Interview Verbeek by Fatum magazine
@Verbeek @postphenomenology @interview
Source: https://www.fatum-magazin.de/ausgaben/synthese/internationale-perspektiven/technology-mediation.html
What does post-phenomenology mean?
The idea of postphenomenology is to try and move beyond the romantic ideas that are so dominant in the approaches of phenomenology, for example Heidegger’s technophobic approach. There is a strong nostalgia for a past in which people supposedly had a more authentic way of dealing with nature. For Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology is a way to describe the things as they are in our perception. But science and technology only take us away from them by analysis and abstraction. I believe postphenomenology sees it completely differently: science and technology are a way of interpreting the world, one of the ways in which the world can become meaningful for us. So first, we are past that kind of romanticism of phenomenology and, secondly, we understand what I call technological mediation as part of the humanworld relation. In phenomenology, the claim has always been that we understand the things or phenomena as they appear to us. But what they ended up doing was to study humanworld relations. It was about concepts that help us understand that relation—consciousness, beingintheworld, perception—it is that link between the subject and the object, or the human and the world. In postphenomenology, we conceptualize this relation as being mediated by technology. For me, this is the greatest innovation in philosophy of technology. When you stop seeing technologies as part of the world and start seeing them as part of our relations with the world, then suddenly the whole perspective changes and technology becomes foundational. For Heidegger, for example, technology is primarily a way of interpreting the world. But only in an ontological manner, to explain what ‘being’ means for us, as Heidegger would say. For me, the ontic way is equally important: technologies actively help us to engage with the world and make us specific humans and the world a specific world.
Technology should not be opposed to authenticity:
So rather than viewing the situation as a struggle between an authentic human and an alienating technology, the idea of postphenomenology is that technology is the basis for authenticity. That is also how I tried to read Michael Foucault in my book Moralizing Technology. Many people, especially in information ethics, read Foucault as the thinker of the Panopticon. He supposedly is the thinker that shows us all the dangers of the panoptic society, the power struggles and how we must fight against them with subversive action. But if you read his last two books on ethics, the structure is much more subtle. For Foucault there is no way to be a subject without having been produced as a subject. The art of living is to subjectivize yourself, maybe almost to subject yourself to such powers. Not to make yourself powerless by technology, but to become a subject by engaging in a critical way with those powers. Authenticity is the result of dealing with technology rather than trying to escape from it.
An issue that still requires more research is the relation between the technology, self and body. How does mediation work there?
P-P: also mediated, consider for example tracking-apps. When you use e.g. a running app that tracks your body while running, you will start experiencing your body differently, also when you do not run.
In response to the outcry when Hans Achterhuis coined the idea of putting morality in things:
The problem behind such an understanding is the presumption of an autonomous individual versus an alienating technology. When you accept that the way in which we lead our modern lives rests upon technological mediations, it rather becomes a matter of responsibility to give these mediations a good shape. The question of course remains how you can do that on a societal level without one group taking power over the other. But this is the central issue we have always been facing in politics. If you make laws you do the same. This, I think, shows the limitations of our liberal democracy. There is a false dichotomy, in my opinion, between the political sphere, in which we organize how we live together and the private sphere where we try to answer the question of the good life. Technologies are about the good life. Sustainability is about how we live in a good way with nature. You cannot do that on your own. So that old question of what the good life is, or could be, has to regain a place in the public sphere.
We need an ethics of care rather than one of strict autonomy:
It cannot be reduced to the private sphere. Exit John Rawls, exit Jürgen Habermas, exit all those liberals. We can no longer afford to reduce the good life to a private question, in the name of autonomy. This exclusive focus on privacy and autonomy strikes me as an individualistic luxury product of the affluent postindustrial society, blinding us for how technologies are in fact profoundly reshaping society. But then the question arises how to avoid a form of paternalism that is disrespectful. The notion implies care rather than autonomy. An ethics of care is about interpersonal relations; it is about interdependencies, about vulnerabilities and not about autonomy and the “I can do whatever I want.” This framework can have a very important place in ethics and the sensitivities for those technologies deserve a central place in our moralizations of technologies. The reason is that technologies are always moral. There is no way to have an amoral device, they always do something to us. So being an ostrich and putting your head in the sand and saying “I am against that” does not help. It is like being against gravity or against language.
Advice to students: how to do philosophy from technology rather than only of technology:
I think to be a good philosopher of technology you need to do at least two things: Of course, you should engage with the tradition. But I think, more importantly, you should engage with technologies themselves. Read technological journals and websites—and always try to think about how they challenge philosophy. That is one of the major achievements of philosophy of technology. When I was a student, I hated that word empirical philosophy, because philosophy is not an empirical science. But that is not what ‘empirical philosophy’ means. It means: doing philosophy ‘from’ technology, rather than ‘of’ technology. Not applying pregiven theories to technologies, but letting new technologies challenge philosophical frameworks. When you think: I cannot make sense of it anymore with all the frameworks we have developed in the past, it is time to come up with something new. That is the challenge of philosophy of technology, which is what makes it so extremely exciting. That you encounter new kinds of realities, humanmade, that have implications way beyond what their designers would expect and that urge us to rethink all the frameworks that we have been developing so far.
In hoeverre komt dit overeen met het idee van filosofie als concept creatie? (cf. Deleuze)
Challenge for myself:
The technological mediation of Vim. What effect does Vim have on 1) my writing and 2) my productivity and 3) my way of thinking? Does choosing a word processor have an ethical dimension? Is it related to good life? (Cf. a section on how Nietzsche's typewriter changed his writing in David Carrs "Is Google Making us Stupid?")