Heidegger and Derrida: Cold Hermeneutics | John D. Caputo
@hermeneutics
Authors:
N.B. these notes is very much a dialogue with Caputo's text in light of my own thesis work, so the interspersions do not necessarily reflect Caputo's remarks.
To read:
Fins: Les fins de l'homme: A partir du travail de Jacques Derrida (Paris: Editions galilee, 1981): Eng. trans. "Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy," trans. John Leavey, Semeia 23 (1982), 63-97.
"For a superb account of La Carte Postale, see Gregory Ulmer's review in Diacritics, 11 (1981), 39-56."
Introduction
What is at stake is the postal principle in relation to Heidegger:
I am interested in Derrida's critique of the "postal principle" which, since it regards message-bearing, is the principle of all hermeneutics. Hermes, the message-bearer from the gods, is the first and paradigmatic postman. If Heidegger dissociates himself from hermeneutics inasmuch as it belongs to transcendental-horizontal thinking, he does not reject hermeneutics in the larger, looser sense of waiting for the message of the gods. Hermeneutics means waiting for the dispatch— Schickung, envois —which is on its way, courtesy of the "it gives." Only a god can save us now, that is to say, only a saving message from the Ereignis, a call which arrives just before the hour of execution, a message borne by a modernday Hermes, perhaps one from Freiburg. Hermes Friburgiensis. (252)
Caputo writes about the postal principle in a very broad sense, and this is a good reminder that I should also do so initially.
Derrida makes the postal principle questionable. He questions the assumption that an unambiguous message can be transmitted from an identifiable sender to a clearly designated addressee. (252)
So the postal principle is first of all the name of the belief that a message from an identifiable sender will unreservedly arrive at a clearly designated addressee. When Derrida writes about the postal principle, it is good to realize that he quickly transforms this naive belief, where the P.P. instead comes to be the name for the idea that a sending can not arrive.
Caputo points out that Derrida's critique of the postal principle can be seen as a critique of Heidegger at those moments in his thought where Heidegger has eschatological tones. One of those moments is when Heidegger firstly speaks of the destiny of being, and then starts using the word Ereignis, sometimes as if we await a final message about the destining of being in the destiny of being. (That is, the final message about its destining, which come "before" the question of being).
Eschatology: "concerned with the final events of history, or the ultimate destiny of humanity." (Wikipedia)
He displaces the apocalyptic and eschatological element in Heidegger's thought, exposing thereby a more radical streak in his work, one which is prepared to live without such hermeneutic comfort, ready for the free play of dispatches, without postal expectations. (252-253)
If we look at the Geschick, we see a double movement. Geschichte can only considered as Geschick by Heidegger at the very moment he claims that being has essentially and increasingly been forgotten in the history of philosophy. The sending of being only comes into view with the simultaneous realization that being as such has been withdrawn in these sendings, that they were all mere hints at a hidden origin.
Undecidability, a most fundamental displacement in Heidegger's work: 1) Are we waiting for a final or true message of being? 2) Or is this undecidability itself quite essential? That is, does this undecidable situation instead displaces the question of being, and replaces it by musings about the event of its destining itself; an event bring us toward the nature of
In other words, when we consider the postal principle in Heidegger we bring forth an immense tension in Heidegger's work. On the one hand Heidegger sometimes seems to maintain eschatological tones in his writing on Ereignis that seem to suggest the possibility or at least the hope of a final message and the destiny of humanity. (Give an example). On the other hand, after mentioning the forgetfulness of being in the destiny of being, Heidegger philosophy does not offer a recipe for remembering being in a way that simply overcomes this forgetfulness. Instead, he deepens it by coming to see the withdrawal of the essence of being as being essential to the sending of being. In other words, when Heidegger thinks of the history of being as a collection of sendings of which the sender has been forgotten, there are also moments where he does not mourn the absence of a return address, but where he instead considers that this absence is essential and even a precondition of the sending itself.
In other words, this displacement foreshadows Derrida's critique of the postal principle, and the paradoxes that follow from it.
This is also why we should be careful to accept Derrida's critique of Heidegger. We should ask continuously, which Heidegger is Derrida critiquing here? When we consider Derrida's interpretation of Heidegger in terms of the post, we see that Derrida recognizes the undecidable moment after the Geschick, but still thinks the scale tips towards Heidegger's eschatological sentiments. This is a deep conflict between Heidegger and Derrida that I think remains to this day, namely Derrida's claim that despite all displacements and emphasis on withdrawal, Heidegger never truly leaves the idea of the destiny of being as a "great post office of history".
This dilemma is touched upon by Caputo here: perhaps the overcoming of the oblivion of being has nothing to do with eschatology, but instead is a question of how we can do ontology when the postal principle breaks down.
And because this displacement, that Derrida follows to its extreme, is perhaps already stronger in Heidegger than Derrida would admit, does Derrida perhaps not so much criticize Heidegger as he brings forth his central philosophical problem, in a different form?
Caputo says: perhaps we can catch Derrida doing "deep hermeneutics".
Still, in the name of Martin, we press further: in what terms are we to describe those who take their stand in this very undecidability, in the breakdown of the postal principle, in the withdrawal and retreat of the Sache selbst? To what extent is this not indeed what is meant by overcoming the oblivion, which has nothing to do with eschatology? And if it is, then have we not infiltrated Derrida, caught him in a moment of deadly earnest, of a certain deep hermeneutics when he thought no one was looking? For everything deep loves the mask. (253)
Complex strategy of Caputo:
1) What is Derrida's critique of postal eschatology? 2) This critique applies to the "eschatological Heidegger" 3) But when we read Derrida, we see that the displacement that Derrida works out is already present in Heidegger 4) When we re-read Heidegger in that light and see hermeneutics brought to its limit, we can perhaps see how Derrida practices "a more elusive, less innocent hermeneutics" (253).
Derrida's Critique of the Postal Principle
Section how Derrida tries to avoid apocalyptic utterances, that declare the end of this or that (the end of philosophy, the end of history etc). Cf. Fins. However, the critique of apocalyptic thinking often has the same underlying stance, namely that one has "seen the light" and want to share and proclaim this experience with others, or better upon them.
However, the disruptive power of "apocalypticism" is also noted:
Apocalypticism is an effective way to disrupt the ruling postal system which monitors the messages which are permitted to be sent out over public lines. It can be an act of defiance of Ia police postale (Fins, 473/89). Indeed, everything which disrupts will be made out as apocalyptic by the powers that be; they will want to make it look that way. (254)
So the apocalyptic utterances "always lay claim to a privileged experience, to a revelation which they pretend to pass on to the rest of us." (253)
In that sense, this apocalyptic style of promising a privileged experience, is a way to express the double bind of writing, as Derrida explored it so often:
It represents the very structure of writing itself. It is the "double bind" of writing, suggesting by its very structure that it has a message to deliver, even while it fails in principle to do so (Fins. 445/46/64). In postal terms, the postman has no message to deliver. But if we can get over the expectation that he does, then perhaps we can enjoy the free circulation and exchange of letters for their own sake. And "getting over" that expectation turns out to be a Derridean way of "overcoming" (verwinden) the "postal principle." (my emphasis)
The reference to Fins 445, 446, 464 might be worth it!
So what is this apocalyptic promise of the postal system?
Apocalypticism follows the logic of the postal principle. It pretends to tell the truth, to deliver a message. It claims to have a destination, a destined hearer (destinaire); it turns on the unity of sender and addressee, of destinateur and destinaire (Fins. 467/84). The postal principle governs a teleo-system, a teleo-logical network of messages- logoi, dispatches, envois, Schickungen- sent out across the lines, from end to end, telos to telos, from computer terminal to computer terminal. (254)
See Fins 467-484
The dream of the postal principle:
It turns on a dream about identifiable origins, about the unity of meaning transmitted across the wires, and identifiable destination. (255)
Example on page 255: the messaging system of the apocalypse itself, with Jesus, various angels relaying messages, etc. It comes very unclear whose voice is speaking in the message. Who sends what to whom? And "Like the cover of La Carte Postale, there is always someone speaking behind the back of the one writing".
After a long passage from Fins (470-1, 387):
The apocalyptic occurs when we are no longer able to identify who is saying what to whom. Dispatches refer to dispatches without decidable origin and destination. We do not know where the rumor started, or just what it means, or who is supposed to take it up. The postal principle is disrupted and we are admitted into a sphere of destinerrance, of messages running awry (Fins, 474/91).
The postal principle and Ereignis.
See the remarks above about the undecidability of the Ereignis? Is it a eschatological longing for the final message sending the true meaning of being? Or is this sending itself, beyond being, all there is?
Ereignis calls us beyond Being - the call itself coming from beyond Being - towards that which sends Being. Ereignis wants to lead or conduct us-from oblivion into memorial thought, from Gestell into Geviert. But with the breakdown of the postal principle all such "conductive violence" is brought to a halt. And all that remains is the call itself, the sheer "Come ... " of every apocalypse: come, lord Jesus; come, beyond Being. (255)
Caputo gives two lengthy supporting citations from Fins 477/94. The point is that this "come" is now empty, has no determinable identity.
And then another one:
Our apocalypse now: that there is no longer any place for the apocalypse as the collection of evil and good in a legein of aletheia, nor in a Geschick of the dispatch. L'envoi, of the Schicken in a co-destination that would assure the "come" of the power to give rise [lieu] to an event in the certainty of a determination. But then what is someone doing who tells you: I tell you this, I have come to tell you this, there is not, there never has been, there never will be an apocalypse, the apocalypse deceives, disappoints? There is the apocalypse without apocalypse. (Fins, 477-78/94-95)
The apocalypse here - I have come to tell you, share this privileged experience with you - is that there is no apocalypse. The apocalypse without apocalypse.
This relatively lucid line of reasoning is a great entry point for understanding Agamben's "destining without destiny", that he discusses in relation to Ereignis, similar to how Caputo does. And that is also what is at stake in Derrida's engagement with the Geschick. Geschick is an ordering of the sendings into a history, but as we have seen this is a history of forgetfulness according to Heidegger. In everything that arrived and was collected as the destiny of being, the essence of being remains to be thought. If this remainder, this no-thing beyond the destiny of being, is what Heidegger turns towards, then perhaps this is an a-destinal sending without message. It is hermeneutics reduced to its utter limit, from meaning, to the announcement of meaning, to only the very event of the address itself. A sending without sender, without addressee, without message.
Perhaps what is destined is then only the absence of destiny. Perhaps the apocalyptic message of the destiny of being is that there is no apocalypse, that when we turn towards that sending from which "there is being", there is merely the contingent event of a sending, without addressee.
A contingent event: a sending that has no other reason for being sent apart from that is was sent.
This is the thinking that is foreshadowed by Heidegger's Geschick and the question what comes after. (Ereignis).
But Derrida would argue that Heidegger holds short, and that he in fact criticizes one "false" postal principle (that of an ideal meaning of being) with another. See:
It is true that Heidegger has put metaphysical tele-communications into question. But he has done so only in the name of another version of the postal principle. The meaning of Being is not, as in Plato, Hegel and Husserl, an ideal and repeatable message, fully constituted in its ideality, sent across the epochs, borne by different translations, copied by different copyists, xeroxed, collated and distributed, and then entrusted to professionally trained couriers. Rather it is something which has all along remained behind, sending out emissaries and dispatches while itself remaining in concealment. The history of metaphysics which is organized around the transmission of ideal meanings - the Platonic-Husserlian postal principle2 - is itself the concealment of the authentic letter of Being which was spoken once, in the earliest dawn of the tradition. Thinking today is essentially preparatory thinking, Vor-denken, preparing for the day of repetition, retrieval, the new coming, the second coming, the new dawn. Come! (256)
Note: the postal principle seems to stay in force for Heidegger partly insofar as he often seems to presuppose the human as the proper addressee of the Ereignis.
I absolutely love the following passage because it summarizes Derrida's critique of the Geschick so clearly and eloquently at the same time:
If we stand at the end of the false postal principle, which keeps delivering the dangerous message of presence- from ousia to Gestell that in turn poses the task of thinking, to think the more mysterious postal principle, the dark play of the Janus-faced message which is to be read backwards, in reversal, and hence turn into the saving message. But that is just a more mysterious hermeneutics, a darker decoding system, which says that the way to understand the message is to read it backwards. The saving is the danger spelled backwards. (256)
It is as if at the end of the Geschick, a collection of letters promising an ideal meaning of being, we need to read the whole correspondence backwards until its Greek origin to understand for the first time what was at stake in that whole history, which turns out to be precisely what was never said in it. Read in this backwards manner, the original message at the inception of philosophy turns into "a saving message", which can be the origin of another beginning of thought as Heidegger puts it in the Beiträge.
So Caputo claims that Heidegger's postal principle is not teleological, but definitely eschatological and therefore apocalyptic.
Derrida projects a critique Heidegger would have given: that Derrida's standpoint is itself technological, that the postal principle Derrida accuses him of itself part of the Geschick in the epoch of technology
Deze passage is belangrijk voor mijn scriptie! Dit is eerlijk gezegd precies het argument dat ik zelf maakte.
Specifically: the epoch of postal technology.
The critique:
Derrida poses the objection to himself that this reading of Heidegger is already displaced by Heidegger, for whom the postal principle would be nothing more than a form of technology, a communication systems technique, which Heidegger has already delimited in advance. But what is Heidegger's delimitation of technology? The Gestell is for him the last and most extreme (eschaton) possibility, the final sending of the Seinsgeschick, the last Schickung, in which we are taken in by what is sent, to the neglect of the "it sends." Whence Heidegger's critique of technology belongs entirely within the framework of "sending" (Schicken) and the postal principle. (257)
And then, the same point w.r.t. metaphors and the reversal of its usual order:
But is that not just a metaphor, an incongruous juxtaposing of Ereignis with a mailman? If so, Derrida thinks, it is the "catastrophic" metaphor which he describes in "The Retreat of Metaphor," in which vehicle and tenor, primary and secondary analogates, are reversed. If language is the house of Being, Heidegger says, that does not mean that we must think language in terms of housing, but housing in terms of language. Accordingly, if Ereignis is a postal system, that does not mean we are to think the Seinsgeschick in terms of letter-sending, but letter-sending in terms of the Seinsgeschick. That is to say, for Derrida, Ereignis is the place - which he himself would call writing, or arché-writing - where all transfers, metaphors, correspondences and communications take place. And his point is that this central processing unit has been scrambled, jammed, decentered, and thrown into confusion, its wires crossed, its lines downed: (257)
And then the quote I also use from The Postcard: CP 73-74.
Hermeneutic Eschatology
Why is Heidegger's eschatology hermeneutical?
The eschatological Heidegger thinks the way the beginning overtakes and outstrips the end. And such an eschatology is essentially hermeneutical for it demands the capacity to hear the saving message in old words. It requires the ears to hear how the oldest of the old tells us what is coming so that we can understand the end as a transition to a new beginning. 258
So, going back to the beginning: Anaximaner.
Note to self: if I discuss nostalgia for the beginning, the Anaximander is probably a good place to look.
Getting in touch with Anaximander is the long distance philosophical call par excellence. (258)
This is not about deciphering this message, "to see if we could get inside the head of a man named Anaximander, who lived long ago at this address in Miletus (HW, 238/18)." (258). Deciphering would imply it's a matter of accurate technique. The authority of Anaximander comes from his sayings laying a claim, not just because it is old / historical distance.
The saying (Spruch) of Anaximander is a claim (Anspruch) (325/16). This is not just any call; it is a priority call with the right to interrupt the work-a-day conversations we are accustomed to have. And so it is not that the call is long-distance that matters, but that there is a voice of authority on the other end. (258)
The importance of historical distance is overcome in this claim, because the voice of this claim is near. This is definitely a claim that Derrida would deconstruct.
In fact, for one so far away, the voice is surprisingly near (Nähe, 325/16), speaking to us now, about something which is coming (in das Kommende hinausspricht), perhaps any day now. (We know neither the day nor the hour.) Which means it may not come at all. And that is why Anaximander is calling: to serve up a warning/reminder, to put us on watch for something which needs hearing and heeding. He wants to set us thinking, to recall to mind (an-denken), something which we tend to forget. (258-259)
Tele-communication, telos, eschatology:
Anaximander's call stretches from one end to the other, so that it looks like a standard tele-communication. But the end in question is not a telos, but an eschaton. Not a linear telos, but a more ambiguous, playful eschaton.
As we know, the history Heidegger envisions is not one of fulfillment but of increasing forgetfulness:
The end of which we are speaking is not a tele-linear goal and consummation in which the accumulated potencies of the Western tradition reach their fulfilment, but quite the opposite. It is the emptying (not the filling), the spending, the exhausting of a great beginning. The eschaton means we have reached the point where the potency of the tradition has been spent, and it is a question as to whether we will persist indefinitely in this dead-end or whether the eschaton will tum itself inside out and become the point of departure for a new beginning, an opening on to what-is-coming. (259)
That historical calculus systematically destroys our true relation to the future (Zukunft), to what is arriving (An-kunft), maybe any day. It is systematically blind to the genuine message which is being sent across the epochs, systematically destructive of what is arriving in the mail, to the coming dispatch (die Ankunft des Geschickes (326/17)). 260
The reference 326/17, refers I think to HW. That is, I assume, Holzwege.
die Ankunft des Geschickes: probably a very useful citation!
Again, all our modern ways of communication do not help us hear the call.
We have at our disposal the most advanced techniques for getting in touch with everything past and present. But it is in just such an age- which Heidegger calls an epoch of "historicism," for we are the least confined of any people before us to the present time and place - that we have become deaf and blind to the message which is sent across the epochs, to the genuine dispatch of Being: Historicism has today not only not been overcome, but is only now entering the stage of its expansion and entrenchment. The technical organization of communications throughout the world by radio and by a press already limping after it is the genuine form of historicism's dominion. (HW, 326/17) (260)
There is an inverse relationship between modern advanced tele-communications and hearing the dispatch of being.
It is a question of how quickly and how efficiently end can be joined to end, telos to telos and that is what has doomed the newspaper and appears now to doom the book. Teleo-logy is the science of getting from end to end with maximal efficiency. In telecommunications, teleology reaches its peak but the lines of eschatology go dead. The age of advanced tele-communications is the age of deafness and blindness to the dispatch of Being. The clarity of the message that is sent in eschatology is in inverse proportion to the technical organization of tele-communications. The noise of technological communication systems drowns out the word which Being sends.
Teleology reaches it peak with modern telecommunications. Why? Because it is the increasingly efficient and fast traversing of historical distance. NOTE: insert this at the point where I write about technology.
Three points:
1) I wrote about how sending requires distance 2) But traversing that distance, overcoming it, is the attempt to "look in the head" of the other, to make ends meet, bringing emitter and receiver immediately together. (Cf. "peeking" in Anaximander's head) 3) What is at stake is something different altogether. Hear the address of the sending (what Heidegger names a "call" (Anspruch)). This "nearness" is orthogonal to historical distance.
The historical "order" of teleology vs eschatology:
In teleology the last always comes after the first, after a long period of maturation; but in eschatology the first can overtake (überholen) the last, and with a suddenness that could not be anticipated. (260)
The decisive difference between eschatology and teleology:
And that is the most decisive difference of all between eschatology and teleology. Teleology reaches fulfilment, satisfaction, peace, rest when it reaches the telos. But in eschatology, the eschaton is the transition point to a new beginning, a new flash of lightning and the commencement of a new postal service. (260-261)
Heidegger's answer:
What once occurred in the dawn of our destiny would then come. as what once occurred. at the last (eschaton). that is, at the departure of the long-hidden destiny of Being. (HW, 327/18) (261)
These HW quotes are flaming. Should really check them.
Geschick and the eschatological character of Being:
"This gathering-together (logos, legein) of the whole history of Being in the end (eschaton) is the eschatology of Being:
The Being of beings is gathered together (lethestai, logos) in the ultimacy of its destiny. The essence of Being hitherto disappears. its truth still veiled. The history of Being is gathered in this departure. The gathering in this departure. as the gathering (logos) at the outermost point (eschaton) of its essence hitherto. is the eschatology of Being. As something fateful (geschickliches) Being is inherently eschatological. (HW. 327/18)
In teleology the beginning is separated from the end as seed from mature form. In eschatology the beginning overtakes the end and precipitates a reversal. Eschatological thinking then is precisely the capacity to see in what is coming the coming again of the early. When the early overtakes (über-holen) the late, the late retrieves (wieder-holen) the early:
If we think in terms of the eschatology of Being. then we must someday await what once belonged to the early in what is one day coming. Today we must learn to ponder the former dawn on its own terms. ( HW, 327 I 18)
In eschatology the beginning overtakes the end, puts an end to the end; in teleology, the end fulfills the beginning and puts an end to the beginning." (261)
Rescue thus can only come in the moment of greatest danger, as a sudden reversal of being's oblivion.
Eschatology is thus a reverse hermeneutics, where near the end you read backwards into the beginning, so the beginning overtakes the end towards a new beginning:
Eschatology is then a logic of reversal, a movement in which the beginning spins itself out into oblivion, and then turns itself around into a new beginning. It is a reverse hermeneutics which knows how to read backwards. (261)
Close to the end, end the end, save from the end into a new beginning:
And that explains the claim that Anaximander's call has upon us. It is a rescue call meant to save us from the eschaton, to avert the fate that the end would be a terminal illness. Anaximander has an urgent message to deliver, and he has placed an emergency call to us, though it comes in the form of a one-line telegram, the rest of the page ripped away. (262)
Cf. what Agamben writes on the impasse of an aporia becoming an euporia:
Beyond Eschatology
Eschatology suffers from a metaphysical-hermeneutic illusion that there is a meaning of Being, and that it was once granted to us, but has since dissipated, and that it is the task of thought to recover and restore it. ( 262 )
However, this project does not make sense given the Seinsgeschick:
The whole project flies in the face of what Heidegger means by lethe as primordially constitutive of aletheia. It flatly contradicts the very notion of the Seinsgeschick that any age would be privileged, that any epoch would be blessed with a particular revelation denied to others. How can any epoch, which is defined as a phase of withdrawal, be singled out as in any way less of a withdrawal? (262)
Towards a more radical Heidegger. Cf. the "paradigm switch" asked for by Sheehan.
Without denying that this hermeneutic eschatology is there I want to show now that Heidegger's task is not unambiguous, that Heidegger knew better, that there is another, more radically critical, deconstructive thought at work, and that it was there from the start. Here we see Derrida looking over the shoulder of Heidegger.
I have in mind the Heidegger who was not interested in Being but in moving beyond Being, for whom the question of the "meaning" of Being was a way of saying that the point is to get beyond Being to what lets Being be, to the horizontal operation which grants Being its play, its space. From Being and Time on there is a relentless effort to get beyond Being, to move thought into the region where we are loosened from the illusion that there is a privileged sense of Being which we should find and hold close to our breasts. (262)
The postal metaphysics breaks down:
In other words, the whole postal metaphysics breaks down, the whole metaphysics of the "tradition" as message bearing is surpassed, and it is no longer a question of recovering an original message which gets sent across the ages. (262)
Love this citation:
Teleology and eschatology differ only in the means they use to deliver the mail. Teleology uses regular lines and has regular deliveries and we know when to expect the postman. Eschatology is more wanton, more playful, and we know neither the day nor the hour when the mail is being delivered. But in both cases there is a primordial message to be carried across the epochs, a tradition which bears a unique message. (262-263)
Cf. destiny without destiny.
This second, more radical Heidegger knows that the message is that there is no message, no privileged sense-of-Being, no special instructions from Milesia. (263)
When we follow this Heidegger, we find him slowly undermining and discarding the notion of the meaning of Being, the truth of Being, and Being itself, in order to bring himself before the matter to be thought.
Give up the postal expectation:
The point is to give up the postal expectation, to get beyond waiting for the mailman, to cease waiting for the letter which will reveal the secret word, the master-name for Being. (263)
What are the implications then? That the saving message is that there is no saving message?
But does that mean that the saving message will be that there is no saving message? Is this the eschatology which consists in putting an end to all eschatologies? Is this thus a new, higher, more critical eschatology, a new hermeneutics, the new secret, the new apocalypse? But before we are buried in a sea of paradoxes, let us briefly trace the steps of the post-eschatological, post-postal Heidegger. (263)
Retracing the steps of Heidegger incrementally moving beyond being
One can see that Heidegger is already set on breaking up the binary Being/being pair and replacing it with a ternary, tripartite articulation in terms of: (1) the being which is to be understood (projected), which is of course no "bare fact" but always something projected within its horizontal setting; (2) the Being of that being, which provides its horizontal frame; (3) the meaning of the Being of that being, the upon which of the projection of the being-in-its-Being. (264)
Again... fantastic phrasing, yet to the point:
Heidegger does not want to get into the fray, to enter a names-of-Being contest with the latest and best name for "Being." He wants to move quietly and inconspicuously around the edges of this debate and to pick out the rule which organizes the various entries in the contest. He is not interested in the message but the nature of the delivery-service. (264)
Heidegger I, the hermeneutic-eschatological Heidegger, kept intervening, keeping the ambiguity of the text alive. Heidegger gave up speaking of the "meaning" of Being, because that word belonged too irrevocably to the transcendental-phenomenological tradition. But when he turned to the "truth" of Being- in a gesture meant to tum away from subjectivism- he complicated things in a different way. For the truth of Being suggested even more forcefully that there is (or was) one sure-fire, luminous disclosure of Being that descended on the early Greeks and has since dropped out of view. The truth of Being suggested that the other views - not exactly world-views but views of Being, Seinsanschauungen - were not true, that they were concealments, coverings-over and that Heidegger, heeding the early Greeks, knew the secret name. (265)
But then Caputo mentions how the "post-postal Heidegger" stresses the lethe in a-letheia, and starts writing about Ereignis. This Heidegger sometimes explicitly says that there is no 'privileged meaning or "truth" of Being' (265).
"no sending enjoys any rights over any other, there is no secret letter being sent special delivery to/from Freiburg." (265)
Consequently, we cannot speak of progress in the history of Western epochs.
Heidegger: "Hege's philosophy is no more perfect than Kant's. Each epoch of philosophy has its own necessity. We simply have to acknowledge that a philosophy is the way it is." (265) Bit unclear where this citation comes from, I think SZ, 62-63, 375.
The epochs in the destiny of being are not a matter of preference, are not Weltanschauungen.
The history of being unfolds in the way it does, that's all folks.
There is no question of preferring one to the other, or of rank-ordering them, no question either of waiting for the delivery of the letter which holds the secret, the master-name. It is a question only of attentiveness to the giving and the sending which is at work throughout the postal epoch, the epochal-postal system. (266)
With emphasis: Ereignis is not yet another master-name for being, which would be a continuation of metaphysics.
The truth of Being would then turn out to be the recognization that there is no truth, no one truth, no privileged sense or meaning of Being, and hence no privileged epoch either. There is simply the incessant giving and taking, bestowal and withdrawal of presence in one form or another over the ages. But if that is so then to overcome metaphysics, to get beyond the "oblivion of Being," would tum out to mean a certain awakening to this state of affairs, a certain Socratic realization that there is no truth, no master-name. The only release from the oblivion would be to awaken to the oblivion. And that is just what is said in the "Seminar" to "Time and Being:" (266)
For quote, see SD, 32/29-30: the recollection of what has not been thought does not overcome the oblivion of being, but rather deepens it: "Thus the awakening from oblivion of Being to the oblivion of Being is the awakening into Ereignis" (Heidegger's quote).
Caputo is actually making the same trajectory as I have, so far.
He ends with the quote about the concealment no longer concealing itself.
And then:
Now thinking is on the alert to metaphysics, and it recognizes metaphysics for what it is, which is concealment, oblivion, withdrawal. It is not withdrawal itself which is overcome- that is ineradicably constitutive of the history of Being- but the withdrawal of the withdrawal. The with- drawal itself is now recognized for what it is. The only "truth" of Being then is a-letheia, which means the acquiescence of thought to the ineradicable lethe of which the various epochal guises, the names of Being are the modification. The truth of Being is demythologized. The history of metaphysics
The history of metaphysics in postal terms:
The truth of Being is demythologized. The history of metaphysics turns out to be a set of dispatches of Being, mailed and stamped, which turn out to be no more than promissory notes, letters of intent, which never deliver the promised message. The Seminar puts this in postal language: "Metaphysics is the history of the way Being is stamped (der Seinsprägungen), that is, seen from the Ereignis, the history of the withdrawing of the sender in favor of the dispatches (Schickungen) which were sent along, of the current letting-presence of the present." (SD, 44/41). Being is packaged and stamped in the form of presence, parcelled out (moira) as presence, in epochally differing ways, and we are lured away from the sending power, that is, the whole postal process, which remains in primordial concealment, in favor of the packages we receive.
268: How even the Greek did not experience truth as unconcealment; this was concealed for them. The end of eschatological Heidegger, beyond the Greek origin even.
Introduction of the "cold truth". The poverty of thought.
But are we not then right back into the eschatological Heidegger with his privileged experience of Being? Is not the account of mortals dwelling poetically precisely what Derrida calls "the most beautiful card which Martin has sent from Freiburg"? That is, is it not a privileged dispatch, special delivery, the truth of Being for those that have the eyes to see? I think not, and for two reasons. (1) We have been disillusioned, once and for all, by Derrida, and by Heidegger himself, that there is some post-metaphysical dawn, some genuine tum in the sequence of epochs in which there would be a non-epochal dispatch, a sending with nothing remaining behind. Hence we do not confuse this experience of the breakdown of metaphysics with a new dawn. It is nothing more than alertness to the darkness of the world-night. (2) The experience of "mortals" under the heavens, upon the earth, is not vision, revelation, eschatology, apocalypse, but precisely the poverty of thought, the humility of one who has less to say than metaphysics. It is the experience of one who has opened himself to the abyss, to the play in which all things are caught up, to the ébranler, the trembling. He is on the alert to the illusions of ground-laying and foundation-seeking; he is open to the play of the child-king. And in that openness, he reaches a kind of understan- ding, the understanding of one who understands the limits of conceptual handicrafts. In letting the world play be, in exposing himself to the abyss, he experiences the truth of truth's very withdrawal. Deconstruction cannot avoid circling around on itself and effecting a deeper, more radical retrieval. And when it does it hits upon what we will call the cold truth. '
Cold Hermeneutics: Double-crossing Derrida
If we have allowed Derrida to infiltrate Heidegger, then, according
Note w.r.t. argument strategie: eindig met Heidegger's "the concealment is no longer concealed". Dit is een punt waarop "postal philosophy" meerdere kanten op kan. Derrida: stop waiting for the letter to arrive, so that we may enjoy the free exchange of letters (cf Caputo). Nancy's theia moira: how are sendings shared? (Shared out/ shared in). Agamben: stresses the contingency of the sending of being. Bartleby and the dead letter office. Destining without destiny. Variations of the same problematic Heidegger left us with. A postal problematic.