Geschlecht I: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference | Derrida, see Psyche 7-27 .

Authors:

From a review by N. Gabriel Martin on David Farrell Krell's book on the Geschlecht essays.

In a note on the title "Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference", Derrida describes the project launched by it as 'situating' the word Geschlecht, a word without French or English counterparts, in "Heidegger's path of thought"[5]. This word summons a host of ideas: humanity, nations, race, species, genre, family, generations, and sex. By insisting on the word that for us is not a word, Derrida refuses to reduce it to a translation or to an overarching idea -- there is no single thing or category which can exhaust the polysemy of Geschlecht, or the themes of this book. Yet is it too much to say that what is interesting to Derrida and Krell in 'Geschlecht' is differences to which Heidegger refuses to give ontological significance; differences which have nothing to do with our finding ourselves, yet which Krell worries at least play their parts in Dasein's Befindlichkeit, which is to say, in who each of us is (see p. 20)?

In that text, Krell explains, Derrida takes issue with the sexlessness of Dasein, the refusal to invest ontological meaning in either sexual relation or sexual difference. Dasein is, of course, always either male or female, but this difference is as neutral as Dasein is -- the difficulty is not in the difference, but in the discord contaminating the difference.

A relevant section discusses a comment on Heidegger's Ears:

9: "But then, if the wager were lost, wouldn't the trace of that silence warrant the detour? The silence does not silence just anything and the trace does not come from just anywhere. But why the wager? Because, as we will see, before predicting anything whatever about "sexuality," one must invoke chance, the aleatory, destiny."

23 "This way allows one to bring out the a priori's , and, as a note on the same page (crediting Husserl) tells us, we know that " ápriorism' is the method of every scientific philosophy which understands itself" (SZ50;75)"

23 Vgl. Agamben: "One may very well wonder what the being of a life is that is but life, which is neither this nor that, neither Vorhandensein nor Dasein. Heidegger never elaborates this ontology of life, but one can imagine all the difficulties it would have run into, since the "neither . . nor" that conditions it excludes or overflows the most structuring concepts (categorial or existential) of the entire existential analytic."

@destiny

24: 'Why do negative determinations impose themselves so often in this ontological characteristic? It is not at all "accidental." it is because one must remove the originality of the phenomena from what has dissembled, disfigured, displaced, or covered them over, from the Verstellungen and Verdeckungen, from all the pre-interpretations whose negative effects must in their turn be annulled by the negative statements, the genuine "sense" of which is in fact "positive." This is a schema we encountered earlier. The negativity of the "characterization" is thus not any more fortuitous than the necessity of the alterations or dissimulations that it attempts in some sense methodically to correct. Verstellungen and Verdeckungen are necessary movements in the very history of Being and its interpretation. They cannot be avoided, like contingent mistakes, any more than one can reduce inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) to a mistake or a sin into which one should not have fallen'