Derrida's Destinerrance | J. Hillis Miller
@destinerrance
Derrida_Jacques.md Miller_J_Hillis.md
I call destinerrance spatio-temporal because, like most of Derrida's key terms, it is a spatial figure for time. It names a fatal possibility of erring by not reaching a predefined temporal goal in terms of wandering away from a predefined spatial goal. (893)
All connected associations in the oeuvre of Derrida:
Destinerrance is connected to différance, that is, to a temporality of differing and deferring, without ascertainable origin or goal; to trace, iterability, signature, event, context, play (jeu: in the sense that one says, "There is play in this machine"); to Derrida's anomalous concept of speech acts; to the future or the "to come" (l'à venir); to the democracy to come in that avenir to come; to decision, obligation, responsibility, and, in another of Derrida's neologisms, irresponsabilisation (Derrida, Donner la mort 89); to interruption, dissemination, the wholly other; to exappropriation, adestination, justice, law, right, the gift, the secret, hospitality, testimony, sendings or dispatches (envois); to the messianic without messianism, as developed in Spectres de Marx and elsewhere; to the specter, singularity, the apocalyptic, the apotropaic or, in John Levey's coinage, the apotropocalyptic (Leavy); finally, always and everywhere, to "l'impossible possibilité de [...] mort" (Derrida, Spectres de Marx 187). Each motif is connected in one way or another to destinerrance, in fulfillment of Derrida's claim, in A Taste for the Secret, that his works are not a heterogeneous collection of occasional essays, but that portentous thing, an oeuvre, an organic corpus (Derrida, A Taste for the Secret 14-15).
Appears in many works, I do not list them here.
One that's interesting: also appears in The Postcard in Le Facteur de la vérité and also in Envois. Find some references.
Good reference:
Leavey, John. "Destinerrance: The Apotropocalyptics of Translation." Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida. Ed. John Sallis. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987. 33-43
Also has psychoanalytic and political contexts. "These uses, the reader will note, include psychoanalytical and political contexts, as well as the question of letters in the epistolary sense and also the question of the subject or ego." (894)
Caputo did something similar w.r.t. the apocalyptic. See Caputo-Heidegger_and_Derrida_Cold_Hermeneutics.md
In my work: an explicit ontological context in reference to Heidegger.
Iterability w.r.t. the postcard:
The consequences of destinerred iterability for everyday life are considerable, to say the least. I write a postcard and send it to my beloved. The postcard means to tell her how much I love her. On it I write, 'Je t'aime" and other endearments. The postcard sends her kisses indicated by a row of Xs at the bottom of the message area. A postcard, however, is open to all under whose eyes it happens to fall. Anyone who intercepts it and reads it can take it as addressed to him or to her. Anyone can interrupt its passage to its intended destination. Anyone can short-circuit that passage. Anyone can make my postcard have a meaning I in no way intended. My intimate postcard can function perfectly well in all kinds of situations. My intention and the address I put on the postcard fail to limit its functioning. One distressing result of this is that I cease to be as single pre-existing "I." I double, triple, quadruple myself in the act of writing that postcard. I become legion. "Tu as raison," says Derrida in La Carte postale, "nous sommes sans doute plusieurs" (10). Iterability also means that the recipient, however fortuitously he or she may come upon that postcard, is transformed into someone else, put beside himself or herself, dislocated, by reading it. I become the person to whom those words seem to be addressed, their fitting recipient. (900)
Amazing quote of Kafka, see page 901:
The easy possibility of letter-writing must-seen theoretically-have brought into the world a terrible dislocation [Zerrüttung] of souls. It is, in fact, an intercourse with ghosts, and not only with the ghost of the recipient but also with one's own ghost which develops between the lines of the letter one is writing and even more so in a series of letters where one letter corroborates the other and can refer to it as a witness. How on earth did anyone get the idea that people can communicate with one another letter! Of a distant person one can think, and of a person who is near can catch hold-all else goes beyond human strength. Writing letters, however, means to denude oneself before the ghosts, something for which they greedily wait. Written kisses don't reach their destination, rather they drunk on the way by the ghosts. It is on this ample nourishment that multiply so enormously [...]. The ghosts won't starve, but we will perish. (Kafka, Letters to Milena 299; Briefe an Milena, 259-60)
It turns out that this letter is also in the Envois, two years before Miller found it. Have a look at page 40 of the French edition La carte postale. (Ik kan het niet vinden in de Engelse vertaling)
Explanation:
The letter itself deflects the letter and the written kisses it contains away from its intended message and its goal, its destination. The letter is deflected toward the ghosts of sender and recipient that the letter itself raises, by a powerful incantation or conjuration. For Kafka too, as for Derrida, and against Lacan, the letter never reaches its destination, or, if it does, it has lost its precious gift of kisses along the way. Message and kisses never reach their destination, according to Kafka's version of the law of destinerrance.
Support for my claim that "there is" sending only at the moment one receives, a reference to Télépathie, see page 903:
In a remarkable couple of pages in "Télépathie" Derrida imagines a letter that has no intended receiver and no fixed message. It just somehow gets written. Someone, male or female, comes upon it by accident and says, quite without any authority or textual evidence, "This letter is addressed to me. It is meant for me." This decision creates a sender, a receiver, and a content that did not exist before the letter followed its errant trajectory. It may bind the newly created sender and receiver together in a life-long liaison. As opposed to Kafka, who sets the real sender and receiver against the ghosts the letter generates, Derrida imagines a transaction by letter that involves nothing but the ghosts it invokes. (903)
Betreffende passage in Télépathie, 7-8. Zoek Engelse vertaling op! (Heb het genoteerd in "Derrida - Telepathy.md")
Kafka's fear. But Derrida goes further.
All Kafka does is to lament the way a letter generates fictive senders and receivers that interfere with the transmission of the message the letter is inteded to send from the real, extra-literary or extra-letteral Kafka to the real, extra-literary Milena. What Kafka fears is bad enough, but what Derrida holds is much more devastating. (905)
Derrida's more radical position:
He hypothesizes a letter that is not the external occasion of a communication between two pre-existing and identifiable subjects, let us say, "Kafka" and "Milena." No, he hypothesizes a letter that seems, after the fact, to have been thrown out (lancée), at the moment it was written, toward an unknown receiver. The sender, male or female, does not know ahead of time the recipient. The recipient's "who" is determined at the moment of reception.
Becoming the recipient is taking a chance and saying: this letter is intended to me.
That might seem to imply that the letter has found its intended recipient. No, the recipient did not exist before receiving the letter. The letter creates the recipient, unpredictably, incalculably, by chance or even by error. The letter reaches that recipient by destinerrance. (905)
These interruptions will repeat with a difference the original performative force of what he wrote. His writings were interruptive events brought about by his response to the demand made on him by the wholly other. Those events are echoed by the happenings now of exappropriative readings of his work by others, such as by me in this essay. I read Derrida's works as if they were addressed to me. They have chosen me, by a happy destinerrance, and I choose to be chosen.a (909)