Technology and Formation: Stiegler on Event and Self-Care

@Stiegler @Heiden @technology @bildung @education @formation @self-care @pharmacology

The basic idea of this article is elegant in its simplicity:

  1. Because technology is supplemental (cf. Derrida & Stiegler), non-natural and yet necessary for human capacities, there is the human need to appropriate technology to develop their capacities.
  2. The supplement is thought in line with the delay of Derrida's différance, but now concretely indicates the time that the development of human capacities (e.g. linguistic and cultural) takes. In this sense technology is inherently linked to human education.

Abstract:

This essay critically examines how Bernard Stiegler addresses the question of present-day technological developments and how they affect our understanding of education and self-formation. The first section is devoted to an account of the basics of Stiegler’s understanding of the relationship between technology and humanity as well as of his characterization of the specific problems that characterize technology today. The main part of the essay analyzes how the questions of self-care, self-formation and education are addressed in relation to these specific problems. Stiegler addresses these problems in terms of the Derridean vocabulary of the pharmakon, and accounts for the present-day technological inventions in terms of pharmacological events. It is shown that Stiegler’s account of education is difficult to combine with his attention to the pharmakon as well as to the event. In the concluding section, it is suggested that the question of self-formation in relation to pharmacological events should be reinterpreted in terms of the concept of experience.

Technology and Birth of Humankind

Stiegler's account in line with Plato's myth on the genesis of humankind in the Protagoras:

In Plato’s myth, humankind is understood as a supplementary or prosthetic being, as Stiegler notes (1998, 193).1 According to the story, the gods, having shaped all mortal beings, assign a task to the two titans Prometheus and Epimetheus, namely the task to hand out to each species the proper capacity (dunamis) it needs for its survival. Epimetheus adopts this task and hands out capacities to all species except one. Turning to humankind, he finds he has no capacities left, leaving the human utterly vulnerable: “the human race was naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed” (321c; Cooper, 1997, 757). In the urgency of the moment, Prometheus decides to steal the art of fire from Hephaistos and the other arts (technai) from Athena in order to compensate for this lack (52)

Main insights from Plato's myth:

  1. Non-proper and non-natural: The human capacity is not properly human because it belongs to the gods, and moreover this capacity is non-natural because it relies on the technics to supplement the human, serving as a prosthesis.
  2. Technical supplement must be thought in line with Derrida's work: "The birth of humankind is marked by the instauration of an original différance between the human’s incompleteness at birth and the technai that supplement this incompleteness: since the technai are not properly human, they compensate for the original human lack (défaut) without completing it." (53) Also see:

More precisely, in line with Derrida’s account, the supplement should be understood as both the condition of both possibility and impossibility: human existence is made possible by the technical supplement since this supplement grants the capacities for survival. Yet, the same supplement threatens this existence. First, because it is not properly or naturally human and thus changes what it is to be human – and the history of humankind is a history in which technology changes who humans are. Second, concretely, the very gifts making human existence possible may also destroy it. Prometheus’ gift of fire is exemplary in this sense, as Stiegler notes: fire is not only the condition of possibility of human civilization, but also what may destroy this civilization by setting it on fire (2013, 24). (53)

  1. Appropriation and deferral. Because technics are supplemental and non-natural to humans, humans need to appropriate technics.
    • This seems to be the first main link between technology and education: "the human capacities are not given by birth, but need to be taught to children" (54)
    • "The child does not speak when it is born, and the child has no natural entrance to the culture in which it is born; the child only enters language and culture with a delay, with a temporal deferral." (54)
    • This delay is the "time need for the human to acquire these capacities" (54)

Gert-Jan discusses an example that partly moves beyond Stiegler: the infancy of a child.

The child is the one that still lacks the capacity to speak (this would be Stiegler's perspective). But Gert-Jan points out that from another perspective this infancy is not a lack but rather an excessive capacity, i.e. the child's ability to learn any language that is not actualized yet in one particular historically constituted language. The lack of not being cultured yet is also the surplus of not being reducible to nature.

See paper for references to both @Jakobsen, @Lyotard and Agamben's and Aristotle's concept of @potentiality .

Main takeaway, there is not a single but a double deferral:

The human’s entrance into language is thus marked by a double deferral: on the one hand, the deferral between birth and education and, on the other hand, the deferral between the constituted language that is handed down from generation to generation, e.g. in the form of writing, and the appropriated language by which the individual can speak. (55)

Stiegler discusses only the first deferral. Gert-Jan wrote a paper on the omission of the first deferral elsewhere, see: “Technology and Childhood” in the International Yearbook for Hermeneutics (2016).

Tradition and Technology

@tradition

Summarizing a quote from Stiegler:

the past mentioned here is not Dasein’s past lived experience and is therefore not simply Dasein’s own past; yet, “without this past, Dasein is nothing,” because the past – e.g., the past of the language and the culture in which Dasein finds itself – offers Dasein the orientation that it does not have. Therefore everything depends on the question of whether Dasein can appropriate this past so that Dasein inherits it as its proper inheritance. It is within the Heideggerian, hermeneutic framework that Stiegler raises his questions concerning the exact status of the past: how is the past given to Dasein and in which senses can it (and can it not) be appropriated? (56)

  • Beyond Husserl's lived experience: past here is not a past lived experience
  • But in line with Heidegger's "hermeneutic relation to the past which needs to be given a future" (56)

The past can only be appropriated if it is written down: writing is a form of mnemonic technics. For this idea Stiegler heavily relies on Derrida's remarks on Husserl's Origin of Geometry. Cf. "a history of a science depends on the externalization of this science in writing and cannot be founded on the lived experience of the scientist alone. It is writing that allows a science to be extended beyond the limits of the consciousness of its inventor as well as the living language community in which it originated and thus to be handed over to other generations and other communities." (57)

Consequently, Derrida's perspective is that the continuity of a tradition requires writing, marks writing as the condition of possibility for the Heideggerian idea of appropriating the past (cf. 57, paraphrased).

Stiegler extends on this by calling writing a "tertiary memory".

See 2465ff of Stiegler, B. (1998). Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus. Translated by Richard Beardsworth and George Collins. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.

See 226 of Stiegler, B. (2009). Technics and Time, 2: Disorientation. Translated by Stephen Barker. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.

In other words, the appropriation of tradition assumes even before the horizon of meaning that allows its interpretation, the technology of writing. Cf. @grammatisation .

Tradition is not only the collection of written sediments handed down to us but also sedimented texts but also a horizon of meaning that offers us the means to interpret and appropriate these texts. Yet, by its dependence on these sediments, tradition is constituted by a structure that precedes the level of meaning and that cannot be reduced to or identified with it: writing is a supplement to the lived experience in Husserl’s sense as well as to the appropriation of the past in Heidegger’s sense. Whereas meaning belongs to the phenomenological level of lived experience as well as to the hermeneutic level of appropriation and understanding, writing as the indispensable supplement of these two levels cannot be accounted for in terms of meaning alone. Rather, writing is what remains if we would suspend the horizon of meaning within which we receive the past and in which we are educated. (57)

N.B. the appropriation of tradition is not something optional, so to say. Through it - i.e. de education and formation that it implies - the world becomes "meaningful and an inhabitable world" (57).

A complete appropriation of the past is impossible. Hermeneutic philosophy agrees. Cf. how Nancy and I think also Ricoeur have shown how hermeneutics moves within the horizon of meaning i.e. meaning is always presupposed. In that context, consider the following citation: Derrida and Stiegler argue that not meaning but writing is presupposed.

Beautiful summary: @exappropriation @expropriation

The point of view of Derrida and Stiegler, however, is that it is not meaning but rather writing that is presupposed, i.e., the horizon of meaning is not all-embracing, but is itself confronted with a past that has the structure of writing, of what is not reducible to meaning, thanks to which it can be appropriated within different horizons of meaning. Consequently, every appropriation is at the same time an “exappropriation” (Stiegler, 1998, 159) since every appropriation leaves a remainder, something that resists interpretation. Thus, the past is never fully one’s own. Yet, in turn, it is this very remainder, writing, that allows for the handing down of the same inheritance to other generations; it is the condition of possibility for the process of interpretation to continue beyond any given horizon of meaning.

@absolute_past (From this perspective I think I also understand Derrida's writing on "absolute past" again. It is a mnemonic structure presupposed in the lived meaningful experience that can at best experience the past as a "past present" )

Gert-Jan now (p. 58) starts introducing why the notion of the event is relevant.

Because writing "is not only traceable in the limits of every interpretation, but it is also the margin or the play that allows for something new to announce itself within this horizon of meaning, i.e., the margin that allows for an innovation of this horizon of meaning." (58)

@sedimentation

@Ricoeur offers an account of tradition as a play between sedimentation and innovation. See page 68 of Ricoeur, P. (1984). Time and Narrative: Volume 1. Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cf. @Romano his hermeneutics of the event (1999): Its basic insight is "that such an innovation, as it is rooted in what is not (or not yet) of the order of meaning, implies a temporary suspension of this horizon of meaning since this innovation appears in the first place, as writing or technics, as what cannot be appropriated in the present horizon of meaning." (58)

Such an event asks for a renewal of the horizon of meaning! It's a similar model to how a paradigm shift is required in science in order to appropriate a new phenomena; I guess that does not necessarily mean that before there was no explanation at all, but they were ad-hoc and did not fit within the overall horizon of meaning.

As non-appropriable, the innovation asks for a renewal of this horizon of meaning so that appropriation become possible. (58)

I do not quote get the specific formulation of Gert-Jan here, but I think the point is that an event may require a re-appropriation of (written) tradition, there is a strange temporal deferral in play by which the past is renewed through an (futural?) event?

TODO, review:

the appropriation of the past is marked by a temporal deferral from which a fundament expropriation may take place (Stiegler, 2009, 184) which has a fundament disorienting effect. According to Stiegler, this temporal deferral, its accompanying expropriation and disorientation are intensified in the present-day forms of technology that constitute proper innovations. This brings us to the second set of problems concerning the relation of technology and education. (59)

Event, Education and Technology

Technological innovation also requires the reconstituting of a meaningful horizon, but this is disrupted by the immense acceleration of technological innovation. This is a problem because the past orients us. The threat is thus an interruption of education and self-formation.

the multiplication of temporal deferrals by which it is accompanied, interrupts the very process of appropriation: our society is no longer capable of reconstituting the horizon of meaning in which the past can be interpreted (59)

Stiegler calls this "short-circuiting".

Kant stresses the courage to think for yourself as the process of becoming mature. Stiegler discusses Foucault reading of Kant and points out that it is the literature public that Kant addresses. The technology of writing is in the middle here.

It is this critical capacity to think as a form of maturity that intrigues Stiegler since the transitional capacity of education – the formation or Bildung that leads humans from immaturity to maturity – is thought by Kant in terms of the technology of writing: Kant addresses the literate public, the audience that can read and write (Stiegler, 2010, 24-28)

See Stiegler, B. (2010). Taking Care of Youth and the Generations. Translated by Stephen Barker. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.

Of course writing itself is also a pharmakon, as well in its relation to maturity. When one simply repeats what was said, taking the written as authority, this is a form of repetition without understanding.

See Footnote 10 on page 60:

As Stiegler (2010, 23-24) points out we already see the pharmacology of writing at work in Kant’s What is Enlightenment?: Kant addresses the literate community, i.e., those who can read and who are formed by writing. In this sense, writing is the very condition of possibility of reaching maturity. Yet, the same writing can also be a threat to maturity and understanding; it “can just as likely suspend the reader in immaturity” and “‘replace understanding’” (24), e.g., when what is written is treated as mere authority rather than as a training or a practice to reach a mature level of understanding.

This is Stiegler's own answer:

Transposed to our times, education means for Stiegler the process of becoming mature in the face of the expropriating and disorienting effects of the pharmacological event. Stressing the pharmacological dimension of technics, he notes that the only way to appropriate the disorienting technical innovations is by inventing other techniques of self-formation that render the subject mature in the face of these new technologies. (60)

Because technics is currently threatening our education, we should develop techniques of self-formation.

Gert-Jan's critique:

  1. Stiegler uses two oppositions: maturity versus immaturity, and disorienting vs reorienting techniques.
  2. "My discussion of these two oppositions is meant to show the intrinsic difficulty or even impossibility of connecting the Derridean idea of pharmakon with the Enlightenment idea of Bildung." (60)

G-J starts with a discussion of the second opposition and returns to the first opposition at the beginning of page 63.

Disorienting vs reorienting techniques

Stiegler seems to associate the two meanings of the pharmakon (poison and medicine) with disorienting (poison) and reorienting (medicine) techniques.

the pharmacological event is first and foremost poisonous since it makes the appropriation of the past and orientation in the new situation by means of the established modes of interpretation and the given horizon of meaning impossible. In a response to this poisonous side the question of education has to be raised again, according to Stiegler, and more specifically the question of the invention of techniques that allow us appropriate and reorient ourselves in the new situation. (61)

Gert-Jan's argument is that when Stiegler embraces the pharmakon, then his seemingly one-sided rejection of massive technological disruptions does not take the ambiguity that the pharmakon implies into account enough.

His own account of the technology of the programming industries as making humans only stupid and immature indicates the very rejection of the ambiguity of the pharmakon with respect to this technology.

Derrida's interest is not only the distinction between speech and writing but also "between good and bad writing, between fertile and sterile writing" (61). See Cooper 1981, 149 for Phaedrus.

In other words, the analogy that G-J makes here is that whereas the pharmakon destabilizes the distinction between good and bad writing, it seems that Stiegler maintains a quite distinction between good and bad technology. As evidence for this claim G-J for example mentions a Chanel Y advertisement as being "the very embodiment of evil" (61) in the eyes of Stiegler.

A second point of G-J's criticism is that even though Stiegler calls for a reform of education, his ideals and reference point of Bildung seem to be "the Enlightenment tradition as well as to the Platonic understanding of education" (62)

Stiegler's idea of education accordingly seems to make assumption that are typical for the Enlightenment:

In terms of the idea of formation or Bildung as developed in the Enlightenment, the fundamental requirement of coming to maturity is that teachers introduce students in the horizon of meaning that constitutes the culture in which they live: e.g., the students are introduced to the canonical texts of this culture, into the way in which they are read, in the practices that are needed for sound scholarship, and so on. Thus formation, in its common understanding, presupposes the idea of relatively stable tradition, culture, or horizon of meaning within which the young students are introduced to such an extent that they can develop their own critical attitude to it; and it presupposes the distinction between the mature teacher and the immature student. (62)

But the whole point of the current situation is that such a stable culture cannot be presupposed anymore through the pharmacological event of disruption.

the question of education and formation departs from a specific “short-circuiting,” that is to say, the question of education can no longer be understood as the introduction of children or immature humans in a relatively stable culture by mature humans. (62)

The following line is quite amazing as it inconspicuously is very radical:

Strictly speaking, the event makes everyone immature; the event turns everyone into a child in relation to the new technologies (63)

This fundamentally overthrows Stiegler's first opposition between maturity and immaturity. When everyone is immature, there are no mature teachers left:

The short-circuiting of the pharmacological event thus deprives our culture of a population of mature teachers. Consequently, the demands that the pharmacological event imposes on the techniques of self-formation are clear: it is required to find a new orientation that cannot use the model of a mere transition from childhood to maturity since there is no maturity present that could guide it. (63)

Interesting footnote on page 63: "One might even wonder whether, by identifying this becoming immature with the activities of the programming industries and by continuously invoking moral judgments (of especially the French Channel Y to which he continuously refers), Stiegler does not present an ontological problem too strongly in moral or ethical categories: after all, the becoming immature is the immediate consequence of the pharmacological event as he thinks it."

G-J's alternative model for education

G-J instead proposes the current situation as an experiment in self-formation that asks how "to become experienced in a situation in which there are neither teachers nor maturities" (64)

The event, "it goes hand in hand with a lack of experience, and if there is a task for the technologies of the self, it is to become experienced in what the event brought about." (64)

In other words, when Stiegler seems to presuppose a sense of maturity, he "seems to forget that the technological disorientation places our society for the task to experiment and find forms of responsibility, adulthood and maturity" (64)

It is not entirely clear to me how "fair" this view on Stiegler is, but the point is nevertheless interesting.

@digital

The latter point is also what I should use for my research proposal. If we are currently truly in an informational revolution, then this implies a major technological disorientation - an event if you will, perhaps the advent of computing - that challenges our common understanding of human reality (cf. the horizon of meaning). If there is to be a digital hermeneutics that establishes an understanding of the digital, then first of all we should recognize, alongside Stiegler, that we should become mature users of digital technology, but secondly should realize that we have no clue what "mature" means. The revolutionary aspect of the information revolution is not only that it fundamentally changes our view on the world, ourselves etc. but also that the world is overtaken by digital technologies at such a speed that we are left behind disoriented. (This was Stiegler's original remark, and that he deviates from by speaking of "good" and "bad" technologies)

@Romano We are always relating to the event as to something that already happened, being recognized from the human failure to experience it. See Stiegler 1998, 165 and Romano 1999, 63-69.

In other words, it departs from an "original disorientation" (65) that Stiegler again seems to tone down with his presuppositions on good and bad tech, maturity and immaturity, Enlightenment presuppositions ...

Right before the end G-J seems to make a small allusion to Heidegger (and he confided to me personally that he thinks Heidegger is right):

Yet, experience and orientation are not presupposed; they rater depart from the gift and the invention of technology. (65, I fixed a type in this quote, cf. "experienceand")

Conclusion

From the outset of this human relation to technics, as Stiegler insists, these capacities cannot be had without their intrinsic danger: they may ultimately incapacitate the human being: technics is a pharmakon for humankind. Yet, the question of present-day technology, its accelerated speed and its radical disorientation seems to bring into play the incapacitating effect intrinsic to the pharmakon stronger than ever. The lack of adulthood, responsibility, maturity, critical thinking, and so on, are due to the pharmacological event that short-circuits the ways we have at our disposal to live with technology. Yet, as I have asked above, is the reference to the classical models of education, which underlie Stiegler’s usage of notions such as adulthood, responsibility and maturity, not highly problematic in relation to his account of technics as pharmakon? These classical models presuppose what is not given according to the interpretation of technics in terms of supplement and pharmakon: namely a pre-given maturity of humankind. (65)

G-J anticipates that Stiegler might concede this, but then says:

but he seems to forget that, though thinking tradition in terms of technics and tertiary retentions, the pharmacological event short-circuits tradition as the realm from which we derive the norms of adulthood, maturity and critical thought. (65)

G-J instead insisted on maintaining the motive of disorientation, but then remarked how the task at hand rather is to become experienced. For his notion of experience, he goes back to hermeneutics of Romano who thinks experience as the exposure to something new (an event).

G-J has argued that Stiegler's self-formation with the ideal of maturity is not pharmacological enough. The idea of experience as the encounter with an event, and then the task of becoming experienced in this time of technological disorientation, stays closer to the insight of Derrida's pharmakon.

Experience understood as the human encounter with an event, as the traversal of its tests, ordeals and dangers, offers a more accurate account of how the event itself is at stake in the self-formation that takes place in experience. Rather than distinguishing the pharmacological event of technology from the techniques of self-formation that remedy the harms done by the event, one should opt for a conception of these techniques that remains much closer to their pharmacological nature. (66)

Why? Because becoming confronted with something radically new is also a dangerous task. This notion of experience is thus itself pharmacological:

whereas it is the only possibility to become experienced, i.e., to become mature in relation to what is experienced and thus to gain capacities to deal with it, it is also the risk of being fully incapacitated: one may fail the test and the dangers may prove to be too much. (66)

What's really nice is a closing remark on @stoicism , namely that self-formation techniques where foremost self tests:

One should not forget, in this context, that the techniques of self-formation developed in Stoicism and to which both Foucault and Stiegler return in their inquiry of the care of the self, were in the first place techniques by which the self was putting itself to the test. In its intrinsic relation to technology, humans are put to the test by the pharmacological event and, with no pre- or “longestablished” forms of adulthood at their disposal that they might imitate, they are first confronted with the test and the task to become experienced in the perilous, new situation. (66)

Addendum

The article surprisingly has some sloppy writing mistakes:

  • At the beginning of the paper, this sentence does not run: "He connects this theme to his more encompassing concerns the importance and impact of technology on humankind and society in general and on the contemporary world in particular." (51-2)
  • On page 61 the footnote exactly repeats text from the main text, with the exception of the last sentence.
  • "experienceand" on page 64.