is panta pos, able to be present to all things, only because he or she is theos pos, able to be present to God. Logocentric cognition, which follows ontology, teleologically intends a noocentric theology.
Derrida's main contribution is to show this structure as well in Husserl's phenomenology, and then project it back onto the tradition of metaphysics.
Sheehan: Derrida also claims to find this structure of logos in Heidegger, but does not recognize that "in both the early and the later Heidegger this term functions as asymptotic difference." (p. 148)
"And that is why, for Derrida, Heidegger is a theologian who dares not speak his name and in fact is unaware of his own genealogy. It does not matter to Derrida whether Dasein's self-presence be finite or full, or whether being-as-presence be ontically possessed or teleologically promised as the ultimate signified. A delayed presence, that is, a teleologically desired presence, is presence nonetheless." (p. 149)
Cite this passage with respect to the futural nature of the advent of being. Derrida would simply ignore this objection, following the reasoning A delayed presence, that is, ..., is presence nonetheless.
Derrida does not call Heidegger a full-blown metaphysician but charges him with being guilty of a little bit of Platonism. But then, Sheehan says :-) :
"when it comes to metaphysics, a little bit of Platonism is like a little bit of pregnancy. The hymen is gone, the undecidability dissolved. Heidegger is an onto-theologian." (p. 149) (That is, according to Derrida's own remarks).
"we find Derrida proposing readings that, quite frankly, we would not accept from our own graduate students."
Reading, Criticism and the Undecidable
"We cannot step outside the circle of logos and move about as zoia in the blissful innocence of animal immediacy. (...) The notion of empircal immediacy, as Derrida says, is a dream that "vanishes at daybreak, as soon as language awakens."" (p. 150, Derrida quote from Ecriture 224 (151))
"We do not "have" logos so much as we "are" or even "are had by" logos. It rules us, constitutes us, speaks when we open our mouths. It is our insubstantial essencew, in and by which we live and move and have our being." (p. 151)
"Entities are traces of the movement of reading itself, of hermeneuein or legein. In Heidegger's terms, they reveal-for-a-while the revelation process (das Jeweilige). In Derrida's terms, they "make an economy of the abyss."" (p.152, Derrida quote Parergon, 2 in La Verite en peinture, 45 )
So when we say that Derrida misunderstand Heidegger, we seem to critique Derrida. "But paradoxically it is not that so much as it is a demonstration that both Derrida and Heidegger are concerned with the same post-metaphysical topic." (p. 152). But Derrida avoids the terms critique, stating that it assumes the possibility of deciding (krinein), whereas deconstruction points out undecidability.
Sheehan's claim: "Undecidability is at one and the same time the act of critical reading and the outcome of that act. Criticism enacts undecidability." (p. 152)
153: Reading, (literary) criticism,
"Rather, the Left too seems to be shot through with the urge to decidability insofar as it opposes the Geviert to the Gestell, or Being-itself to Seiendheit, or meditative thinking to calculation." (p. 154)
Derrida on the other hand blurs the line between presence and absence, Left and Right, etc.
Conclusion
"Here is the final paradox of undecidability: we cannot tell the difference between the silent and discalced initiates of the Lethe and the very verbal Brook of Fire who would purge us with the experience of différance. The end of philosophy indeed. The utter silencing of theology - not only of revealed theology but also of philosophical ontotheology and even of negative ontotheology - might well be a contemporary echo of the suggestion made in 1843 that "the critique of religion is the premise of all [other] critique." The deconstruction of Lethe in the name of the undecidability of presence and absence might be the prelude to a new critique of the earth." (p. 155).