Philosophy of the Gift: Jacques Derrida, Martin Heidegger | Charles Champetier, Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities 6:2, 15-22
@gift
Authors:
Derrida's paradox of the gift: "a true gift would presuppose the total absence of return (countergift), of trace and of custody (including custody as a memory of a given or received gift)". This is the double bind of the gift.
In this creation of debt, the gift is annulled at the moment of its giving:
Derrida: "The simple intention to give, insofar as it carries the intentional meaning of the gift, suffices to make a return payment to oneself. The simple consciousness of the gift right away sends itself back the gratifying image of goodness or generosity, of the giving being who, knowing itself to be such, recognizes itself in a circular, specular fashion, in a sort of auto-recognition, self-approval, and narcissistic gratitude" (GT 23)
Derrida therefore shows a "refusal to deal simultaneously with the gift and the debt" (15-16), and this placed him in opposition to antro- and ethnological approaches that consider the gift in terms of the circulation of commodities (where the notion of debt, and of increase and decrease in value, is relevant).
Criticism of Derrida: "the question "why give?" presupposes, in its very utterance, that something is strange with the gift in relation to what is supposed to be human nature (that is, the rational interest of the subject, the satisfaction of basic needs, etc.). From the start, the gift is [by Derrida] placed under relatively abnormal circumstances" (16).
"Surreptitiously, Derrida's thought assimilates every goal to a useful outcome, every will to the lure of gain. It inscribes itself in agreement with the liberal sophistry according to which the best proof that men are by nature self-interested lies in our actions having goals (admitted or not) satisfying some need or other." (16)
According to Derrida, the gift cannot even be given out of generosity, as this too would be part of some natural drive, a need or desire to give. (16).
Behind every gift it is suspected by Derrida that it is a hidden anticipation of a countergift.
Since Derrida postulates that the gift should not create a debt or obligation, he paradoxically himself creates the obligation to not feel obliged (17)
Poetics of the gift: "Independently of the possibility of restitution, it seeks to incite pleasure, admiration, sympathy, homage, knowledge or gratitude. To provoke, that is, to bring about the arrival of that which is where it is, in its "present" -- this is the poetics of the gift." (17)
17- Derrida is deaf to the practices of the archaic gift where the given object itself also has a spirit (hau). Spiritual bonds between things, mediation of beings, men, nature, gods. The agents of the gift are thought as connected through this invisible presence, that is not transcendent but "inside the immanence of the cycle of obligations that it triggers" (17).
Context: "the "savages" valorized the whole in the part, and the collective in the singular, that they happily confused essence and accident, matter and the sacred - this is what shocks the modern mind, even if it is armed with the best intentions. The gift's unintelligibility, the frantic will to make it accountable, to trace the non-said, reveals the anxiety of the observer more than the nature of the observed." (17-18)
"A contrario, the Derridean gift is conceived in total autonomy of its agents (one could speak here of autism), who cannot ordinarily be transcribed to positions inside the real." (17)
Champetier accusses Derrida of using Heideggerian philosophy to contest the realizability of the gift:
"the Being of the gift is not allowed to be thought in its actuality, that is, the fact of giving necessarily distances us from the gift - the essence of the gift is being altered and is veiled by its existence." (18)
That is, Derrida makes of the gift what Being is to beings (in a particular interpretation): essential but withdrawing.
Being as gift: "es gibt Sein"
Champetier argues that Derrida's interpretation of the "gift as forgetting" (18) is based on misinterpretation of Heidegger. However, he himself has a very specific interpretation of Heidegger.
A very typical "humanities" interpretation of Heidegger, unfortunately without any arguments or references:
"Heidegger's aim, therefore, is not the renewal of forgetting as a negative invitation to rethink Being beyond the history of metaphysics (and of philosophy itself), it is rather its overcoming in a retrieved harmony with the world through meditation, poetry, and art." (18).
Anxiety, in relation to the gift of Being (this text depends on What is Metaphysics?): "For Heidegger, anxiety, and the peril, resides squarely in the forgetting of this favour of Being and in the forgetting of the reciprocal offering with which the favour is answered; the latter can be envisaged as humanity's originary debt, with respect to which meditation, poetry, and art are as many counterparts." (19)
I think this is a misinterpretation by Champetier. The "it" is not, I would say, Being itself:
"Il y a translates "it gives" imprecisely. For the "it" that here "gives" is Being itself. The "gives" names the essence of Being that is giving, granting its truth." (p.19)
Champetier makes a remark about man as the recipient of Being and it's influence as such on the gift, but does not clearly specify it. I.e. I can use this quote to show that this topic is present in the literature, but that it is not worked out often:
"Perceptible "change" in the historical process is measured by the distancing of the gift (in retention); this is a distancing that, in part, is derived from man's own attitude as a recipient of Being." (19)
The present as present (temporality):
"From gift as destination, a certain investigation of time becomes possible, precisely that of time as presence, Anwesen (the gift is also said, in our language, as "present")." (19)
"Presence itself therefore resides in the forgetting of absence and, as a result, a fourth dimension imposes itself on Heidegger's reflection - that of nearness, which refers to the "virtual" space, where past, present, and future are combined inside presence" (19)
The conclusion depends in my opinion too much on his own interpretation of Heidegger. I think Heidegger, in a way, already states this conclusion himself in another form, when he considers the pure givenness of being after asking: how is it that things are, rather than not? Because it is the gift, it is given.
"As a result, the final consequence of the Heideggerian thought, which remains unformulated by its author, could have been the reversal of the initial discourse: no longer "Being gives itself," but rather "the gift is" - as the grounding of all thinking." (20).
Beyond the metaphysics of subjectivity
Quote of Heidegger: "to give, to receive and to sojourn mark the mortals dwelling upon the earth." (Qu'appele-t-on penser, Paris PUF 1955, 255. What is thinking?)
"To man the awesome privilege belongs to sovereignly build his abode; that is, to receive what is originarily given to him, this Òhouse friendÓ to whom hospitality is always due and in whose absence anxiety wells up." (p. 20)