Heidegger/Derrida--Presence | John Sallis, The Journal of Philosophy

Authors:

This text is from 1984, and the questions it raises are discussed to such an extent that they seem utterly non-original when reading this back. The writing style is ... Derridean. Enough said.

"The operation of signification, the functioning of language, does not require the presence, even the mediated presence, of the subject; the text is unaffected by the death of the author.3 In this sense-though only and precisely in this sense-nothing is to be gained by the presence of the author, not even if he were to read his texts aloud, feigning even an originary dictation." (p. 595)

"The opposition of opposites presupposes a common position, the slash conjoining before it can separate. It is from that position that one must begin." (p. 596)

@presence

"What is common to metaphysics is the positing of Being (Sein) as presence, its self-positing as metaphysics of presence" (p. 597)

But what does presence mean? Aspects of its meaning in Heidegger:

  • Suz: Vorhandenheit, present-at-hand, correlated with noein, Anschauung.
    • But since Zuhandenheit is more primordial, Vorhandenheit is not purely present-at-hand, but rather only shows when the Zuhandenheit is repressed. (cf. 597)

Sallis' argument is that everything is openly or concealed ready-to-hand. Therefore, the presence of something is not a "self-contained positivity". "Rather, it is extended beyond itself into the referential totality by which it is determined, its presence limited and yet rendered possible by its insertion in that totality. But the totality is one of signifying references; it is Bedeutsamkeit, the operation of signification. There is no pure presence; for in whatever presents itself there is already in play the operation of signification." (597-598)

Three issues in conclusion (based on Derrida quotes)

1) SuZ, although presence primarily means Vorhandenheit, it is not the only meaning of presence. Later texts, already in Basic Problems of Phenemenology, develop different systems of meaning. ousia, parousia, Gegenwärtigkeit, Anwesen, Anwesenheit, Vorhandenheit... How to translate all these things with "presence"? 2) Does Heidegger successfully delimit presence (in order to step outside of the metaphysics of presence itself?) 3) "To ask straightforwardly about the meaning of presence is already to assume what presence means, to assume it in the very question of meaning" (p. 601).

I consider this to be the most interesting passage (perhaps the only one):

"If the question of Being is determined as a ques- tion of meaning, as the question of the meaning of Being, then is it not in its very formulation a question of presence, a question di- rected toward a recovery of presence? Indeed this would be so, were it not the case that the Heideggerian text, from Being and Time on, engages ceaselessly in a deconstructive reduction, a delimitation, of meaning, its reduction to the woraufhin des Entwurfs (Sein und Zeit, 151), its referral to world, i.e., signification, and eventually to AX)Oc-ta. Meaning as presence becomes, is reduced to, the meaning of presence, the latter taken not straightforwardly, but as that which delimits presence. The Heideggerian text, thus releasing the torsion in the question of the meaning of presence, twists it free of metaphysical closure." (p. 601).