The Neutrality Thesis of Technological Artefacts

@dual-use

Arguments in favor and against.

Arguments often rely on the "dual-use" of technological artefacts.

In favor

Joseph C. Pitt, “Guns don’t kill, people kill”: values in and/or around technologies, in P. Kroes & P.P. Verbeek, eds., The moral status of technical artefacts, Springer 2014, pp. 89-101

Values are something that only humans can have. There is no meaningful way to say that artefacts "have" values.

What are values? A pragmatist definition:

To attempt to move the discussion further, I propose a different pragmatist account: a value is an endorsement of a preferred state of affairs by an individual or group of individuals that motivates our actions. To some this may sound like a definition of “goal”. However, values differ from goals in that goals are objectives to be obtained. Once obtained, a goal is no longer a goal; it becomes something achieved. Values, on the other hand, as a motivation to achieve a preferred states of affairs, serve as action initiators, directing what we do in one direction rather than another. The preferred state of affairs serves as a regulative ideal. [...]

The pragmatist idea is basically that to have a value, you must endorse it, that is, take actions to support the value.

Pitt argues against a quite straightforward account of non-neutrality that claims the values (and intentions) of the designer are embedded in the artefact. This is a quite crude view of non-neutrality (held by Langdon Winner, apparently). (The postphenomenological account of multi-stabilities would for example not be so susceptible to this criticism).

Pitt's point is: where do we locate the values when they are supposedly embedded in an artefact? It's just a metaphorical way of speaking. (The postphenomenological answer would be, I think, that they occur in technological mediation i.e. through multi-stable interactions in various contexts; the value is certainly not one-sidedly determined by the designer, which would be a "designer fallacy").

Another argument: the design process often has so many participants, that it's a mystery when and where exactly a value becomes embedded in the product. If instead, all values become embedded, then:

"Now, if we were to concede that it is possible for values to be embedded in artifacts, there will be lots of them, so many in fact that it is unlikely they can be differentiated. In short, even conceding that artifacts embody values gives us little to work with"

Main argument: there's so many values involved in the making of an artefact that it's effectively the same as saying the artefact is value-neutral.

Again, the argument really seems to rely on the inability to pinpoint which of the values would be Moses (Robert Moses and the Long Island Expressway is the running example). Exemplified here:

"Robert Moses may have desired to keep inner city people from the beaches on Long Island, but the values embedded in the LIE, if values are embedded in things come from many people and who can tell which ones are Moses’?"

But besides suffering from the designer fallacy, that's not the interesting point, I would say. The interesting point is that the bridge being there has real and morally relevant consequences for real people, and has a real impact on how different racial populations may move and act in a city.

Overview:

  1. Value-neutrality
  2. Even if we concede there are embedded values, there are too many to be differntiated
  3. We don't know because we don't know what values look like

I like the conclusion with respect to the slogan though:

But the slogan seems to suggest that we are confronted with an either/or situation. Either people kill or guns kill. But putting the situation to us in that way only forces a false choice. Perhaps a better way to put it is “Guns don’t kill, people kill using guns, knives, their hands, garrotes, automobiles, fighter planes, poison, voodoo dolls, etc.” The culprit is people.

Against

From: Pieter Vermaas, Peter Kroes, Ibo van de Poel, Maarten Franssen & Wybo Houkes, A philosophy of technology: from technical artefacts to sociotechnical systems, Morgan & Claypool 2011, ch. 1, ‘Technical artefacts’, fragment pp. 16-18

  1. Designers anticipate both the form and the potential use of something. The artefact is designed such that it fits in a particular use plan. These use plans are not morally neutral. E.g. are gas chambers really a neutral technique just used badly? Of course, such a use plan does not determine use. But artefacts are not suitable for just any "dual" use.

  2. Design and use-phases cannot always be fully disconnected. In sociotechnical systems design anticipates a particular social environment and all uses are connected. But who designs the overal system, completely independent from its "use" that involves complex interactions and interelations?

  3. New artefacts lead to new possibilities for acting. New ways of acting may lead to new ethical questions. This of course also puts new responsibilities on users, but the point is that the emergence of the new artefact is itself morally relevant. E.g. the sheer possibility of prenatal testing forces parents to think about this, even if the answer is "no".

Examples:

For instance, the invention of the aeroplane made it possible to speedily transport goods to distant destinations and that, in turn, gave rise to new moral obligations when it came to the matter of dealing with disasters and famine in distant regions. From time to time, new options for acting that are opened up by technology can be very controversial, precisely because of the inherent moral considerations – like in the case of the cloning of animals and people – and can therefore constitute grounds for wishing to oppose certain technologies.

  1. Technical artefacts do not only fulfill functions (defined by their "use") but have side-effects. Do these side-effects always depend on use, like proponents of the neutrality thesis would have to claim? Does the noise hindrance of a plane depend on its use? It's more reasonable to argue it's a side-effect of its design. This is a trivial example, but side-effects can include "safety, health, sustainability and privacy". If these are side-effects of design, they should also "have be accounted for in the design phase". The argument against neutrality here is that these moral values are already "built in" artefacts.

Conclusion:

The function and the use plan link technical artefacts inextricably to human goals, and since such goals have moral significance, the same has to be said of the technical artefacts to which they are related.